# Boddie v. Connecticut > Supreme Court of the United States · March 2, 1971 · 401 U.S. 371 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424473 ## Case - **Full name:** BODDIE Et Al. v. CONNECTICUT Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** March 2, 1971 - **Citations:** 401 U.S. 371; 91 S. Ct. 780; 28 L. Ed. 2d 113; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 73 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan - **Judges:** Harlan, Burger, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Black - **Cited by:** 2,670 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by a later decision, 504 F.2d 483 (1974). - Negative treatments: 4 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424473 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that “the State’s refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a disso lution of their marriages, and… - stating that “a statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity . . . is beyond question,” and that “in cases involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly, th… - stating that “due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard” - holding that it was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause to deny indigent individuals access to the courts because of their inability to pay a filing fee - holding that valid contractual rights against a government body create property interests within the scope of the Due Process Clause ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in part. I join the Court’s opinion to the extent that it holds that Connecticut denies procedural due process in denying the indigent appellants access to its courts for the sole reason that they cannot pay a required fee. “ [C] on-sideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with *387 a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970). When a State’s interest in imposing a fee requirement on an indigent is compared to the indigent’s interest in being heard, it is clear that the latter is the weightier. It is an unjustifiable denial of a hearing, and therefore a denial of due process, to close the courts to an indigent on the ground of nonpayment of a fee. But I cannot join the Court’s opinion insofar as today’s holding is made to depend upon the factor that only the State can grant a divorce and that an indigent would be locked into a marriage if unable to pay the fees required to obtain a divorce. A State has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery. As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between the parties, the court system is usually “the only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.” Ante, at 376-377. In this case, the Court holds that Connecticut’s unyielding fee requirement violates the Due Process Clause by denying appellants “an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages” without a sufficient countervailing justification. Ante, at 380. I see no constitutional distinction between appellants’ attempt to enforce this state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate any other right arising under federal or state law. If fee requirements close the courts to an indigent he can no more invoke the aid of the courts for other forms of relief than he can escape the legal incidents of a marriage. The right to be heard in some way at some time extends *388 to all proceedings entertained by courts. The possible distinctions suggested by the Court today will not withstand analysis. In addition, this case presents a classic problem of equal protection of the laws. The question that the Court treats exclusively as one of due process inevitably implicates considerations of both due process and equal protection. Certainly, there is at issue the denial of a hearing, a matter for analysis under the Due Process Clause. But Connecticut does not deny a hearing to everyone in these circumstances; it denies it only to people who fail to pay certain fees. The validity of this partial denial, or differentiation in treatment, can be tested as well under the Equal Protection Clause. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), we held under the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due Process Clause that a State may not deny a free transcript to an indigent, where the transcript is necessary for a direct appeal from his conviction. Subsequently, we have applied and extended that principle in numerous criminal cases. See, e. g., Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U. S. 214 (1958); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U. S. 438 (1962); Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969). The rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike. They fail to perform their function in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause if they shut their doors to indigent *389 plaintiffs altogether. Where money determines not merely “the kind of trial a man gets,” Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 19 , but whether he gets into court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a mockery. A State may not make its judicial processes available to some but deny them to others simply because they cannot pay a fee. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966). In my view, Connecticut’s fee requirement, as applied to an indigent, is a denial of equal protection. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424473. Public record. Not legal advice.