# National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers

> Supreme Court of the United States · February 25, 1974 · 414 U.S. 453

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425498

## Case

- **Full name:** NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. Et Al. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD PASSENGERS
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** February 25, 1974
- **Citations:** 414 U.S. 453; 94 S. Ct. 690; 38 L. Ed. 2d 646; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 39
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan
- **Judges:** Stewart, Burger, White, Marshall, Blacicmun, Rehnquist, Brennan, Douglas, Powell
- **Cited by:** 631 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425498

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that "[a] frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies"
- noting the "frequently stated principle of statutory construction . . . that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies"
- noting the “frequently stated principle of statutory construction ... that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies”

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result.
Although I am in agreement that the legislative history of the Amtrak Act provides a clear and convincing expression of Congress' intent to preclude anyone except the Attorney General and in certain situations an employee or his duly authorized representative from maintaining an action under, the Act against petitioners, I would leave open the question whether a private suit for mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1361 might be maintained against the Attorney General if his refusal to act under § 307 — even though within the letter of his authority — went “beyond any rational exercise of discretion.'' United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F. 2d 371, 374 (CA2 1968); see Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and “Nonstatutory'' Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308 , 333-335 (1967).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425498. Public record. Not legal advice.
