# Oregon v. Mitchell

> Supreme Court of the United States · December 21, 1970 · 400 U.S. 112

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424371

## Case

- **Full name:** Oregon v. Mitchell, Attorney General
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** December 21, 1970
- **Citations:** 400 U.S. 112; 91 S. Ct. 260; 27 L. Ed. 2d 272; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Hablan
- **Judges:** Hablan, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, White, Marshall, Stewart, Burger, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 466 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424371

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, prior to the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, that an amendment to the Voting Rights Act lowering the voting age in state and local elections from twenty-one to eighteen exceeded the bounds of congressional authority because "the Constitution was ... intended to…
- discussing the Reconstruction Congress's "power to interfere with state voter qualifications," positing that this power "was said to exist in a variety of constitutional provisions, including Art. I, § 2, Art. I, § 4, the war power, the power over territories, the guarantee of…
- noting that "literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious," and concluding that the "danger of violation of § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment was sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power under § 2."

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Hablan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
From the standpoint of this Court’s decisions during an era of judicial constitutional revision in the field of the suffrage, ushered in eight years ago by Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), I would find it difficult not to sustain all three aspects of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, here challenged. From the standpoint of the bedrock of the constitutional structure of this Nation, these cases bring us to a crossroad that is marked with a formidable “Stop” sign. That sign compels us- to pause before we allow those decisions to carry us to the point of sanctioning Congress’ decision to alter state-determined voter qualifications by simple legislation, and to consider whether sound doctrine does not in truth require us to hold that one or more of the changes which Congress has thus sought to make can be accomplished only by constitutional amendment.
The four cases require determination of the validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments in three respects. In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have sought to enjoin the enforcement of § 302 of the Act as applied to lower the voting age in those States from 21 to 18. 1
*153 In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks a declaration of the validity of the Act and an injunction requiring Arizona and Idaho to conform their laws to it. The Act would lower the voting age in each State from 21 to 18. It would suspend until August 6, 1975, the Arizona literacy test, which requires that applicants for registration be able to read the United States Constitution in English and write their names. It would require Idaho to make' several changes in its laws governing residency, registration, and absentee voting in presidential elections. Among the more substantial changes, Idaho’s present 60-day state residency requirement will in effect be lowered to 30 days; its 30-day county residency requirement- for intrastate migrants will be abolished ; Idaho will have to permit voting by citizens of other States formerly domiciled in- Idaho who emigrated too recently to register in their new homes; and it must permit absentee registration and voting by persons who have lived in Idaho for less than six months. The relevant provisions of the Act and of the constitutions and laws of the four States are set out in an Appendix to this opinion.
Each of the States contests the power of Congress to enact the provisions of the Act involved in its suit. 2 The Government places primary reliance on the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment by appropriate *154 legislation. For reasons to follow, I am of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as thej^ see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections. I find no other source of congressional power to lower the voting age as fixed by state laws, or to alter state laws on residency, registration, and absentee voting, with respect to either state or federal elections. The suspension of Arizona’s literacy requirement, however, can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and I would sustain it on that basis.
I
It is fitting to begin with a quotation from one of the leading members of the 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the States in 1866:
“Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence which they have left on the question.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 677 (1866) (Sen. Sumner).
Believing this view to be undoubtedly sound, I turn to the circumstances, in which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted for enlightenment on the intended reach of its provisions. This, for me, necessary undertaking has unavoidably led to an opinion of more than ordinary length. Except for those who are willing to close their eyes to constitutional history in making constitutional interpretations or who read such history with a preconceived determination to attain a particular constitutional *155 goal, I think that the history of the Fourteenth Amend- - ment makes it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under that Amendment.
A. Historical Setting 3
The point of departure for considering the purpose and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the suffrage should be, I think, the pre-existing provisions of the Constitution. Article I, § 2, provided that in determining the number of Representatives to which a State was entitled, only three-fifths of the slave population should be counted. 4 The section also provided that the qualifications of voters for such Representatives should be the same as those established by the States for electors of the most numerous branch of their respective legislatures. Article I, § 4, provided that, subject to congressional veto, the States might prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Representatives. Article II, § 1, provided that the States might direct the manner of choosing electors for Presir dent and Vice President, except that Congress might fix a uniform time for the choice. 5 Nothing in the original *156 Constitution controlled the way States might allocate their political power except for the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government, which appears in Art. IV, § 4. 6 No relevant changes in the constitutional structure were made until after the Civil War.
At the close of that war, there were some four million freed slaves in the South, none of whom were permitted to vote. The white population of the Confederacy had been overwhelmingly sympathetic with the rebellion. Since there was only a comparative handful of persons in these States who were neither former slaves nor Confederate sympathizers, the place where the political power should be lodged was a most vexing question. In a series of proclamations in the summer of 1865, President Andrew Johnson had laid the groundwork for the States to be controlled by the white populations which had held power before the war, eliminating only the leading rebels and those Unwilling to sign a loyalty oath. 7 The Radicals, on the other hand, were ardently in favor of Negro suffrage as essential to prevent resurgent rebellion, requisite to protect the freedmen, and necessary to ensure continued Radical control of the government. This ardor cooled as it ran into northern racial prejudice. At that time, only six States — Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York— permitted Negroes to vote, and New York imposed special property and residency requirements on Negro voters. 8 In referenda late that year, enfranchising pro- *157 posáis were roundly beaten in Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Territory of Colorado, and the District of Columbia. Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 25-26. Such popular rebuffs led the Radicals to pull in their horns and hope for a protracted process of reconstruction during which the North could be educated to the advisability of Negro suffrage, at least for the South. In the meantime, of course, it would.be essential to bar southern representation in Congress lest a combination of southerners and Democrats obtain control of the government and frustrate Radical goals.
The problem of congressional representation was acute. With the freeing of the slaves, the Three-Fifths Compromise ceased to have any effect. While predictions of the precise effect of the change varied with the person doing the calculating, the consensus was that the South would be entitled to at least 15 new members of Congress, and, of course, a like number of new presidential electors. The Radicals had other rallying cries which they kept before the public in the summer of 1865, but one author gives this description of the mood as Congress convened: 9
“Of alb the movements influencing the Fourteenth Amendment which developed prior to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, that for Negro suffrage was the most outstanding. The volume of private and public comment indicates that it was viewed as an issue of prime importance. The cry for a changed basis of representation was, in reality, subsidiary to this, and was meant by Radicals to secure in another way what Negro suffrage might accomplish for them: removal of the danger of Democratic dominance as a consequence of Southern restoration. The danger of possible repudiation of the national obligations, and assumption of the rebel *158 debt, was invariably presented to show the need for Negro suffrage or a new basis of representation. Sentiment for disqualification of ex-Confederates, though a natural growth, well suited such purposes. The movement to guarantee civil rights, sponsored originally by the more conservative Republicans, received emphasis from Radicals only when state elections indicated that suffrage, would not serve as a party platform.”
When Congress met, the Radicals, led by Thaddeus Stevens, were successful in obtaining agreement for a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, composed of 15 members, to “inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress . . . .” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 30, 46 (1865) (hereafter Globe).
All papers relating to representation of the Southern States were to be referred to the Committee of Fifteen without debate. The result, which many had not foreseen, was .to assert congressional control over Reconstruction and at the same time to put the congressional power in the hands of a largely Radical secret committee.
The Joint Committee began work with the beginning of 1866, and in due course reported a joint resolution, H. R. 51, to amend the Constitution. The proposal would have based representation and direct taxes on population, with a proviso that
“whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation.” Globe 351,
The result, if the Southern States did not provide for Negro suffrage, would be a decrease in southern repre *159 sentation in Congress and the electoral college by-some 24 seats from their pre-war position instead of an increase of 15. The House, although somewhat balky, approved the measure after lengthy debate. Globe 538. The Senate proved more intractable. An odd- combination of Democrats, moderate Republicans, and extreme Radicals combined to defeat the measure, with the Radicals basing their opposition largely on the fear that the proviso would be read to authorize racial voter qualifications and- thus prevent Congress from enfranchising the freedmen under powers assertedly granted by other clauses of the Constitution. See, e. g., Globe 673-687 (Sen. Sumner).
At about this same time the Civil Rights Bill and the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill were being debated. Both bills provided a list of rights secured, not including voting. 10 Senator Trumbull, who reported the Civil Rights Bill on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: “I do not want to bring up the question of negro suffrage in the. bill.” Globe 606. His House counterpart exhibited the same reluctance. Globe 1162 (Cong. Wilson of Iowa). Despite considerable uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the measures, both ultimately passed. In the midst of the Senate debates on the basis of representation, President Johnson vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, primarily bn constitutional grounds. This veto, which was narrowly sustained, was followed shortly by the President’s bitter-attack on Radical Reconstruction in his Washington’s Birthday speech. These two actions, which were followed a month later by the veto of the Civil Rights Bill, removed any lingering hopes among the Radicals that Johnson would support them in a thoroughgoing plan of reconstruction. By the same token they increased the Radicals’ need for an *160 articulated plan of their own to be put before the country in the upcoming elections as an alternative to the course the President was taking.
- The second major product of the Reconstruction Committee, before the resolution which became the Fourteenth Amendment, was a proposal to add an equal rights, provision to the Constitution. This measure, H. R. 63, which foreshadowed § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, read as follows:
“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal-protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.” Globe 1034.
