# Detroit Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 5, 1979 · 440 U.S. 301

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427474

## Case

- **Full name:** Detroit Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 5, 1979
- **Citations:** 440 U.S. 301; 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728; 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8939; 99 S. Ct. 1123; 59 L. Ed. 2d 333; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 66
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Stevens
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, White
- **Cited by:** 279 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427474

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that NLRB abused its discretion in requiring employer to release to union certain employee aptitude tests used to screen job applicants, in part because the “remedy selected by the Board does not adequately *314 protect the security of the tests”
- stating that “unless a party’s neglect to press an exception before the Board is excused by the statutory ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exception or unless the Board determination at issue is patently in excess of its authority, we are bound by it”
- holding that NLRB erred in requiring employer to disclose performance test scores of employees as information for collective bargaining, regardless of employee consent, because of the sensitive nature of the test scores
- rejecting argument that a party need not object to ALJ recommendation where it has “no practical reason” to do so, explaining that, accepting this, as “extraordinary circumstance” would undermine the statutory exception and that party in fact had a reason to challenge the reco…

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This is a close case on both issues. With respect to the test battery and answer sheets, I agree with Mr. Justice White that we should respect the Board’s exercise of its broad remedial discretion. On the other hand, I agree with the Court that the Union should not be permitted to invade the individual employees’ interest in the confidentiality of their test scores without their consent. Accordingly, I join all but Part II-A of the Court’s opinion and also join Part I of Mr. Justice White’s dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427474. Public record. Not legal advice.