# Manson v. Brathwaite

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 16, 1977 · 432 U.S. 98

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426869

## Case

- **Full name:** Manson, Correction Commissioner v. Brathwaite
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 16, 1977
- **Citations:** 432 U.S. 98; 97 S. Ct. 2243; 53 L. Ed. 2d 140; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 116
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Marshall, Brennan
- **Cited by:** 4,694 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Declined to follow by Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458 (1995).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 8
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426869

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a determination regarding the reliability, i.e., correctness, of an identification procedure turns on whether the process was imper-missibly suggestive and therefore created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misiden-tification
- finding that the indicators of the witness’s ability to make an accurate identification, including correct identification of race, height, hair, and facial structure, were not outweighed by the corrupting effect of the challenged identification
- holding identification reliable where the identifying police officer was “not a casual or passing observer” but rather “knew that his claimed observations would be subject later to close scrutiny and examination at any trial”
- finding that the first factor favored a reliability finding where the witness had two to three minutes to view assailant and opened the door for him twice, looking him directly in the eyes and having a short conversation
- finding no due process violation because, among other reasons, the witness was more than a casual observer whose attentiveness to the defendant’s appearance suggested that the challenged identification was reliable

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
While I join the Court’s opinion, I would emphasize two points.
First, as I indicated in my opinion in United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F. 2d 397, 405-406 (CA7 1975), the arguments in favor of fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of convicting the innocent on the basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony carry substantial 'force. Nevertheless, *118 for the reasons stated in that opinion, as well as those stated by the Court today, I am persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed “more effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial fiat,” id., at 408 , and that the Federal Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by the States in the development of such rules.
Second, in evaluating the admissibility of particular identification testimony it is sometimes difficult to put other evidence of guilt entirely to one side. * Mb. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court carefully avoids this pitfall and correctly relies only on appropriate indicia of the reliability of the identification itself. Although I consider the factual question in this case extremely close, I am persuaded that the Court has resolved it properly.
In this case, for example, the fact that the defendant was a regular visitor to the apartment where the drug transaction occurred tends to confirm his guilt. In the Kirby case, where the conviction was for robbery, the fact that papers from the victim’s wallet were found in the possession of the defendant made it difficult to question the reliability of the identification. These facts should not, however, be considered to support the admissibility of eyewitness testimony when applying the criteria identified in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 . Properly analyzed, however, such facts would be relevant to a question whether error, if any, in admitting identification testimony was harmless.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426869. Public record. Not legal advice.