# United States v. Janis

> Supreme Court of the United States · October 4, 1976 · 428 U.S. 433

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426585

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES Et Al. v. JANIS
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** October 4, 1976
- **Citations:** 428 U.S. 433; 96 S. Ct. 3021; 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 162
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Stewart
- **Cited by:** 1,216 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426585

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that “exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs im posed by t…
- holding that “exclusion from federal civil [tax] proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer” was not found “to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the ex…
- holding that a forfeiture proceeding was quasi-criminal rather than civil in nature since its object was "to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law”
- holding that the presumption does not apply when the IRS makes a naked assessment without foundation
- holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a defective warrant would not be excluded from a federal, civil tax proceeding

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs,
dissenting.
I adhere to my view that the exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent constitutional ingredient of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 355-367 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 550-562 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Repetition or elaboration of the reasons supporting that view in this case would serve no useful purpose. My view of the exclusionary rule would, of course, require an affirmance of the Court of Appeals. Today’s decisions in this case and in Stone v. Powell, post, p. 465, continue the Court’s “business of slow strangulation of the rule,” 422 U. S., at 561 . But even accepting the proposition that deterrence of police misconduct is the only purpose served by the exclusionary rule, as my Brother Stewart apparently does, his dissent persuasively demonstrates the error of today’s result. I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426585. Public record. Not legal advice.
