# Mathews v. Eldridge > Supreme Court of the United States · February 24, 1976 · 424 U.S. 319 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426280 ## Case - **Full name:** Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Eldridge - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** February 24, 1976 - **Citations:** 424 U.S. 319; 41 Cal. Comp. Cases 920; 96 S. Ct. 893; 47 L. Ed. 2d 18; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 141 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Brennan - **Judges:** Powell, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens - **Cited by:** 17,171 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Criticized by City of Dayton v. Rutledge, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 14 (1983). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 16 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426280 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the “specific dictates of due process” must be determined by weighing (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2 - holding that court review of due process challenges require consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any of addi… - holding that no evidentiary hearing is required prior to the termination of social security benefits and stating that the factors to be considered when determining what process is due are (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an… - finding 6 that "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through th… - explaining that the “specific dictates of due process generally require consideration of three district factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208, 212 (1972), I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, prior to termination of benefits, Eldridge must be af *350 forded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seg. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). I would add that the Court’s consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument. It is speculative. Moreover, the very legislative determination to provide disability benfits, without any prerequisite determination of need in fact, presumes a need by the recipient which is not this Court’s function to denigrate. Indeed, in the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits were terminated there was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family’s furniture was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, 47-48. Finally, it is also no argument that a worker, who has been placed in the untenable position of having been denied disability benefits, may still seek other forms of public assistance. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426280. Public record. Not legal advice.