# City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 29, 1978 · 435 U.S. 389

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427117

## Case

- **Full name:** CITY OF LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA, Et Al. v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 29, 1978
- **Citations:** 435 U.S. 389; 24 P.U.R.4th 395; 98 S. Ct. 1123; 55 L. Ed. 2d 364; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 19
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Marshall
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall, Rehnquist, Stewart, White
- **Cited by:** 632 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427117

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that the term “person” in the Sherman Act included all entities, whether public or private, that “engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states” and thus included both states and cities (internal quotation…
- noting that “[c]ases subsequent to Pennington have emphasized the possible constitutional infirmity in the antitrust laws that a contrary construction would entail in light of the serious threat to First Amendment freedoms that would have been presented”
- concluding that a municipality engages in state action when “the State authorized or directed [it] to act as it did”
- holding that the definition of “person” or “persons” liable under the antitrust laws clearly includes cities
- holding that States and municipalities are “persons” under federal antitrust law

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring.
I agree with The Chief Justice, post, at 426-426, that any implied “state action” exemption from the antitrust laws should be no broader than is necessary to serve the State’s legitimate purposes. I join the plurality opinion, however, because the test there established, relating to whether it is “state policy to displace competition,” ante, at 413, incorporates within it the core of The Chief Justice’s concern. As the plurality opinion makes clear, it is not enough that the State *418 “desire[s] to insulate anticompetitive practices.” Ante, at 416. For there to be an antitrust exemption, the State must “impose” the practices “as an act of government.” Ibid. State action involving more anticompetitive restraint than necessary to effectuate governmental purposes must be viewed as inconsistent with the plurality’s approach.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427117. Public record. Not legal advice.