# Schneckloth v. Bustamonte > Supreme Court of the United States · May 29, 1973 · 412 U.S. 218 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425318 ## Case - **Full name:** Schneckloth, Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 29, 1973 - **Citations:** 412 U.S. 218; 93 S. Ct. 2041; 36 L. Ed. 2d 854; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 6 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan - **Judges:** Stewart, Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Blacicmun, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall - **Cited by:** 10,411 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299 (2016). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 1 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425318 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a search “conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” and that “one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant… - stating that if a defendant’s confession is not “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker’ ” and “ ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process’ ” (q… - stating that if a defendant's confession is not "`the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker'" and "`if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process'" (quoti… - holding that “knowledge of a right to refuse [consent] is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent” and noting that “[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a cr… - stating that, in the context of an automobile search, “if under all circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily — that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority — then we have found the consent… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting. The Fourth Amendment specifically guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” We have consistently held that governmental searches conducted pursuant to a validly obtained warrant or reasonably incident to a valid arrest do not violate this guarantee. Here, however, as the Court itself recognizes, no search warrant was obtained and the State does not even suggest “that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants.” Ante, *277 at 227-228. As a result, the search of the vehicle can be justified solely on the ground that the owner’s brother gave his consent — that is, that he waived his Fourth Amendment right “to be secure” against an otherwise “unreasonable” search. The Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as.a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. In my view, the Court’s conclusion is supported neither by “linguistics,” nor by “epistemology,” nor, indeed, by “common sense.” I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425318. Public record. Not legal advice.