It was reported by Congressman Bingham of Ohio, who later opposed the Civil Rights Bill because he believed it unconstitutional. Globe 1292-1293. The amendment immediately ran into serious opposition in the House and the subject was dropped. 11
Such was the background of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, at loggerheads with the President over Reconstruction, had not come up with a plan of its own after six months of deliberations; both friends and foes prodded it to develop an alternative. The Reconstruction Committee had been unable to produce anything which could even get through Congress, much less obtain the adherence of.three-fourths of the States. The Radicals, committed to Negro suffrage, were confronted with widespread public opposition to that goal and the necessity for a reconstruction plan that could do service as' a party platform in the elections that fall. ..The language *161 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be'read with aware-' ness that it was designed in response to this situation.
B. The Language of the Amendment and Reconstruction Measures
Sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth- Amendment as originally reported read as follows: 12
“Sec. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
“Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when *162 ever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.” Globe 2286.
In the historical context, no one could have understood this language as anything other than an abandonment of the principle of Negro suffrage, for which the Radicals had been so eager. By the same token, the language could hardly have been understood as affecting the provisions of the Constitution placing voting qualifications in the hands of the States. Section 1 must have been seen as little more than a constitutionalization of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, concededly one of the primary goals of that portion of the Amendment. 13
While these conclusions may, I think', be confidently asserted, it is not so easy to explain just how contemporary observers would have, construed the three clauses of § 1 to reach this result. 14 No doubt in the case of *163 many congressmen it simply never occurred to them that the States’ longstanding plenary control over voter qualifications would be affected without explicit, language to that effect. And since no speaker during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment pursued the contention that § 1 would be construed to include the franchise, those who took the opposite view rarely explained how they arrived at their conclusions.
In attempting to unravel what was seldom articulated, the appropriate starting point is the fact that the framers of the Amendment expected the most significant portion of § 1 to be the clause prohibiting state laws “which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States/’ These privileges were no doubt understood to include the ones set out in the first, section of the Civil Rights Act. To be prohibited by law from enjoying these rights would hardly be consistent with full membership in a civil society.
The same is not necessarily true with respect to prohibitions on participation in the political process. Many members of Congress accepted the jurisprudence of the day, in which the rights of man fell into three categories: natural, civil, and political. The privileges of citizens, being “civil” rights, were distinct from the rights arising from governmental organization, which were political in character. 15 Others no doubt relied on *164 the experience under the similar language of Art. IV, § 2, which had never been held to guarantee the right to vote. The remarks of Senator Howard of Michigan, who as spokesman for the Joint Committee explained in greater detail than most why the Amendment did not reach .the suffrage, contain something of each view. See Globe 2766, quoted infra, at 187; nn. 56 and 57, infra; cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 256 (1898) (dictum).
Since the Privileges and Immunities Clause was ex- . pected to be the primary source of substantive protection, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were relegated to a. secondary role, as the debates and other contemporary materials make clear. 16 Those clauses, which appear on their face to correspond with the latter portion of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, see n. 13, supra, and to be primarily concerned with person and property, would not have been expected to enfranchise the freedmen if the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not.
Other members of Congress no doubt saw § 2 of the proposed Amendment as the Committee’s resolution of the related problems of suffrage and representation. Since that section did not provide for enfranchisement, but simply reduced representation for disfranchisement, any doubts about the effect of the broad language of § 1 were removed. Congressman Bingham, who was primarily responsible for the language of § 1, *165 stated this view. Globe 2542, quoted infra, at 185. Finally, characterization of the Amendment by such figures as Stevens and Bingham in the House and Howard in the Senate, not contested by the Democrats except in passing remarks, was no doubt simply accepted by many members of Congress; they, repeating it,' gave further force to the interpretation, with the result that, as will appear below, not one speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously stated' that it would affect state voter qualifications, and only three,, all opponents of the measure, can fairly be characterized as raising the possibility. 17 Further evidence of this original understanding can be found in later events.
The 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, also enacted the first Reconstruction Act, c. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This Act required, as a condition precedent to readmission of the Southern States, that they adopt constitutions providing that the elective franchise should be enjoyed by all male citizens over the age of 21 who had been residents for more than one year and were not disfranchised for treason or common-law felony; even so, no State would be readmitted until a legislature elected under the new Constitution had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and that Amendment had become part of the Constitution.
The next development came when the ratification drive in the North stalled. After a year had passed during which only one Northern State had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Arkansas was readmitted to the Union by the Act of June 22, 1868, 15 *166 Stat. 72 . This readmission was based on the “fundamental condition” that the state constitution should not be amended to restrict the franchise, except with reference to residency requirements. Three days later the Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73 , held out a promise of similar treatment to North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida if they would ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. By happy coincidence, the' assent of those six States was just sufficient to complete the ratification process. It can hardly be suggested, therefore, that the “fundamental condition” was exacted from them as a measure of caution lest the Fourteenth Amendment fail of ratification.
The 40th Congress, not content with enfranchisement in the South, proposed the Fifteenth Amendment to extend the suffrage to northern Negroes. See Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 46. This fact alone is evidence that they did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have accomplished such a result. Less well known is the fact that the 40th Congress considered and very nearly adopted a proposed amendment which would have expressly prohibited not only discriminatory voter qualifications but discriminatory qualifications for office as well. Each House passed such a measure by the required two-thirds .margin. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1318, 1428 (1869). A conference committee, composed of Senators Stewart and Conkling.and Representatives Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan, struck out the officeholding provision, id., at 1563, 1593, and with Inauguration Day only a week away, both Houses accepted the conference report. Id., at 1564, 1641. See generally Gillette 58-77. While the reasons for these actions are unclear, it is unlikély that they were provoked by the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment covered the field; such a rationale seemingly would have made the enfranchising provision itself unnecessary.
*167 The 41st Congress readmitted the remaining three States of the Confederacy. The admitting act in. each case recited good-faith ratification -of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and. imposed the fundamental conditions that the States should not restrict the elective franchise 18 and “[t]hat it shall never be lawful for the said State to deprive any citizen. of the United States, on account of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, of the right to .hold office under the constitution and laws of said State.” Act of Jan. 26, 1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62 , 63 (Virginia); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, c. 19, 16 Stat. 67 , 68 (Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, c.- 39, 16 Stat. 80 , 81 (Texas).
These materials demonstrate not only that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is susceptible of an interpretation that it does not reach- suffrage qualifications, but that this is the interpretation given by the immediately succeeding Congresses. Such an interpretation is the most reasonable reading of the section in view of the background against which it was proposed and -adopted, particularly the doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, the prejudice in the North against any recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage, and the basic constitutional structure of leaving suffrage qualifications with the States. 19 If any further clarification were *168 needed, one would have thought it provided by the second section of the same Amendment, which specifically contemplated that the right to vote would be denied or abridged by the States on racial or other grounds. As a unanimous Court once asked, “Why this, if it was not in the power of the [state] legislature to deny the right of suffrage to some male inhabitants?” Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 174 (1875).
The Government suggests that the list of protected qualifications in § 2 is “no more than descriptive of voting laws as they then stood.” Brief for the United States, Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., 75. This is wholly inaccurate. Aside from racial restrictions, all States had residency requirements and many had literacy, property, or taxation qualifications. On the other hand, several of the Western States permitted aliens to vote if they had satisfied certain residency requirements and had declared *169 their intention to become citizens. 20 It hardly seems necessary to observe that the politicians who framed the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar with the makeup of the electorate. In any event, the congressional debates contain such proof in ample measure. 21
Assuming, then, that § 2 represents a deliberate selection of the voting qualifications to be penalized, what is the point of it? The Government notes that “it was intended — although it has never been used — to provide a remedy against exclusion of the newly freed slaves from the vote.” Brief for the Defendant, Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., 20. Undoubtedly this was the primary purpose. But the framers of the Amendment, with their attention thus focused on racial voting qualifications, could hardly have been unaware of § 1. If they understood that section to forbid such qualifications, the simple means of penalizing this conduct would have been to impose a reduction of representation for voting discrimination in violation of § 1. Their adoption instead of the awkward phrasing of § 2 is therefore significant.
To be sure, one might argue that § 2 is simply a rhetorical flourish, and that the qualifications listed there are merely the ones which the framers deemed to be consistent with the alleged prohibition of' § 1. This argument is not only unreasonable on its face and untenable in light of the historical record; it is fatal to the validity of the reduction of the voting age in § 302 of the Act before us.
The only sensible explanation of § 2, therefore, is that the racial voter qualifications it was designed to penalize *170 were understood to be permitted by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment was a halfway measure, adopted to deprive the South of representation until it should enfranchise the freedmen, but to have no practical effect in the North.. It was politically acceptable precisely because of its regional consequences and its avoidance of an explicit recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage. As my Brother Black states: “[I]t cannot -be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern themselves.” Ante, at 127. The detailed historical materials make this unmistakably clear.
C. The Joint Committee
The first place to look for the’ understanding of the .framers of the'Fourteenth Amendment is the Journal .of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 22 The exact sequence of the actions of this Committee presumably had little or no effect on the members of Congress who. were not on the Committee, for the Committee attempted to keep its deliberations secret, 23 and the Journal itself was. lost for nearly 20 years. 24 Nevertheless the Journal, although only a record of proposals and votes, illustrates the thoughts of those leading figures of Congress who-were members and participated in the drafting of the Amendment.
Two features emerge from such a review with startling clarity. First, the Committee regularly rejected explicitly *171 enfranchising proposals in favor of plans which would postpone enfranchisement, leave it to congressional discretion, or abandon it altogether. Second, the abandonment of Negro suffrage as a goal exactly corresponded with the adoption of provisions to reduce representation for discriminatory restrictions on the ballot.
