# United States v. Hale

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 23, 1975 · 422 U.S. 171

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426138

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. Hale
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 23, 1975
- **Citations:** 422 U.S. 171; 95 S. Ct. 2133; 45 L. Ed. 2d 99; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 78
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger
- **Judges:** Marshall, Burger, Douglas, White, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 789 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426138

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[sjilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, ... failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in questi…
- concluding “the respondent’s silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and that any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact”
- noting that "[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force," and stating that a variety of factors, e.g., intimidation by situation, fear, or unwillingness to incriminate another may cause the defendant to remain silent
- holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the defendant “why he had not given the police his alibi when he was questioned shortly after his arrest”
- explaining that post- Miranda silence is so ambiguous as to be of little probative force, and any value it may have is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect

## Opinion text

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the judgment.
I cannot escape the conclusion that this case is something of a tempest in a saucer, and the Court rightly avoids placing the result on constitutional grounds. A dubious aspect of the Court’s opinion is to renew the dictum of Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391 (1957), see ante, at 178, and n. 6. There the Court casually elevated a fallacy into a general proposition in terms that the innocent “are more likely to [remain silent] in secret proceedings . . . than in open court proceedings . . . .” To begin with, there is not a scintilla of empirical data to support the first generalization nor is it something generally accepted as validated by ordinary human experience. It is no more accurate than to say, for example, that the innocent rather than the guilty, are the first to protest their innocence. There is simply no basis for declaring a generalized probability one way or the other. Second, the Grünewald suggestion that people are more likely to speak out “in open court proceedings . . .” has no basis in human experience. A confident, assured person will likely speak out in either place; a timid, insecure person may be more overwhelmed by the formality of “open court proceedings” than by a police station. Moreover, if an accused is in *182 “open court,” there is a constitutional option to remain totally silent, but if an accused takes the stand all admissible questions must be answered. A nonparty witness has less option than the accused and must take the stand if called. We ought to be wary of casual generalizations that read well but “do not wash.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9426138. Public record. Not legal advice.