# Barnes v. United States

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 18, 1973 · 412 U.S. 837

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425370

## Case

- **Full name:** Barnes v. United States
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 18, 1973
- **Citations:** 412 U.S. 837; 93 S. Ct. 2357; 37 L. Ed. 2d 380; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 53
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan
- **Judges:** Brennan, Powell, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmttn, Rehnquist, Douglas, Bren-Nan, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 671 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425370

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the legislative history for the 1939 amendment to the statute precluding possession of stolen mail “conclusively refutes” the argument that the government must prove specifically that the defendant knew the property was stolen from the mail
- holding that an instruction on the presumption regarding consent for criminal property damage in the fourth degree to be constitutional
- holding that common sense and experience permitted jury to conclude from defendant’s unexplained possession of recently-stolen checks that defendant must have known or been aware of the high probability that checks were stolen
- finding in a case involving unexplained possession of recently stolen treasury checks that “common sense and experience tell us that [Barnes] must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen”
- recognizing that “the mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain a defendant’s possession consistent with innocence does not bar” reliance on the inference of guilt

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr, Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
Petitioner was charged in two counts of a six-count indictment with possession of United States Treasury *853 checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen. The essential elements of such an offense are (1) that the defendant was in possession of the checks, (2) that the checks were stolen from the mails, and (3) that the defendant knew that the checks were stolen. The Government proved that petitioner had been in possession of the checks and that the checks had been stolen from the mails; and, in addition, the Government introduced some evidence intended to show that petitioner knew or should have known that the checks were stolen. But rather than leaving the jury to determine the element of “knowledge” on the basis of that evidence, the trial court instructed it that it was free to infer the essential element of “knowledge” from petitioner’s unexplained possession of the checks. In my view, that instruction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it permitted the jury to convict even though the actual evidence bearing on “knowledge” may have been insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dissent.
We held in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970), that the Due Process Clause requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . .” Thus, in Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 417 (1970), we approved the inference of “knowledge” from the fact of possessing smuggled heroin because ‘“[cjornmon sense’ . . . tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The basis of that “common sense” judgment was, of course, the indisputable fact that all or virtually all heroin in this country is necessarily smuggled. Here, however, it cannot be said that all or virtually all endorsed United States Treasury checks have been stolen. Indeed, it is neither unlawful nor unusual *854 for people to use such checks as direct payment for goods and services. Thus, unlike Turner , “common sense” simply will not permit the inference that the possessor of stolen Treasury checks “inevitably” knew that the checks were stolen. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969).
In short, the practical effect of the challenged instruction was to permit the jury to convict petitioner even if it found insufficient or disbelieved all of the Government’s evidence bearing directly on the issue of “knowledge.” By authorizing the jury to rely exclusively on the inference in determining the element of “knowledge,” the instruction relieved the Government of the burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction thereby violated the principle of Winship that every essential element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425370. Public record. Not legal advice.