# United States v. Dinitz

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 8, 1976 · 424 U.S. 600

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426303

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. Dinitz
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 8, 1976
- **Citations:** 424 U.S. 600; 96 S. Ct. 1075; 47 L. Ed. 2d 267; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 18
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger
- **Judges:** Chief', Stewart, Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 1,247 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled by Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426303

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, "[e]ven accepting the appellate court's conclusion that the trial judge overreacted in expelling [defense counsel] from the court-room," where the appellate court "did not suggest, the respondent has not contended, and the record does not show that the judge's ac…
- reasoning that absent a defense motion, if mistrial is needed for "prosecutorial or judicial error," the "doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the …
- holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrials where bad-faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor threatens to harass a defendant by means of successive prosecutions or a declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict
- stating that, where a judicial or prosecutorial error warranting mistrial occurs, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error"
- explaining that an important double-jeopardy concern is that the accused not be put to a “‘Hobson’s choice’ between giving up his first jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial error”

## Opinion text

Mr. Chief' Justice Burger,
concurring.
I concur fully with Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court. I add an observation only to emphasize what is plainly implicit in the opinion, i. e., a trial judge’s plenary control of the conduct of counsel particularly in relation to addressing the jury.
An opening statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an occasion for argument. To make statements which will not or cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates to significant elements of the case, professional misconduct. Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to an opposing party to allow an attorney, with the standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of the court, to present to the jury statements not susceptible of proof but intended to influence the jury in reaching a verdict.
A trial judge is under a duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop such professional misconduct. Here the misconduct of the attorney, Wagner, was not only unprofessional per se but contemptuous in that he defied the court’s explicit order.
Far from “overreacting” to the misconduct of Wagner, *613 in my view, the trial judge exercised great restraint in not citing Wagner for contempt then and there. *
A bar association conscious of its public obligations would sua sponte call to account an attorney guilty of the misconduct shown here. See Report of American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 60-66 (Final Draft 1970) ; American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Administration of Criminal Justice — The Defense Function, § 7.4, p. 131 (1974 Compilation).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426303. Public record. Not legal advice.