# Menna v. New York

> Supreme Court of the United States · December 1, 1975 · 423 U.S. 61

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426225

## Case

- **Full name:** Menna v. New York
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** December 1, 1975
- **Citations:** 423 U.S. 61; 96 S. Ct. 241; 46 L. Ed. 2d 195; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 96
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan
- **Judges:** Brennan, Chiee, Rehnquist
- **Cited by:** 916 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426225

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds
- holding that defendant, by pleading guilty, did not waive a double jeopardy claim because, were the claim well founded, the government could “not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt [might be] established”
- holding that a counseled plea of guilty does not constitute an implied waiver of a claim based upon the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution
- holding that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its 17 face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”
- holding that a plea of guilty did not waive a challenge to the constitutionality of the prosecution itself and the petitioner could directly appeal in order to challenge the charge on double jeopardy grounds

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Brennan
agrees that “[w]here the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty,” ante, at 62, but on his view that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from mounting successive prosecutions for offenses growing out of the same criminal transaction, he believes that the proper disposition of the case is not a remand but outright reversal. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Chiee Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426225. Public record. Not legal advice.