This correspondence was present from the start. Five plans were proposed to deal with representation. One would have prohibited racial qualifications for voters and based representation on the whole number of citizens in the State; the other four proposals contained no enfranchising provision but in various ways would have reduced representation for States where the vote was .racially restricted. Kendrick 41-44. A subcommittee reduced the. five proposals to two, one prohibiting discrimination and the other reducing representation where it was present. On Stevens’- motion the latter. alternative was accepted by a vote of 11 to 3, Kendrick 51; with minor changes it was subsequently reported as H. R. 51.
The subcommittee also proposed that whichever provision on the basis of representation was adopted, the Congress should be'empowered to legislate to secure all citizens “the same political rights "d privileges” and also “equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.” Kendrick 51. After the Committee reported H. R. 51, it turned to consideration of this proposal. At. a meeting attended by only 10 members, a motion to strike out the clause authorizing Congress . to legislate for equal political rights and privileges lost by a vote of six to four. Kendrick 57. At a subsequent-meeting, however, Bingham had the subcommittee . proposal replaced with another which did not mention political rights and privileges, but was otherwise quite similar. Kendrick 61; see the .-opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr.' Justice White, and Mr. Justice *172 Marshall, post, at 258-259, for the text of the two provisions. The Committee reported the substitute as H. R. 63. In the House so much concern was expressed over the centralization of power the amendment would work — a few said it would even authorize Congress to regulate the suffrage — that the matter was dropped. Post, at 260.
The Fourteenth Amendment had as its most direct antecedent a proposal drafted by Robert Dale Owen, who was not a member of Congress, and presented to the Joint Committee by Stevens. 25 Originally the plan provided for mandatory enfranchisement in 1876 and for reduction of representation until that date. . Kendrick 82-84. However, Stevens was pressured by various congressional delegations who wanted nothing to do with Negro suffrage, even at a remove of 10 years. 26 He therefore successfully moved to strike out the enfranchising provision and correspondingly to abolish the 10-year limitation on reduction of representation for racial discrimination. The motion carried by a vote of 12 to 2. Kendrick 101.
Bingham was then successful in replacing § 1 of Owen’s proposal, which read:
“No discrimination shall be made by any State, or by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons, because, of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”
with the following now-familiar language:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive *173 any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Kendrick 106.
The summary style of the Journal leaves unclear the reasons for the change. However, Bingham himself had rather consistently voted against proposals for direct and immediate enfranchisement, 27 and on the face of things it seems unlikely that the other members of the Joint Committee understood his provision to be an enfranchising proposal. 28 That they did not so understand is *174 demonstrated by the speeches in the debates on the floor. 29
Before I examine those debates, a word of explanation is in order. For obvious reasons, the discussions of voter qualifications in the 39th Congress and among the public weré cast primarily in terms of racial disqualifications. This does not detract from their utility as guides to interpretation. When an individual speaker said that the Amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of Negroes, he must have taken one of two views: either the Amendment did not reach voter qualifications at all; or it set standards limiting state restrictions on the ballot, but those standards did not prohibit racial discrimination. I have already set out some of the reasons which lead me to conclude that the former interpretation is correct, and that it is the under *175 standing shared by the framers of the. Amendment, as well as by almost all of the opponents. The mere statement of the latter position appears to me to be a complete refutation of it. Even on its wholly unsupportable assumptions (1) that certain framers of the Amendment contemplated that the privileges and immunities of citi- ' zens included the vote, (2) that they intended to permit state laws to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens whenever it was rational to do so, and (3) that they agreed on the rationality of prohibiting the freed slaves from voting, this remarkable theory still fails to explain why they understood the Amendment to permit racial voting qualifications in the free States of the North.
D. In Congress
On May 8, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens led off debate on H. R. 127, the Joint Resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment. After explaining the delay of the Joint Committee in coming up with a plan of reconstruction, he apologized for his proposal in advance:
“This proposition is not all that the committee desired. It falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public opinion. Not only Congress but the several States are to be consulted. • Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this.” Globe 2459.
In the climate of the times, Stevens could hardly have been understood as referring to anything other than the failure of the measure to make some provision for the enfranchisement of the freedmen. However, lest any mistake be made, he recounted the history of. the Committee’s prior- effort in the field of representation and suf *176 frage, H. R. 51, which “would surely have secured the enfranchisement of every citizen at no distant period.” That measure was dead, “slaughtered by a puerile and pedantic criticism,” and “unless this (less efficient, I admit) shall pass, its death has postponed the protection of the colored race perhaps for ages.” Ibid.
With this explanation made, Stevens turned to a section-by-section study of the proposed resolution. The results to be achieved by § 1, as he saw it, would be equal punishment for crime, equal entitlement to the benefits of “[w]hatever law protects the white man,” equal means of redress, and equal competence to testify. Ibid. If he thought the section provided equal access to the polls, despite his immediately preceding apology for the fact that it did not, his failure to mention that application is remarkable. 30
Turning then to § 2, Stevens again discussed racial qualifications for voting. He explained the section as follows:
“If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall forfeit her right to representation in the samé proportion. The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever' in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both legislative and executive.” Ibid.
Stevens recognized that it might take 'several years for the coercive effect of the Amendment to result in Negro suffrage, but since this would give time for education and enlightenment of the freedmen, “That short delay would *177 not be injurious.” Ibid. He did not indicate that he believed it would be unconstitutional. He admitted that § 2 was not so good as the proposal which had been defeated in the Senate, for that, by reducing representation by all the members of a race if any one was discriminated against, would have hastened, full enfranchisement. Section 2 allowed proportional credit. “But it is a short step forward. The large stride which we in vain proposed is dead . . . .” Globe 2460.
I have dealt at length with Stevens’ remarks because of his prominent position in the House and in the Joint Committee. The remaining remarks, except for Bing-ham’s summation, can be treated in more summary fashion. Of the supporters of the Amendment, Garfield of Ohio, 31 Kelley of Pennsylvania, 32 Boutwell of Massachusetts (a member of the Joint Committee), 33 *178 Eliot of Massachusetts, 34 Beaman of Michigan, 35 and Farnsworth of Illinois, 36 expressed their regret that the Amendment did not prohibit restrictions on'the franchise. As the quotations set out in the margin indicate, the absence of such a prohibition was generally attributed to prejudice in the Congress, in the States, or both, to such an extent- that an enfranchising amendment could not pass. This corresponds with the first part of Stevens’ introductory speech.
*179 Other supporters of the Amendment obyiously based their remarks on their understanding that it did not affect state laws imposing discriminatory voting qualifications, but did not indicate that the omission was a drawback in their view. In this group were Thayer of Pennsylvania, 37 Broomall of Pennsylvania, 38 Raymond of New York, 39 McKee of Kentucky, 40 Miller of Pennsyl *180 vania, 41 Banks of Massachusetts 42 and Eckley of Ohio. 43
The remaining members of the House who supported the Fourteenth Amendment either did not speak at all or did not address themselves to the suffrage issue in any very clear terms. Those in the latter group who gave speeches on the proposed. Amendment included *181 Spalding of Ohio, 44 Longyear of Michigan, 45 and Shella-barger of Ohio. 46 The remaining Republican members of the Joint Committee — Washburne of Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Conkling of New York, and Blow of Missouri — did not participate in the debates over the Amendment.
In the opposition to the Amendment were only the handful of Democrats. Even they, with one seeming exception, did not assert that the Amendment was ap-' plicable to suffrage, although they would have been expected to do so if they thought such a reading plausible. Finck of Ohio and Shanklin of Kentucky did not even *182 mention Negro suffrage in their attacks on the Amendment, although Finck discussed the reasons why the Southern States could not be expected to ratify it, Globe 2460-2462, and Shanklin characterized the Amendment as “tyrannical and oppressive.” Globe 2501. Eldridge of Wisconsin 47 and Randall of Pennsylvania 48 affirmatively indicated their understanding that with the Amendment the Radicals had at least temporarily abandoned their crusade for Negro suffrage, as did Finck when the measure returned from the Senate with amendments. 49
The other two Democrats to participate in the three days of debate on H. R. 127, Boyer of Pennsylvania and Rogers of New Jersey, have been a source of great comfort to those who set out to prove that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive on this issue. Each, in the course of a lengthy speech, included a sentence which, taken out.of context, can be read to indicate a fear that § 1 might prohibit racial restrictions on the ballot. Boyer said, “The first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill, and is intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent in *183 directly, the political equality of the negro race.” Globe 2467. Rogers, commenting on the uncertain scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, observed: “The right to vote is a privilege.” Globe 2538.
While these two statements are perhaps innocuous enough to be left alone, it is noteworthy that each speaker had earlier in the session delivered a tirade against the principle of Negro suffrage; 50 if either seriously believed that the Fourteenth Amendment might enfranchise the freedmen, he was unusually calm about the fact. That they did not seriously interpret the Amendment in this way is indicated as well by other portions of their speeches. 51
*184 Two other opponents of .the Fourteenth Amendment, Phelps of Maryland and Niblack of Indiana, made statements which have been adduced to show that there was no consensus on the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to suffrage laws. Phelps voiced his sentiments on May 5, three days before the beginning of debate. 52 In the course of a speech urging a soft policy on reconstruction, he expressed the fear that the Amendment would authorize Congress to define the privileges of citizens to include the suffrage — or indeed that it might have that effect proprio vigore. Globe 2398. Phelps did not repeat this sentiment after he was contradicted by speaker after speaker during the debates proper; indeed, he did not take part in the debates at all, but simply voted against the Amendment, along with most of his Democratic colleagues. Globe 2545. 53
As for Niblack, on the first day of debate he made the following remarks:
“I give notice that I. will offer the following amendment if I shall have the opportunity:
*185 “ ‘Add to the fifth section as follows:
“ ‘Provided, That nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to authorize Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any State, or to abridgé or restrict the power of any State to regulate or control the same within its own jurisdiction, except as in the third section hereof prescribed.’ ” Globe 2465.
