# Johnson v. Louisiana > Supreme Court of the United States · May 22, 1972 · 406 U.S. 356 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424882 ## Case - **Full name:** Johnson v. Louisiana - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 22, 1972 - **Citations:** 406 U.S. 356; 92 S. Ct. 1620; 32 L. Ed. 2d 152; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 55 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan - **Judges:** White, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart - **Cited by:** 930 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported abrogated by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424882 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - reasoning that, although the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal trials, the unanimity requirement is not such an essential feature of the right that it is incorporated against the states - stating: “Jury verdicts finding guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are regularly sustained even though the evidence was such that the jury would have been justified in having a reasonable doubt.” - holding that the “taint” of an allegedly illegal arrest was purged when defendant was represented by counsel and brought before a magistrate before the incriminating lineup occurred - noting that when a jury in a federal court, which operates under a unanimity rule, cannot agree unanimously upon a verdict the defendant is not acquitted — which he would be, if nonunanimity could operate as acquittal — but is given a new trial ## Opinion text *395 Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, dissenting. * Readers of today’s opinions may be understandably puzzled why convictions by 11-1 and 10-2 jury votes are affirmed in No. 69-5046, when a majority of the Court agrees that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal jury trials, and a majority also agrees that the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is to be enforced against the States according to the same standards that protect that right against federal encroachment. The reason is that while pay Brother Powell agrees that a unanimous verdict is required in federal criminal trials, he does not agree that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is to be applied in the same way to State and Federal Governments. In that circumstance, it is arguable that the affirmance of the convictions of Apodaca, Madden, and Cooper is not inconsistent with a view that today’s decision in No. 69-5046 is a holding that only a unanimous verdict will afford the accused in a state criminal prosecution the jury trial guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment. In any event, the affirmance must not obscure that the majority of the Court remains of the view that, as in the case of every specific of the Bill of Rights that extends to the States, † the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial *396 guarantee, however it is to be construed, has identical application against both State and Federal Governments. I can add only a few words to the opinions of my Brothers Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall, which I have joined. Emotions may run high at criminal trials. Although we can fairly demand that jurors be neutral until they have begun to hear evidence, it would surpass our power to command that they remain unmoved by the evidence that unfolds before them. What this means is that jurors will often enter the jury deliberations with strong opinions on the merits of the case. If at that time a sufficient majority is available to reach a verdict, those jurors in the majority will have nothing but their own common sense to restrain them from returning a verdict before they have fairly considered the positions of jurors who would reach a different conclusion. Even giving all reasonable leeway to legislative judgment in such matters, I think it simply ignores reality to imagine that most jurors in these circumstances would or even could fairly weigh the arguments opposing their position. It is in this context that we must view the constitutional requirement that all juries be drawn from an accurate cross section of the community. When verdicts must be unanimous, no member of the jury may be ignored by the others. When less than unanimity is sufficient, consideration of minority views may become nothing more than a matter of majority grace. In my opinion, the right of all groups in this Nation to participate in the criminal process means the right to have their voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that right. Majority verdicts could destroy it. [This opinion applies also to No. 69-5046, Apodaca v. Oregon, post, p. 404.] See, for example, First Amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 (1961); Fourth Amendment, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963); Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964); Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969); Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897); Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause, Klopfer v. North *396 Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967); Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424882. Public record. Not legal advice.