# Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois

> Supreme Court of the United States · October 3, 1977 · 431 U.S. 720

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426839

## Case

- **Full name:** ILLINOIS BRICK CO. Et Al. v. ILLINOIS Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** October 3, 1977
- **Citations:** 431 U.S. 720; 97 S. Ct. 2061; 52 L. Ed. 2d 707; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 105
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun
- **Judges:** White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 1,275 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426839

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[p]ermitting the use of pass-on theories . . . would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge from direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate con…
- stating that "[p]ermitting the use of pass-on theories ... would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge from direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consu…
- concluding that Congressional intent to empower private attorneys general “is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it”
- explaining that “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction” and a “presumption of adherence to our prior decisions construing legislative enactments would support our reaffirmance of the Hanover Shoe construction of [Section 4]”
- holding that an indirect purchaser of a product cannot sue a distant manufacturer for alleged antitrust violations under a “pass-on” theory — meaning a theory that the intermediary passed on the unlawful overcharges through the distribution channel to them

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
I regard Mr. Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion as persuasive and convincing, and I join it without hesitation.
I add these few sentences only to say that I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now have lost, are the victims of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968), had not preceded this case, and were it not “on the books,” I am positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers who could demonstrate injury would almost be compelled.
But Hanover Shoe is on the books, and the Court feels that it must be “consistent” in its application of pass-on. That, *766 for me, is a wooden approach, and it is entirely inadequate when considered in the light of the objectives of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 tells us all that is needed as to Congress’ present understanding of the Acts. Nevertheless, we must now await still another statute which, as the Court acknowledges, ante, at 734 n. 14, the Congress may adopt. One regrets that it takes so long and so much repetitious effort to achieve, and have this Court recognize, the obvious congressional aim.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426839. Public record. Not legal advice.