Like Phelps, Niblack found it unnecessary to participate in the debates. He was not heard from again until the vote on the call for the previous question. As Garfield ascertained at the time, the only opportunity to amend H. R. 127 would arise if the demand was voted down. Niblack voted to sustain it. Globe 2545.
Debate in the House was substantially concluded by Bingham, the man primarily responsible for the language of § 1. Without equivocation, he stated:
“The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States.
“The second section excludes the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save, indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each State to a republican government and to choose their Representatives in Congress is of .the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might change a State government from a republican to a despotic government, and thereby deny suffrage to the people.” Globe 2542.
Stevens then arose briefly in rebuttal. He attacked Bingham for saying in another portion of his speech that the disqualification provisions of § 3 were unenforceable. He did not contradict — or even refer to — Bingham’s *186 interpretation of §§ 1 and 2. Globe 2544. The vote was taken and the resolution passed immediately thereafter. Globe 2545:
To. say that Stevens did not contradict Bingham is to minimize the force of the record. Not once, during the three days of debate, did any supporter of the Amendment criticize or correct any of the Republicans or Democrats who observed that the Amendment left the ballot “exclusively under the control of the States.” Globe 2542 (Bingham). This'fact is tacitly admitted even by those who. find the debates “inconclusive.” The only contrary authority they can find in the debates is the pale remarks of the four Democrats already discussed. 54
In the Senate, which did not have a gag rule, matters-proceeded, at a more leisurely pace. The introductory speech would normally have been given by Senator Fes-senden of Maine, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on behalf of the Senate, .but he was still weak with illness and unable to deliver a lengthy speech. The duty of presenting the views of the Joint Committee therefore devolved on Senator Howard of Michigan. 55
54 Like my colleagues, post, at 264, I find it difficult to understand what Bingham meant when he said that “the exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States.”. Globe 2542. However, I do not find this mysterious sentence to mean that the exercise of the elective franchise is exclusively under the control of the States and Congress, nor do I find it to dilute the force of his explicit statements quoted above that § 1 did not reach the right to vote. The general statements by) Bingham and Stevens to the effect that the- Amendment was designed to achieve equality before the law, or would be effectuated by legislation in part, likewise do not weaken the -force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question quoted above.
*187 Howard minced no words. Hé stated that
“the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic]. Globe 2766.
“The second section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with that right.” Ibid. Howard stated that while he personally would have preferred to see the freedmen enfranchised, the Committee was confronted with the necessity of proposing an amendment which could be ratified.
“The committee were of opinion that the States are not yet prepared to sanction so fundamental a change as would be the concession of the right of suffrage to the colored race. We may- as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no misunderstanding on the subject. It was‘bur opinion that three fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race.” Ibid.
Howard’s forthright attempt to prevent misunderstanding was completely successful insofar as the Senate was concerned; at least, no one has yet discovered a remark during the Senate debates on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment which indicates any contrary impres *188 sion. 56 For some, however, time has muddied the clarity with which he spoke. 57
The Senate, like the House, made frequent reference to the fact that the proposed amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of the freedmen. The sup *189 porters who expressed their regret at the fact were Wade of Ohio, 58 Poland of Vermont, 59 Stewart of Nevada, 60 Howe of Wisconsin, 61 Henderson of Mis *190 souri, 62 and Yates of Illinois. 63 The remarks of Senator Sherman of Ohio, whose support for the amendment was lukewarm, see Globe 2986, seem to have been based on the common interpretation. 64
Doolittle of Wisconsin, whose support for the President resulted in his virtually being read out of the Republican Party,-proposed to base representation on adult male voters. Globe 2942. In a discussion with Senator Grimes of Iowa, a member of the Joint Committee, about the desirability of this change, Doolittle defended, himself by pointing out that: “Your amendment proposes to *191 allow the States to say who shall vote. Globe 2943. Grimes did not respond. Among the Democrats, no different view was expressed. Those whose remarks are informative are Hendricks of . Indiana, 65 . Cowan of Pennsylvania, 66 Davis of Kentucky, 67 and Johnson of Maryland. 68
Senator Howard, who had opened debate,' made the last remarks in favor of the Amendment. He said:
“We know very well that the States retain the power, which they have always possessed, of regulating the right of suffrage in the States. It is the theory of the Constitution itself. That right has never been taken from them; no endeavor has ever been made to take it from them; and the theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not to assume to regulate *192 it by any clause of the Constitution of the United States.” Globe 3039.
Shortly thereafter the Amendment was approved. Globe 3041-3042.
In the House, there was a brief discussion of the Senate amendments and the measure generally, chiefly by the Democrats. Stevens then concluded the debate as he had begun it, expressing his regret that the Amendment would not enfranchise the freedmen. 69 The House accepted the Senate changes and sent the measure to the States. Globe 3149.
E. Collateral Evidence of Congressional Intent
It has been suggested that despite this evidence of congressional understanding, which seems to me overwhelming, the history is nonetheless inconclusive. Primary reliance is placed on debates over H. R. 51, the Joint Committee’s first effort in the field of the basis of representation. In these debates, some of the more extreme Radicals, typified by Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, suggested that Congress had power to interfere with state voter qualifications at least to the extent of enfranchising the freedmen. This power was said to exist in a variety of constitutional provisions, including Art. I, § 2, Art. I, § 4, the war power, the power over territories, the guarantee of a republican form of government, and § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Those who held this view expressed concern lest the Committee’s proposal be read to authorize the States tq discriminate on racial grounds and stated that they could not vote for the measure if such was the correct construction. They were sometimes comforted by sup *193 porters of the committee proposal, who assured them that there would be no such effect. From these statements, and thé fact that some of those who took the extreme view ultimately did vote, for the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, it is sought to construct a counterargument: if H. R. 51, properly interpreted, would not have precluded congressional exercise of power otherwise existing under the constitutional provisions referred to, then § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted,, does not preclude the exercise of congressional power under §§ 1 and 5 of that Amendment.
This argument, however, is even logically fallacious, and quite understandably none of the opinions filéd today place much reliance on-it. I do not maintain that, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment took away with one hand what they had given with the other, but simply that the Amendment must be construed as a whole, and that for the reasons already given, supra, at 167-170, the inclusion of § 2 demonstrates that the framers never intended to confer the power which my Brethren seek to find in §§ 1 and 5. Bingham, for one, distinguished between these two positions. When it was suggested in the debates over H. R. 51 that the proviso would remove pre-existing congressional power over voting qualifications, Bingham made the response quoted by my colleagues.. Globe 431-432; see post, at 276-277.. When it was observed during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that § 2 démonstrated that the Amendment did not reach state control over voting qualifications, Bingham was the one making the observation. Globe 2542, quoted supra, at 185. As Bingham seems to have recognized, the sort of argument he made in connection with H. R. 51 is beside the point with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment.
In any event, even- disregarding its analytical difficulties, the argument is based on blatant factual shortcomings. All but one of the speakers on whose statements *194 primary reliance is placed stated, either during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment or subsequently, that the Amendment did not enfranchise the freedmen. 70
Finally, some of those determined to sustain the legislation now before us rely on speeches made between two and three years after Congress had sent the proposed Amendment to the States. - Boutwell and Stevens in the House, and Sumner in the Senate, argued that the Fif *195 teenth Amendment or enfranchising legislation was unnecessary because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination in voter qualifications. Each had earlier expressed the opposite position. 71 Their subsequent attempts to achieve by assertion what they had not had the votes to achieve by constitutional processes can hardly be entitled to weight.
F. Ratification
State materials relating to the ratification process are not very revealing. For the most part only gubernatorial messages and committee reports have survived. 72 So far as my examination of these materials reveals, while the opponents of the Amendment were divided *196 and sometimes equivocal on whether it might be construed to require enfranchisement, 73 the supporters of the Amendment in the States approached the congressional proponents in the unanimity of their interpretation. I have discovered only one brief passage in support of the Amendment which appears to be based on the assumption that it would result in enfranchisement. 74 These remarks, in the message of the Governor of Illinois, had to compete in the minds of the legislators with the viewpoint of the Chicago Tribune. This Radical journal repeatedly criticized the Amendment's lack of an enfranchising provision, and at one time it even expressed the hope that the South would refuse to' ratify the Amendment so that the North would turn to enfranchisement of the freedmen as the only means of reconstruction. June 25, 1866, quoted in James 177. In all the other States I have examined, where the materials are sufficiently full for the understanding of a supporter of the Amendment to appear, his under *197 standing has been that enfranchisement would not result. 75
The scanty official materials can be supplemented by other sources. There was a congressional election in the fall of the year the Fourteenth Amendment went to the States. The Radicals ran on the Amendment as their reconstruction program, attempting to force voters to choose between their plan and that of President Johnson. From the campaign speeches and from newspaper reactions, we can get some further idea of the understanding of the States.
