# Michigan v. Tyler > Supreme Court of the United States · May 31, 1978 · 436 U.S. 499 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427220 ## Case - **Full name:** MICHIGAN v. TYLER Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 31, 1978 - **Citations:** 436 U.S. 499; 98 S. Ct. 1942; 56 L. Ed. 2d 486; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 97 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by White - **Judges:** Rbhnqtjist, Stewart, Burger, Powell, White, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Brennan, Iv-A - **Cited by:** 1,153 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned — as noted by a later court. - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 4 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427220 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that, under the Fourth Amendment, “ ‘one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unl… - stating that, under the Fourth Amendment, "`one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unle… - reasoning that where fire personnel entered a building in response to a fire, departed when darkness hindered their work, and then re-entered shortly after daylight to continue their investigation, the warrantless re-entry was lawful as a continuation of the first entry - holding that, while administrative search warrants issued without probable cause can be used to investigate the cause of a fire, search warrants based on probable cause must be used where authorities are seeking evidence that will be used in a criminal investigation ## Opinion text Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join in all but Part IY-A of the opinion, from which I dissent. I agree with the Court that: “[A]n entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause of *515 the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches.” Ante, at 511. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the warrantless searches, at 8 and 9 a. m. were not, in fact, continuations of the earlier entry under exigent circumstances * and therefore ruled inadmissible all evidence derived from those searches. The Court offers no sound basis for overturning this conclusion of the state court that the subsequent re-entries were distinct from the original entry. Even if, under the Court’s “reasonable time” criterion, the firemen might have stayed in the building for an additional four hours — a proposition which is by no means clear — the fact remains that the firemen did not choose to remain and continue their search, but instead locked the door and departed from the premises entirely. The fact that the firemen were willing to leave demonstrates that the exigent circumstances justifying their original warrantless entry were no longer present. The situation is thus analogous to that in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 358-359 (1977): “The agents’ own action ... in their delay for two days following their first entry, and for more than one day following the observation of materials being moved from the office, before they made the entry during which they seized the records, is sufficient to support the District Court’s implicit finding that there were no exigent circumstances. . . .” To hold that some subsequent re-entries are “continuations” *516 of earlier ones will not aid firemen, but confuse them, for it will be difficult to predict in advance how a court might view a re-entry. In the end, valuable evidence may be- excluded for failure to seek a warrant that might have easily been obtained. Those investigating fires and their causes deserve a clear demarcation of the constitutional limits of their authority. Today’s opinion recognizes the need for speed and focuses attention on fighting an ongoing blaze. The firetruek need not stop at the courthouse in rushing to the flames. But once the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have left the premises, the emergency is over. Further intrusion on private property can and should be accompanied by a warrant indicating the authority under which the firemen presume to enter and search. There is another reason for holding that re-entry after the initial departure required a proper warrant. The state courts found that at the time of the first re-entry a criminal investigation was under way and that the purpose of the officers in re-entering was to gather evidence of crime. Unless we are to ignore these findings, a warrant was necessary. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), did not differ with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), that searches for criminal evidence are of special significance under the Fourth Amendment. The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that “[i]f there are exigent circumstances, such as reason to believe that the destruction of evidence is imminent or that a further entry of the premises is necessary to prevent the recurrence of the fire, no warrant is required and evidence discovered is admissible.” 399 Mich. 564, 578 , 250 N. W. 2d 467, 474 (1977). It found, however, that “[i]n the instant case there were no exigent circumstances justifying the searches made hours, days or weeks after the fire was extinguished.” Id., at 579 , 250 N. W. 2d, at 475 . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427220. Public record. Not legal advice.