# United States v. Hale

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 23, 1975 · 422 U.S. 171

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426139

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. Hale
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 23, 1975
- **Citations:** 422 U.S. 171; 95 S. Ct. 2133; 45 L. Ed. 2d 99; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 78
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Douglas
- **Judges:** Marshall, Burger, Douglas, White, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 789 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426139

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[sjilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, ... failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in questi…
- concluding “the respondent’s silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and that any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact”
- noting that "[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force," and stating that a variety of factors, e.g., intimidation by situation, fear, or unwillingness to incriminate another may cause the defendant to remain silent
- holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the defendant “why he had not given the police his alibi when he was questioned shortly after his arrest”
- explaining that post- Miranda silence is so ambiguous as to be of little probative force, and any value it may have is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the judgment below should be affirmed, but “I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the special circumstances of this case. I can think of no special circumstances that would justify use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person who asserts it.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 425 (1957) (concurring opinion). My view of this case is therefore controlled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). I do not accept the idea that Miranda loses its force in the context of impeaching the testimony of a witness. See Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). In my opinion Miranda should be given full effect.
I also believe, as does my Brother White, that given the existence of Miranda due process is violated when the prosecution calls attention to the silence of the accused at the time of arrest.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426139. Public record. Not legal advice.