The tone of the campaign was set by the formal report of the Joint Committee, which Fessenden openly stated he had composed as a partisan document. James 147. Indeed, it was not even submitted to Congress until the day the Senate approved the measure, and then only in manuscript form. Globe 3038. On the delicate issue of Negro suffrage, the report read as follows: 76
“Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was doubtful, in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached. As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. *198 This it was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage .of increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise. Such a provision would be in its nature gentle and persuasive, and would lead, it was hoped, at no distant day, to an equal participation of all, without distinction, in all the rights and privileges of citizenship, thus affording a full and adequate protection to all classes of citizens, since all would have, through the ballot-box, the power of self-protection.
“Holding these views, your committee prepared an amendment to the Constitution to carry out this idea; and submitted, the same to. Congress. Unfortunately,' as we think, it did not receive the •necessary.'constitutional support in the Senate, and therefore could not be proposed for adoption by the States. The principle involved in that amendment is, however, believed to be sound, and your committee have again proposed it in another form, hoping that it may .receive the approbation of Congress.”
Newspapers expressed the same view of the reach of the Amendment. Even while deliberations were underway, predictions that Congress would come up with a plan involving enfranchisement of the freedmen had gradually ceased. James 91. When the Amendment was released to the press, Andrew Johnson was reported as seeing in it a “practical abandonment of the negro suffrage issue.” Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 30, 1866, quoted in James 117. The New York Herald had reported editorially that the Amendment- reflected an abandonment .of the Radical push for Negro suffrage and acceptance of Johnson’s position that control over suffrage rested exclusively with the States. . May 1, 1866, reported in James 119. The Nation, a Radical organ, *199 attributed the absence of any provision on Negro suffrage to “sheer want of confidence in the public.” 2 Nation 545 (May. 1, 1866), quoted in James 120. The Chicago Tribune, another Radical organ, complained that § 1 was objectionable as “sürplusage,” May 5, 1866, quoted in James 123, and later in the same month criticized .the measure for “postponing, and not settling” the matter of equal political rights for Negroes. May 31, 1866, quoted in James 146. As deliberations continued, the reporting went on in the same vein. The New York Times reported that with elections approaching, “No one now talks or dreams of forcing Negro suffrage upon the Southern States.” June 6, 1866. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial and the Boston Daily Journal for June 7, 1866, commented on the Radicals’ abandonment of Negro suffrage. James 145.
Much the same picture emerges from the campaign' speeches. Although an occasional Democrat expressed the fear that the Amendment would or might result in political equality, 77 the supporters of the Amendment denied such effects without exception that I have discovered. Among the leading congressional figures who stated in campaign speeches that the Amendment did not prohibit racial voting qualifications were Senators Howe, Lane, Sherman, Sumner, and Trumbull, and Congressmen Bingham, Delano, Schenck, and Stevens. See James 159-168, 173, 178; Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 ; 70-78 (1949).
As was pointed out above, all but a handful of Northern States prohibited blacks from voting at all, *200 and opposition to a change was intense. Between 1865 and 1869 referenda on the issue rejected impartial Negro suffrage in Colorado Territory, Connecticut; Wisconsin, Minnesota (twice), the District of Columbia, Nebraska Territory, Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, and New York. Only Iowa and Minnesota accepted it, and that on the day Grant was elected to the Presidency. 78 It is inconceivable that' those States, in that climate, could have ratified the Amendment with the expectation that it would reqúire them to permit their black citizens to ' vote.
Small wonder, then, that in early 1869 substantially the same group of men who three years earlier had proposed the Fourteenth Amendment felt it necessary to make further modifications in the Constitution if state suffrage laws were to be controlled even to the minimal degree of prohibiting qualifications which on their face discriminated on the basis of race. If the consequences for our federal system were not so serious, the contention that the history is “inconclusive” would be undeserving of attention. And, with all respect, the transparent failure of attempts to cast doubt on the original understanding is simply further evidence of the force of the historical record.
II
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suffrage qualifications is remarkably free of the problems which bedevil most attempts to find a reliable guide to present decision in the pages of the past. Instead, there is virtually unanimous agreement, .clearly and repeatedly expressed, that- § 1 of the Amendment did not reach discriminatory voter qualifications. In this rather remarkable situation, the issue of the, bearing of the- historical understanding on constitutional interpretation squarely arises.
*201 I must confess to complete astonishment at the position of some of my Brethren that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment has become irrelevant. Ante, at 139-140. In the six years since I first set out much of this history, 79 I have seen no justification for such a result which appears to me at all adequate. With matters in this posture, I need do no more by way of justifying my reliance on these materials than sketch the familiar outlines of our constitutional system.
When the Constitution with its original Amendments came into being, the States delegated some of their sovereign powers to the Federal Government, surrendered other powers, and expressly retained all powers not delegated or surrendered. Amdt. X. The power to set state voting qualifications was neither surrendered nor delegated, except to the extent that the guarantee of a republican form of government 80 . may be thought to require a certain minimum distribution of political power. The power to set qualifications for voters for national office, created by the Constitution, was expressly committed to the States by Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § l. 81 By Art. V, States may be deprived of their retained powers only with the concurrence of two-thirds of each House of Congress and three-fourths of the States. No one asserts that the power to set voting qualifications was taken from the States or subjected to federal control by any Amendment before the Fourteenth. The historical evidence makes it plain that the Congress and the States proposing and ratifying that Amendment affirmatively understood that they were not limiting state power over voting . qualifications. The *202 existence of the power therefore survived the amending process, and, except as it has Been limited by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth,- and Twenty-fourth Amendments, it still exists today. 82 Indeed, the very fact that constitutional amendments were deemed necessary to bring about federal abolition of state restrictions on voting by reason of race (Arndt. XV), sex (Arndt. XIX), and, even with respect to federal elections, the failure to pay state poll taxes (Arndt. XXIV), is itself forceful evidence of the common understanding in 1869, 1919, and 1962, respectively, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to legislate in these respects.
It must be recognized, of course, that the amending process is not the only way in which constitutional understanding alters with time. The judiciary has long been entrusted with the task of. applying the Constitution .in changing circumstances, and as conditions change the Constitution in a sense changes as well. But when the Court gives the language of the Constitution an *203 unforeseen application, it does so, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers. 83 This is necessarily so; the federal judiciary, which by express constitutional provision is appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held responsible by the electorate, has no inherent general authority to establish the norms for the rest of society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the precepts ordained in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people. When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect. 84
*204 As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the commands of . the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as the Court understands them. Although Congress’ expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage qualifications is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, 85 this cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers. The reason for this goes beyond Marshall’s assertion that: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 86 It inheres in the structure of the *205 constitutional system itself. Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution making. The concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States was needed for the political check to be adequate. To allow a simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure. Nor is that structure adequately protected by a requirement that the judiciary be able to perceive a basis for the congressional interpretation, the only restriction laid down in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966).
It is suggested that the proper basis for the doctrine enunciated in Morgan lies in the relative factfinding competence of Court, Congress, and state legislatures. Post, at 246-249. In this view, as I understand it, since Congress is at least as well qualified as a state legislature to determine factual issues, and far better qualified than this Court, where a dispute is basically factual in nature the congressional finding of fact should control, subject only to review by this Court for reasonableness.
In the first place, this argument has little .or no force as applied to the issue whether the Fourteenth Amendment covers voter qualifications. Indeed, I do not understand the adherents of Morgan to maintain the con *206 trary. But even on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment does place a limit on the sorts of voter qualifications which a State may adopt, I still do not see any real force in the reasoning.
When my Brothers refer to “complex factual questions,” post, at 248, they call to mind disputes about primary, objective facts dealing with such issues as the number of persons between the ages of 18 and 21, the extent of their education, and so forth. The briefs of the four States in these cases take no issue with respect to any of the facts of this nature presented to Congress and relied on by my Brothers Douglas, ante, at 141-143, and Brennan, White, and Marshall, post, at 243-246, 279-280. Except for one or two matters of dubious relevance, these facts are not subject to rational dispute. The disagreement in these cases revolves around the evaluation of this largely uncontested factual material. 87 On the assumption that maturity and experience are relevant to intelligent and responsible exercise of the elective franchise, are the immaturity and inexperience of the average 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old sufficiently serious to justify denying such a person a direct voice in decisions affecting his or her life? Whether or not this judgment is characterized as “factual,” it calls for striking a balance between incommensurate interests. Where the balance is to be struck depends ultimately on the values and the perspective of the decisionmaker. It- is a matter as to which men of' good will can and do reasonably differ.
I fully agree that judgments of the sort involved here are beyond the institutional competence and constitu *207 tional authority of the judiciary. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 634-641 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting). They are pre-eminently matters for legislative discretion, with judicial review, if it exists at all, narrowly limited. But the same reasons which in my view would require the judiciary to sustain a reasonable state resolution of the issue also require.Congress to abstain from entering the picture.
Judicial, deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide. Establishment of voting qualifications is a matter for state legislatures. Assuming any authority at all, only when the Court can say with some confidence that the legislature has demonstrably erred in adjusting the competing interests is it justified in striking down the legislative judgment. This order of things is more efficient and more congenial to our system and, in my judgment, much more likely to achieve satisfactory results than one in which the Court has a free hand to replace state legislative judgments with its own. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963).
