# Webb v. Texas > Supreme Court of the United States · December 4, 1972 · 409 U.S. 95 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425050 ## Case - **Full name:** Webb v. Texas - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** December 4, 1972 - **Citations:** 409 U.S. 95; 93 S. Ct. 351; 34 L. Ed. 2d 330; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 8 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun - **Judges:** Blackmun, Rehnquist - **Cited by:** 649 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425050 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding trial judge's threatening remarks effectively drove witness off the stand and deprived petitioner of due process when judge warned witness of his right to refuse to testify and of necessity to tell the truth, but also implied that he expected witness, who had a prior c… - holding that a trial judge’s warnings to a defense witness about the dangers of perjury infringed on the defendant’s due process rights where the judge not only provided information of the consequences of perjury but also implied that the judge believed the witness would lie a… - holding that the defendant’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby “effecti… - holding that the defendant had been deprived due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when a trial judge’s “lengthy and intimidating warning” and “threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand” (… - holding that the defendant was denied due process, when his only witness refused to testify after the trial court had, upon its own initiative, warned the witness of the penalties for perjury in "unnecessarily strong terms" and had thereby "effectively dr[iven] the witness off… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins, dissenting. The facts before us do not, in my opinion, justify the Court’s summary disposition. Petitioner Webb (who, on a prior occasion, had been convicted on still another *99 burglary charge) was apprehended by the owner of a lumber business. The owner, armed with his shotgun, had driven to his office at three o’clock in the morning upon the activation of a burglar alarm. When he entered the building, the owner observed a broken window and an assortment of what he regarded as burglary tools on his desk. When men emerged from an adjacent room, a gun fight ensued. Two intruders escaped, but the owner, despite his having been shot twice, succeeded in holding the petitioner at gunpoint until police arrived. Although the admonition given by the state trial judge to the sole witness proffered by the defense was obviously improper, sufficient facts have not been presented to this Court to demonstrate the depth of prejudice that requires a summary reversal. The admonition might prove far less offensive, and the conduct of the trial judge understandable, if, for example, as is indicated in petitioner’s brief, p. 8, prepared by counsel and filed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the witness were known to have been called for the purpose of presenting an alibi defense. Against the backdrop of being caught on the premises and of apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt, offset only by a bare allegation of prejudice, I would deny the petition for certiorari and, as the Court so often has done, I would remit the petitioner to the relief available to him by way of a post-conviction proceeding with a full evidentiary hearing. * Petitioner’s counsel assured the Court of Criminal Appeals that the witness would not have been called “unless he had been previously interviewed and found to be helpful to the appellant’s cause.” Brief for Appellant on First Motion for Rehearing 7, Webb v. Texas, 480 S. W. 2d 398 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1972). An evidentiary hearing would allow petitioner’s trial counsel to outline the testimony that was expected from the witness. A prior trial is mentioned in the record. An evidentiary hearing might reveal events at the prior trial that justified the trial judge’s unusual concern about possible perjury. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9425050. Public record. Not legal advice.