# Brewer v. Williams > Supreme Court of the United States · May 16, 1977 · 430 U.S. 387 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426726 ## Case - **Full name:** Brewer, Warden v. Williams - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 16, 1977 - **Citations:** 430 U.S. 387; 97 S. Ct. 1232; 51 L. Ed. 2d 424; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 64 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens - **Judges:** Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, White - **Cited by:** 2,147 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned in part by Nollie Lee Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (1985). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 5 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426726 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that police discussion with defendant which mentioned the desirability of finding a murdered girl’s body so that it could be given a “Christian burial” violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel since the police acted with specific intent to exploit the … - holding that defendant’s incriminating statements, made in response to the “Christian burial speech” by a police officer during a car ride, without presence of counsel, were inadmissible at trial because the officer “deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information” f… - stating that “[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him” - holding that use of defendant’s admission that he killed his abductee was violative of sixth amendment right to counsel where admission was made after defendant was indicted for abducting the victim and before defendant’s attorney met with defendant ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his opinion for the Court which I join, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Marshall have *415 accurately explained the reasons why the law requires the result we reach today. Nevertheless, the strong language in the dissenting opinions prompts me to add this brief comment about the Court's function in a case such as this. Nothing that we write, no matter how well reasoned or forcefully expressed, can bring back the victim of this tragedy or undo the consequences of the official neglect which led to the respondent's escape from a state mental institution. The emotional aspects of the case make it difficult to decide dispassionately, but do not qualify our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the future as well as with concern for the result in the particular case before us. Underlying the surface issues in this case is the question whether a fugitive from justice can rely on his lawyer’s advice given in connection with a decision to surrender voluntarily. The defendant placed his trust in an experienced Iowa trial lawyer who in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement authorities to honor a commitment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a potentially dangerous person. Under any analysis, this was a critical stage of the proceeding in which the participation of an independent professional was of vital importance to the accused and to society. At this stage—as in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual—the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual’s effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer. * The importance of this point is emphasized by the State’s refusal to permit counsel to accompany his client on the trip from Davenport to Des Moines. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426726. Public record. Not legal advice.