The same considerations apply, and with almost equal force, to Congress’ displacement of state decisions with its own ideas of wise policy. The sole distinction between Congress and the Court in this regard is that Congress, being an elective body, presumptively has popular authority for the value judgment it makes. But since the state legislature has. a like authority, this distinction between Congress and the judiciary falls short of justifying' a congressional veto on the state judgment. The perspectives and values of national legislators on the issue of voting qualification's are. likely to differ from those of state legislators, but I see no reason *208 a priori to prefer those of the national figures, whose collective decision, applying nationwide, is necessarily less able to take account of peculiar local conditions. Whether one agrees with this judgment or not, it is the one expressed by the Framers in leaving voter qualifications to the States. The Supremacy Clause does not, as my colleagues seem to argue, represent a judgment that federal decisions are superior to those of the States whenever the two may differ.
To be sure, my colleagues do not expressly say that Congress or this Court is empowered by the Constitution to substitute its own judgment for those of the States. However, before sustaining a state judgment they require a “clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest.” 88 Post, at 238; see post, at 247 n. 30. I should think that if the state interest were truly “compelling” and “substantial,” and a clear showing could be made that the voter qualification was “necessary” to its preservation, no reasonable person would think the qualification undesirable. Equivalently, if my colleagues or a majority of Congress deem a given voting qualification undesirable as a matter of policy, they must consider that the state interests involved are not “compelling” or “substantial” or that they can be adequately protected in other ways. It follows that my colleagues must be prepared to hold invalid as a matter *209 of federal- constitutional law all state voting qualifications which they deem unwise, as well as all such qualifications which Congress reasonably deems unwise. For this reason, I find their argument subject to the same objection as if it explicitly acknowledged such a conclusion.
It seems to me that the notion of - deference to congressional interpretation of the Constitution, which the Court promulgated in Morgan , is directly related to this higher standard of. constitutionality which the Court intimated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966), and brought to fruition in Kramer . When the scope of federal review of state determinations became so broad as to be judicially unmanageable, it was natural for the Court to seek assistance from the national legislature. If the federal role were restricted to its traditional and appropriate scope, review for the sort of “plain error” which is variously described as “arbitrary and capricious,” “irrational,” or “invidious,” there would be no call for the Court to defer to a congressional judgment on this score that it did not find convincing. Whether a state judgment has so exceeded the bounds of' reason as to authorize federal intervention is not a matter as to which the political process is intrinsically likely to produce a sounder or more acceptable result. It is a matter of the delicate adjustment of the federal system. In this area, to rely on Congress would make that body a judge in its own cause. The role of final arbiter belongs .to this Court.
III
Since I cannot agree that the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress, or the federal judiciary, to control voter qualifications, I turn to other asserted sources of congressional power. My Brother Black would find that such power. exists with respect to federal elections by *210 virtue of Art. I, § 4, and seemingly other considerations that he finds implicit in federal authority.
The constitutional provisions controlling the regulation of congressional elections are the following:
Art. I, § 2: “the Electors [for Representatives] in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”
Art. I, §4: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”
Amdt, XVII: “The electors [for Senators] in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”
It is difficult to see how words could be clearer in stating what Congress can control and what it cannot control. Surely nothing in these provisions lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress. The reason for the scheme is not hard to find. In the Constitutional Convention, Madison expressed the view that: “The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution.” 2 M. Earrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp, 249-250 (1911). He explained further in The Federalist No. 52, p. 326 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
“To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the *211 States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be.the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.”
See also Federalist No. 60, p. 371 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton), quoted in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, post, at 290, which is to the same effect.
As to presidential elections, the Constitution provides:
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .” Art. II, § 1, el. 2.
“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
Even the power to control the “Manner” of holding elections, given with respect to congressional elections by Art. I, § 4, is absent with respect to the selection of presidential electors. 89 And, of course, the fact that it was deemed necessary to provide separately for con *212 gressional power to regulate the time of choosing presidential electors and the President himself demonstrates that the power , over “Times, Places and Manner” given by Art. I, § 4, does not refer to presidential elections, but only to the elections for Congressmen. Any shadow of a justification for congressional power with respect to congressional elections therefore disappears utterly in presidential elections.
IV
With these major contentions resolved, it is convenient to consider the three sections of the Act individually to determine whether they can be supported by any other basis of congressional power.
A. Voting Age
The only constitutional basis advanced in support of the lowering of the voting age is the power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, a power found in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons already given, it cannot be said that the statutory provision is valid as declaratory of the meaning of that clause. Its validity therefore must rest on congressional power to lower the voting age as. a means of preventing invidious discrimination that is within .the purview of that clause.
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment may well foreclose the possibility that § 5 empowers Congress to enfranchise a class of citizens so that they may protect themselves against discrimination forbidden by the first section, but it is unnecessary for me to explore that question. For I think it fair to say that the suggestion that members of the age group between 18 and 21 are threatened with unconstitutional discrimination, or that any hypothetical discrimination is likely to be affected by lowering the voting age, is little short of fanciful. I see no justification for stretching to find any such possibility *213 when all the evidence indicates that Congress — led on by recent decisions of this Court — thought simply that 18-year-olds were fairly entitled to the vote and that Congress could give it to them by legislation. 90
I therefore conclude, for these and either reasons given in this opinion, that in § 302 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 Congress exceeded its delegated powers.
B. Residency
For reasons already stated, neither the power to regulate voting qualifications in presidential elections, asserted by my Brother Black, nor the power to declare the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, relied on by my Brother Douglas, can support § 202 of the Act. It would also be frivolous to contend that requiring' States to allow new arrivals to vote in presidential elections is an appropriate means of preventing local discrimination against them in other respects, or of forestalling violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. The remaining grounds relied on are the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, 91 and the right to travel across state lines.
While the right of qualified electors to cast their ballots and to have their votes counted was held to be a privilege of citizenship in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884), and United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), these decisions were careful to observe that it *214 remained with the States to determine the class of qualified voters. It was federal law, acting on this state-defined class, which turned the right to vote into a privilege of national citizenship. As the Court has. consistently held, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses do not react on the mere status of citizenship to enfranchise any citizen whom an otherwise valid state law does not allow to vote. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 170-175 (1875); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 632 (1904); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302. U. S. 277, 283 (1937); cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1944). Minors, felons, insane persons, and persons who have .not satisfied residency requirements are among those citizens who are not allowed to vote in most States. 92 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV of the Constitution is a .direct descendant of Art. IV of the Articles of Confederation:
“The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this .Union, the free inhabitants of each of.'these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from, justice excepted, shall be entitled to ' all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . .
It is inconceivable that these words when used in the Articles could have been understood to abolish state durational residency requirements. 93 There is not a *215 vestige of evidence that any further extent was envisioned for them when they were carried over into the Constitution. And, as I have shown, when they were substantially repeated in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment it was affirmatively understood that they did not include the right to vote. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is therefore unavailing to sustain any portion of § 202.
The right to travel across state lines, see United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 630 (1969), is likewise insufficient to require Idaho to conform its laws to the requirements of § 202. Mr. Justice Stewart justifies § 202 solely on the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of § 1 which he deems the basis for the right to travel. Post, at 285-287. I find it impossible to square the position that § 5 authorizes Congress to abolish state voting qualifications based on residency with the position that it does not authorize Congress to abolish such qualifications based on race. Since the historical record compels me to accept the latter position, I must reject the former.
Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall do not anchor the right of interstate travel to any specific constitutional provision. Post, at 237-238. Past decisions to which they refer have relied on the two Privileges and Immunities Clauses, just discussed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and .the Commerce Clause. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 630 n. 8; id., at 663-671 (dissenting opinion). The Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to state laws; and surely the Commerce Clause cannot be seriously relied on to sustain the Act here challenged. With no specific clause of the Constitution *216 empowering Congress to enact § 202, I fail to see how that nebulous judicial construct, the right to travel, can do so.
C. Literacy
The remaining provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments involved in these cases is the five-year suspension of Arizona’s requirement that registrants be able to read the Constitution in English and to write their names. Although the issue is not free from difficulty, I am of the opinion that this provision can be sustained as a valid means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.
Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or effect, Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious. 94 This danger of violation of § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment was sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power under § 2.
Whether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into the extent and effects of discrimination, either as . a condition precedent or as a condition subsequent to suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make. 95 The fact that the suspension is only for five years will require Congress to re-evaluate at the close of that period. While a less sweeping approach *217 in this delicate area might well have been appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of the reasonable. 96 I therefore agree that § 201 of the Act is a valid exercise of congressional power to the extent it is involved in this case. I express no view about its validity as applied to suspend tests such as educational qualifications, which do not lend themselves so readily to discriminatory application or effect.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, I would grant the relief requested in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig. I would dismiss the complaint in No. 47, Orig., for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In No. 46, Orig., I would grant declaratory relief with respect to the validity of § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments as applied to Arizona’s current literacy test; I would deny relief in all other respects, with leave to reapply to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for injunctive relief in the event it proves necessary, which I am confident it will not.
V
In conclusion I add the following. ' The consideration that has troubled me most in deciding that the 18-year-old and residency provisions of this legislation should be held unconstitutional is whether I ought to regard the doctrine of stare decisis as preventing me from arriving at that result. For as I indicated at the outset of this opinion, were I to continue to consider myself constricted by recent past decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches *218 state electoral processes, I would, particularly perforce of the decisions cited in n. 84, supra, be led to cast my vote with those of my Brethren who are of the opinion that the lowering of the voting age and the abolition of state residency requirements in presidential elections are within the ordinary legislative power of Congress.
After much reflection I have reached the conclusion that I ought not to allow stare decisis to stand in the way of casting my vote in accordance with what I am deeply convinced the Constitution demands. In the annals of this Court few developments in the march of events have so imperatively called upon us to take a fresh hard look at past decisions, which could well be mustered in support of such developments, as do the legislative lowering of the voting age and, albeit to a lesser extent, the elimination of state residential requirements in presidential elections. Concluding, as I have, that such decisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, I think it my duty to depart from them, rather than to lend my support to perpetuating their .constitutional error in the flame of stare decisis.
