# Montanye v. Haymes

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 25, 1976 · 427 U.S. 236

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426512

## Case

- **Full name:** MONTANYE, CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, Et Al. v. HAYMES
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 25, 1976
- **Citations:** 427 U.S. 236; 96 S. Ct. 2543; 49 L. Ed. 2d 466; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 74
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, White
- **Cited by:** 963 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426512

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a mere transfer from one facility to another does not implicate the Due Process Clause, regardless of whether the transfer is the result of the inmate’s misbehavior or is punitive in nature if there is no State law to the contrary
- holding that “[p]risoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.”
- holding prisoner housing is a matter squarely within the “broad discretion” of prison officials, “free from judicial intervention” except in extreme circumstances
- noting that, absent unusual circumstances, prison officials, rather than judges, should decide where a particular prisoner should be housed

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Respondent's complaint, fairly read, alleges two quite different theories of recovery: First, that he was entitled to a hearing before he could be transferred from one facility to another because the transfer deprived him of an interest in liberty; second, that the transfer was a form of punishment for circulating a petition, for communicating with a court, and for rendering legal assistance to other inmates.
Since respondent has not alleged a material difference between the two facilities, I agree with the Court that the transfer did not cause him a grievous loss entitling him to a hearing. In my opinion this conclusion is unaffected by the motivation for the transfer, because I think it is the seriousness of its impact on the inmate’s residuum of protected liberty that determines whether a deprivation has occurred.
I am persuaded, however, that the allegations of his complaint are sufficient to require a trial of his claim that the transfer was made in retribution for his exercise of protected rights. On this claim, the reason for the defendants’ action is critical and the procedure followed is almost irrelevant. I do not understand the Court to disagree with this analysis, and assume that the Court of Appeals, consistently with this Court’s mandate, may direct the District Court to conduct a trial. *
*245 The reason for my dissent is that the same result would follow from a simple affirmance. Thus, although the Court has explained why it believes the opinion of the Court of Appeals should be “reversed,” it has not explained why that court's judgment was not correct. I would affirm that judgment.
Respondent alleged in his complaint that his transfer violated his First Amendment rights because it had the purpose of suppressing his attempt to petition the courts, and that any rule which forbade *245 him to do that was unconstitutional. It was also disputed whether respondent had actually broken any rule against giving legal advice to other prisoners. It was improper for the District Court either to dismiss the complaint or to grant summary judgment for the defendants without a trial of the facts. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 ; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426512. Public record. Not legal advice.