# Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance > Supreme Court of the United States · December 7, 1972 · 409 U.S. 205 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425066 ## Case - **Full name:** TRAFFICANTE Et Al. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** December 7, 1972 - **Citations:** 409 U.S. 205; 93 S. Ct. 364; 34 L. Ed. 2d 415; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 4 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by White - **Judges:** Douglas, White, Blackmun, Powell, Black-Mun - **Cited by:** 820 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled by Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 178 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2011) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 1 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425066 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that tenants had alleged sufficient injury and thus had standing to sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 where they alleged that Defendant’s discriminatory practice of not renting to blacks had injured them in that “(1) they had lost the social benefits of living in … - explaining that because Congress intended to define standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as broadly as possible under Article III, the Fair Housing Act conferred standing to sue on any resident of the housing unit who had been injured by racial discrimination in the man… - finding, in an action by tenants challenging allegedly racially discriminatory practices of landlords that the definition of “‘persons aggrieved’ in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is consistent with Congress’s intent to “define sanding as broadly as is permitted by Article III o… - holding that the term “aggrieved person” in § 810(a) of the Fair Housing Act, which the Act defined to include “[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice,” demonstrated Congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permit… - holding that white tenants had standing to challenge landlord’s racially discriminatory practices under the FHA because the “definition of ‘person aggrieved’ in § 810(a) … showed a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Cons… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Black-mun and Mr. Justice Powell join, concurring. Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968,1 would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners’ complaint in this case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Art. Ill of the Constitution. But with that statute purporting to give all those who are authorized to complain to the agency the right also to sue in court, I would sustain the statute insofar as it extends standing to those in the position of the petitioners in this case. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 240, 248-249 (1970). Consequently, I join the Court’s opinion and judgment. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425066. Public record. Not legal advice.