# Stump v. Sparkman > Supreme Court of the United States · June 5, 1978 · 435 U.S. 349 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427115 ## Case - **Full name:** STUMP Et Al. v. SPARKMAN Et Vir - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 5, 1978 - **Citations:** 435 U.S. 349; 98 S. Ct. 1099; 55 L. Ed. 2d 331; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 74 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Powell - **Judges:** Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, White - **Cited by:** 5,609 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427115 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that because judge, in approving mother’s ex parte petition to have her mentally challenged daughter sterilized, acted in his capacity judge, and performed type of act normally performed only by judges, the lack of formality with which he proceeded did not render hi… - stating that “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting Brad… - holding that because “some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judg… - holding that a judge had engaged in judicial acts when he granted a petition for sterilization of a minor child where the case had no docket number; was not filed with the clerk’s office; the proceeding was ex parte and without notice to the minor child; there was no hearing; … - recognizing as a “well established” principle of law “of the highest importance” that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting. While I join the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, I wish to emphasize what I take to be the central feature of this case— Judge Stump’s preclusion of any possibility for the vindication of respondents’ rights elsewhere in the judicial system. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), which established the absolute judicial immunity at issue in this case, recognized that the immunity was designed to further the public interest in an independent judiciary, sometimes at the expense of legitimate individual grievances. Id., at 349 ; accord, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967). The Bradley Court accepted those costs to aggrieved individuals because the judicial system itself provided other means for protecting individual rights: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law *370 has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” 13 Wall., at 354 . Underlying the Bradley immunity, then, is the notion that private rights can be sacrificed in some degree to the achievement of the greater public good deriving from a completely independent judiciary, because there exist alternative forums and methods for vindicating those rights. 1 But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies that otherwise would be available, the underlying assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative. See Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 . 2 In this case, as Me. Justice Stewart points out, ante, at 369, Judge Stump’s unjudicial conduct insured that “[t]here was and could be no appeal.” The complete absence of normal judicial process foreclosed resort to any of the “numerous remedies” that “the law has provided for private parties.” Bradley, supra, at 354 . In sum, I agree with Mr. Justice Stewart that petitioner judge’s actions were not “judicial,” and that he is entitled to no judicial immunity from suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 . See Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 44 , 53-55 (1960); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209 , 233-235 (1963); Note, Federal Executive Immunity From Civil Liability in Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. Mateo, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 625 , 647 (1977). In both Bradley and Pierson any errors committed by the judges involved were open to correction on appeal. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427115. Public record. Not legal advice.