# Weinberger v. Salfi

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 1975 · 422 U.S. 749

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426189

## Case

- **Full name:** WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Et Al. v. SALFI Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 26, 1975
- **Citations:** 422 U.S. 749; 95 S. Ct. 2457; 45 L. Ed. 2d 522; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 145
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Douglas
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, Douglas, Brennan, Rates, Berwald, Gant
- **Cited by:** 2,536 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366 (1976).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 23
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426189

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[ejxhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have the opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the bene…
- stating that “[e]xhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have the opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the bene…
- finding court divested of jurisdiction only when statute explaining exhaustion of administrative remedies contained “sweeping and direct” statutory language that went beyond a requirement of administrative exhaustion; in Weinberger the statute at issue was “sweeping and direct…
- stating that § 405(g)’s 19 requirement that there be a “final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing” is “central to the 20 requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction – the statute empowers district courts to review a 21 particular type of decision by the Secretary…

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that because there is clearly jurisdiction the Court's extended discussion of the subject is unwarranted.
On the merits, I believe that the main problem with these legislatively created presumptions is that they frequently invade the right to a jury trial. See Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 473 (1943) (Black, J., concurring). The present law was designed to bar payment of certain Social Security benefits when the purpose of the marriage was to obtain such benefits. Whether this was the aim of a particular marriage is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury in an appropriate case. I therefore would vacate and remand the case to give Mrs. Salfi the right to show that her *786 marriage did not offend the statutory scheme, that it was not a sham.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426189. Public record. Not legal advice.