In taking this position, I feel fortified by the evident malaise among the members of the Court with those decisions. Despite them, a majority of the Court holds that this congressional attempt to lower the voting age by simple legislation is unconstitutional, insofar as it relates , to state elections. Despite them, four members of the Court take the same view of this legislation with respect to federal elections as well; and the fifth member of the Court who considers the legislation constitutionally infirm as regards state elections relies not at all on any of those decisions in reaching the opposite conclusion in federal elections. And of the eight members of the Court who vote to uphold the residential provision of the stat *219 ute, only four appear to rely upon any of those decisions-in reaching that result.
In these circumstances I am-satisfied that I am free to decide these cases unshackled by a line of decisions which I have felt from the start entailed a basic departure from sound constitutional principle.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF HARLAN, J.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, PUB. L. 91-285, 84 STAT. 314
Title II — Supplemental Pkovisions
APPLICATION OF PROHIBITION TO OTHER STATES
Sec. 201. (a) Prior to August 6, 1975, no citizen shall be denied, because of his failure to'comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election conducted in any State or political subdivision of a State as to which the provisions of section 4 (a) of this Act are hot in effect by reason of determinations made under section 4 (b) of this Act. .
(b) As used in this section, the term “test or device” means any requirement that a pérson as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (L) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, of (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class. ^
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING
Sec. 202. (a) The Congress hereby finds that .the imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient *220 opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections—
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to. vote for their President and Vice President;
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines;
(3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens of each State under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution;
(4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote for such officers because of the way they may vote;
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, and due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment;, and
(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections.
(b) Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that in order to sécure and protect the above-stated rights of citizens under the Constitution, to enable citizens to better obtain the enjoyment of such rights, and to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary (1) to completely abolish the durational.residency requirement as a precondition to voting for President and Vice President, and (2) to establish nationwide, uniform standards relative to absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections.
(c) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any election for President and Vice President shall be deniéd the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President,- or for. President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to comply with any durational residency *221 requirement of such State or political subdivision; nor shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political subdivision.at the time of such election, if- such citizen shall have complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision providing for the casting of absentee ballots in such election.
(d) For the purposes of this section, each State shall provide by law for the registration or other means of qualification of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty, days immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President or for President and Vice President in such election; and each State shall provide by law for the casting of. absentee ballots for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their election district or unit in such State on the day such election is held and who have applied therefor not later than seven days immediately prior to such election and have returned such ballots to the appropriate election official of such State not later than the time of closing of the polls in such State on the day of such election.
(e) If any citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision. in any election for President and Vice President has begun residence in such State or political subdivision after the thirtieth day next preceding such election and, for that reason, does not satisfy the registration requirements of such State or political subdivision he shall.be allowed to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice *222 President, or for President and Vice President, in such election, (1) in person in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he had satisfied, as of the- date of his change of residence, the requirements to vote in that State or political sub-division, or (2) by absentee ballot in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he satisfies, but for his nonresident status and the reason for his absence, the requirements for absentee voting in that State or political subdivision.
(f) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote by absentee ballot in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of any requirement; of registration that does not include a provision for absentee registration.
(g) Nothing in this section shall prevent any State or political subdivision from adopting less restrictive voting practices than those that are prescribed herein.
SEPARABILITY
Sec. 205. If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not. be affected by such determination.
Title III — Reducing Voting Age to Eighteen in Federal^ State, and Local Elections
DECLARATION AND FINDINGS
Sec. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the requirement that a *223 citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in any primary or in any election—
(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote — a particularly unfair treatment of such, citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed .upon such citizens;
(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are gúaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and
(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest.
(b) In order to secure the constitutional rights set forth in subsection (a), the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial of the right to vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or over.
PROHIBITION
Sec; 302. Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or older..
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 305. The provisions of title III shall take effect with respect to any primary or election held on or after January 1, 1971.
ARIZONA CONSTITUTION
Art. 7, § 2. No person shall be entitled to vote at any general election, or for any office that now is, or hereafter may be, elective by the people, or upon any question *224 which may be submitted to a vote of the people, unless such person be a citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years or over, and shall have resided in the State one year immediately preceding such election, provided that qualifications for voters at a general election for the purpose, of electing presidential electors shall be as prescribed by law. The word “citizen” shall include persons of the male and female sex.
ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED
§ 16-101. Qualifications of elector
A. Every resident of the state is qualified to become an elector and may register to vote at all elections authorized by law if he:
1. Is a citizen of the United States.
2. Will be twenty-one years or more of age prior to the regular general election next following his registration.
3. Will have been a resident of the state one year and of the county in which he claims the right to vote thirty days next preceding the election.
4. Is able to read the constitution of the United States in the English language in a manner showing that he is neither prompted nor reciting from memory, unless prevented from so -doing by physical disability.
5. Is able to write his name, unless prevented from so doing by physical disability.
B. At an election held between the date of registration and the next regular general election, the elector is eligible to vote if at the date of the intervening election he is twenty-one years of age and has been a resident of the state one year, and the county thirty days.
C. A person convicted of treason or a felony, unless restored to civil rights, or an idiot, insane person or person under guardianship is not qualified to register. As amended, Laws 1970, c. 151, § 1.
*225 § 16-107. Closing of registrations
A. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o’clock p. m. of the day which is two months preceding the' date of the next primary election and seven o’clock p. m. of the day of the primary election.
B. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o’clock p. m. of the eighth Monday preceding a general election and seven o’clock p. m. of the day thereof. As amended, Laws 1958, c. 48, § 1; Laws 1970, c. 151, § 5.
IDAHO CONSTITUTION
Art. 6, § 2. Qualifications of electors. — Except as in this article otherwise provided, every male or female citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the county where he or she offers to vote, thirty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as provided by law, is a qualified elector; provided however, that every citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state for sixty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as required by law, is a qualified elector for the sole purpose of voting for presidential electors; and until otherwise provided by the legislature, women who have the qualifications prescribed in this article may continue to hold such school offices and vote at such school elections as provided by the laws of Idaho territory.
IDAHO CODE
Sec. 34-401. Qualifications of voters. — Every person over the age of twenty-one (21) years, possessing the qualifications following, shall be entitled to vote at all elections: He shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this state six (6) months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote, *226 and in the county thirty (30) days.: provided, that no person shall be permitted to vote at any county seat election who has not resided in the county six (6) months, and in the precinct ninety (90) days, where he offers to vote; nor shall any person be permitted to .vote at any election for the division of the county, or striking off from any county any part thereof, who has not the qualifications provided for in section 3, article 18, of the constitution; nor shall any person be denied the right to vote at any school district election, nor to hold any school district office on account of sex.
34-408. Eligibility of new residents to vote. — Each citizen of the United States who, immediately prior to his removal to this state, was a citizen of another state and who has been a resident of this state for sixty (60) days next preceding the day of election but for less than the six. (6) month period of required residence for voting prior to a presidential election, is entitled to' vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors at that election, but for no other offices, if
(1) he otherwise possesses the substantive qualifications to vote in this state, except the requirement of residence and registration, and
(2) he complies %ith the provisions of this act.
34-409. Application for presidential ballot by new residents. — A person desiring to qualify under this act in order to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors shall be considered as registered within the meaning of this act if oiyor before ten (10) days prior to the date of the general election, he shall make an application in the form of an affidavit executed in duplicate in the presence of the county auditor, substantially as follows .... _
34-413. Voting by new residents. — (1) The applicant, upon receiving the ballot for presidentiaband vice-presidential electors shall mark - forthwith the. ballot' in the *227 presence of the county auditor, but in a manner that the official cannot know how the ballot is marked. He shall then fold the ballot in the county auditor’s presence so as to conceal the markings, and deposit and seal it in an. envelope furnished by the county auditor.
34-1101. Absent voting authorized: — Any qualified elector of the state of Idaho who is absent or expects to be absent from the election precinct in which he resides on the day of holding any election under any of the laws of this. state in which an official ballot is required, or who is within the election precinct and is, or will be, unable, because of physical disability, or because of blindness, to go to the voting place, and if registration is required for such election, who is duly registered therefor, may vote, at any such election; as hereinafter provided.
34-1105. Return of ballot. — On marking such ballot or ballots such absent or disabled or blind elector shall refold same as theretofore folded and shall inclose the same in said official envelope and seal said énvelope securely and mail by registered or certified mail or deliver it in person to the officer who issued same; provided, that an absentee ballot must be received by the issuing officer by 12:00 o’clock noon on the day of the election before such ballot may be counted. Said ballot or ballots shall be so marked, folded and sealed by said voter in private and secretly. Provided, that whenever the disability or blindness makes it necessary that the voter shall be assisted in marking his ballot, such voter may ■ have the assistance of any'person of his choice in marking his ballot.
OREGON. CONSTITUTION
Art. II, § 2. Qualifications of electors. (1) Eveijy citizen of the United States is entitled to vote in all eleqtioiis not otherwise provided for by this Constitution if such citizen:
(a) Is 21 years of age or older ....
*228 TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Art. 6, § 1. Classes of persons not allowed to vote
Section 1. The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State, to wit:
First: Persons under twenty-one (21) years of age.
Second: Idiots and lunatics.
Third: All paupers supported by any county.
