# United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans > Supreme Court of the United States · May 31, 1977 · 431 U.S. 553 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426816 ## Case - **Full name:** United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 31, 1977 - **Citations:** 431 U.S. 553; 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7577; 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1510; 97 S. Ct. 1885; 52 L. Ed. 2d 571; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 98 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Marshall - **Judges:** Stevens, Marshall, Brennan - **Cited by:** 1,319 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Declined to follow by Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 406 Mass. 515 (1990). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 7 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426816 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that untimely charges may still constitute relevant background evidence in proceeding in which current practice is at issue - holding that “[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis of a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current pra… - finding that a prior unlawful employment practice “may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue,” but “United was entitled to treat [Evans’ forced resignation] as lawful after [she] failed to file a charge of… - holding that past acts of discrimination outside of the limitations period "may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue,” but the emphasis must be placed on "whether any present violation exist[s],” and not … - holding that a challenge to a neutral seniority system “may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which has no present legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event might at one time have justified a valid claim agai… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. But for her sex, respondent Carolyn Evans presently would enjoy all of the seniority rights that she seeks through this litigation. Petitioner United Air Lines has denied her those rights pursuant to a policy that perpetuates past discrimination by awarding the choicest jobs to those possessing a *561 credential married women were unlawfully prevented from acquiring: continuous tenure with United. While the complaint respondent filed in the District Court was perhaps inartfully drawn, 1 it adequately draws into question this policy of United’s. For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion and in my separate opinion in Teamsters v. United States, ante, at 378,1 think it indisputable that, absent § 703 (h), the seniority system at issue here would constitute an “unlawful employment practice” under Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. V). And for the reasons developed at length in my separate opinion in Teamsters, ante, at 381-394,1 believe § 703 (h) does not immunize seniority systems that perpetuate post-Act discrimination. The only remaining question is whether Ms. Evans’ complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Her cause of action accrued, if at all, at the time her seniority was recomputed after she was rehired. Although she apparently failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after her seniority was determined, Title VII recognizes that certain violations, once commenced, are continuing in nature. In these instances, discriminatees can file charges at any time up to 180 days after the violation ceases. (They can, however, receive backpay only for the two years preceding the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. V).) In *562 the instant case, the violation — treating respondent as a new employee even though she was wrongfully forced to resign — is continuing to this day. Respondent’s charge therefore was not time barred, and the Court of Appeals judgment reinstating her complaint should be affirmed. 2 Although the District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(1), the basis for its ruling was that the complaint was time barred. Thus, the dismissal closely resembles a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the only issue before us is whether “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). It is, of course, true that to establish her entitlement to relief, respondent will have to prove that she was unlawfully forced to resign more than 180 days prior to filing her charge with the EEOC. But if that is sufficient to defeat her claim, then discriminatees will never be able to challenge “practices, procedures, or tests . . . [which] operate to 'freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices,” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 430 (1971), even though Griggs holds that such practices are impermissible, and the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 , indicates that Congress agrees, see Teamsters v. United States, ante, at 391-393 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The consequence of Ms. Evans’ failure to file charges after she was discharged is that she has lost her right to backpay, not her right to challenge present wrongs. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426816. Public record. Not legal advice.