Fourth: All persons convicted of any felony, subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may make.
§ 2. Qualified; elector; registration; absentee voting
Sec. 2. Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this State one (1) year next preceding, an election and the last six (6) months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector; provided, however, that before offering to vote .at an. election a voter shall have registered annually, but such requirement for registration shall not be considered a qualification of an elector within the meaning of the term “qualified elector” as used in any other Article of this Constitution in respect to any matter except qualification and eligibility to vote at an election. Any legislation enacted in anticipation of the adoption of this Amendment shall not be invalid because of its anticipatory nature. The Legislature may authorize absentee voting. And this provision of the Constitution shall be self-enacting without the necessity of further legislation.
TEXAS ELECTION CODE
Article 5.01. Classes of persons not qualified to vote . The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this state:
1. Persons under twenty-one years of age.
2. Idiots and lunatics.
*229 3. All paupers supported by the county.
4. All persons convicted of any felony except those restored to full citizenshp and right of suffrage or pardoned.
Art. 5.02. Qualification and requirements for voting
Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election and the last six months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, and who shall have registered as a voter, shall be deemed á qualified elector. No person shall be permitted to vote unless he has registered in accordance with the provisions of this code. The provisions of this section, as modified by Sections 35 and 39 of this code, shall apply to all elections, including general, special, and primary elections, whether held by the state, by a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, or by a political party.
Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall dissent from the judgments insofar as they declare § 302 unconstitutional as applied to state and local elections, and concur in the judgments in all other respects, for the following reasons.
These cases draw into question the power and judgment of Congress in enacting Titles II and HI of the "Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314 . The State of Arizona challenges the power of Congress to impose a nationwide ban, until August 6, 1975, on the use of literacy and certain other tests to limit the franchise in any election. The State of Idaho takes issue with the asserted congressional power to find that the imposition of a durational residence requirement to deny the right to vote in elections for President and Vice President imposes a burden upon the right of free inter *230 state migration that is not necessary to further a compelling state interest. 1 Finally, the States of Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Idaho would have us strike down as unreasonable and beyond congressional power the findings, embodied in § 301 (a) of the Amendments, that denying the vote to otherwise qualified persons 18 to 21 years of age, while granting it to those 21 years of age and Older, violates thé Equal Protection Clause and is, in any event, hot reasonably related to any compelling state interest. 2 . In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have invoked our original jurisdiction under Art. Ill,- § 2, of the Constitution to restrain the Attorney General of the United States, a citizen of New York, from enforcing the 18-year-old voting provisions of the Amend *231 ments. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 307 (1966). In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks orders enjoining Arizona from enforcing age and literacy limitations on the franchise, 3 arid enjoining Idaho from enforcing age, residence, and absentee voting limitations, 4 insofar as those limitations are inconsistent with the 1970 Amendments. Original jurisdiction, again, is founded upon Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution. See United States v. California, 332 U. S 19, 22 (1947). Since, in our view, congressional power to enact the challenged Amendments is found in the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteerith Amendments, and since we may easily perceive a rational basis for the congressional judgments underlying each of them, we would deny relief in Ños. 43; Orig., and 44, Orig., and issue the requested orders in Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig.
I
The Voting Nights Act of. 1965, 79 Stat. 438,42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V), proscribed the use of any “test or device,” 5 including literacy tests, in States *232 or their political subdivisions that fell within a coverage formula set forth in § 4 (b) of the 1965 Act. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (a), (b) (1964 ed., Supp. Y). Although we had previously concluded that literacy tests, fairly administered, violate neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment, Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U. S. 45 (1959), we nevertheless upheld their selective proscription by Congress. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). Canvassing the “voluminous” legislative history of the 1965 Act, we found ample basis for a legislative conclusion that such a proscription was necessary to combat the “insidious and pervasive evil” of racial discrimination with regard to voting. Id., at 308-315 . Accordingly, we held the proscription to be well within the power of Congress granted by § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 327-334. Three years later, in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), we sustained application of the ban on literacy tests to a county where there was no evidence that the test itself was discriminatory . or that — at least since 1962 6 — it had been administered in a discriminatory manner. Notwithstanding this fact, we noted that the record did contain substantial evidence that in years past, “Gaston County [had] systematically deprived. its. black citizens of the educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens.” Id., at 297 . Since this “in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test,” id., at 291 , even impartial administration of an impartial test would inevitably'result in just thé discrimination that Congress *233 and the Fifteenth Amendment had sought to proscribe. Id., at 296-297 ; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 333-334 .
No challenge is made in the present cases either to the 1965 Act or to the five-year extension of its ban on “tests or devices” embodied in Title I of the 1970 Amendments. Arizona does, however, challenge .§ 201 of the Amendments, which extends (until August 6, 1975) the 1965 Act's selective ban on the use of “tests or devices” to all States and political subdivisions in which it is not already in force by virtue of the 1965 Act. In substance, Arizona argues that it is and has been providing education of equal quality for all its citizens; that its literacy test is both fair and fairly administered; and that there is no evidence in the legislative record upon which Congress could have relied to reach a contrary conclusion. It urges that to the extent that any citizens of Arizona have been denied' the right to vote because of illiteracy resulting from discriminatory governmental practices, the unlawful discrimination has been by governments other than the State of Arizona or its political subdivisions. Arizona, it suggests, should not have its laws overridden to cure discrimination on the part of governmental bodies elsewhere in the country.
We need not question Arizona’s assertions as to the nondiscriminatory character, past and present, of its educational system. Congressional power to remedy the evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination does not end when the subject of that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred. “The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed-upon the theory that the peoples of.the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc,, 294 U. S. *234 511, 523 (1935); see Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 173-176 (1941). In upholding the suspension of literacy tests as applied to Gaston County under the 1965 Act, we could see “no legal significance” in the possibility that adult residents of the county might have received -their education “in other counties or States also maintaining segregated and unequal school systems.” Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S., at 293 n. 9. 7
The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments contains substantial information upon which Congress could have based a finding that the use of literacy tests in Arizona and in other States where their use was not proscribed by the 1965 Act has the effect of denying the vote to racial-minorities whose illiteracy is the consequence of a previous, governmentally sponsored denial of equal educational opportunity. The Attorney General of Arizona told the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that- many older Indians in the State were “never privileged to attend a formal - school.' 8 Extensive testimony before both Houses indicated that racial minorities have long received inferior educational opportunities throughout the United States. 9 And in *235 terstate migration of such persons, particularly of Negroes from the Southern States, has long been a matter of common knowledge. 10
Moreover, Congress was given testimony explicitly relating the denial of educational opportunity to inability to pass literacy tests in States not covered by the formula contained in the 1965 Act. The United States Commission on Civil Rights reported a survey of the Northern and Western States which.concluded that literacy tests have a negative impact upon voter registration which “falls most heavily on blacks and- persons of Spanish surname.” 11 With regard specifically to Arizona, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council testified that a greater percentage, of Navajos are registered in New Mexico, which has no literacy test, than in Arizona. 12
In short, there is no question but that Congress, could' legitimately have’ concluded that the use of literacy tests'anywhere within the United States has the-inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in .education. Almost five years ago, we found in § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment an ample grant of legislative power for Congress to decree a selective proscription of such .tests in certain portions of the country. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 327-334 . We have since held that power ample to cover the proscription of fair literacy tests, fairly administered, which *236 nevertheless operate to disenfranchise racial minorities because of previous governmental discrimination against them in education. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S., at 287, 289-293 . Five years of experience with the 1965 Act persuaded Congress that a nationwide ban on literacy and other potentially discriminatory tests was necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting throughout the country. That conclusion is amply supported in the legislative record and § 201 of the 1970 Amendments is accordingly well within the scope of congressional power.
II
Section 202 of the 1970 Amendments abolishes all durational state residence requirements restricting the right to vote in presidential elections. In their place, Congress has undertaken to prescribe a uniform nationwide system of registration and absentee voting designed to allow all otherwise qualified persons to vote in such elections regardless of the length of time they, have lived in a particular jurisdiction. 13 The States are required to keep open their registration rolls for presidential elections until 30 days preceding the election. § 202 (d). Persons who have changed their residence within 30 days of the election are, if otherwise qualified, entitled to vote either in person or by absentee ballot in the State of their previous residence, § 202 (e), and the States are compelled to permit the casting of absentee ballots by all properly qualified persons who have made application not less than seven days prior to the election, and returned the ballot to the appropriate officials not later than the closing of polls on election day. '§§ 202 (b), (d). Provision must also be made by the States to allow absentee registration. § 202 (f).
*237 Idaho challenges the power, of Congress to enact such legislation insofar as it conflicts with Idaho’s statutory and constitutional provisions regarding durational residence requirements for voting; regarding absentee voting; and regarding absentee registration. 14 The State’s argument in brief is. that the Constitution has left to the States the power to set. qualifications for voters in both state and federal elections, subject only to certain explicit limitations such as, for example, those imposed by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments. Admitting that unreasonable residence requirements may not withstand judicial scrutiny, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), Idaho urges that its 60-day residence requirement is necessary for protection against fraud, and for administrative purposes. In consequence, § 202 of the 1970 Amendments is said to be of no weight against these compelling state interests.
Whether or not the Constitution vests Congress with particular power to set qualifications for voting in strictly federal elections, 15 we believe there is an adequate, constitutional basis for § 202 in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For more than a century, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and settlement. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C. J.) ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 629-631, 634 (1969). From whatever constitutional provision this right may be said to flow, 16 both its existence *238 and its fundamental importance to our Federal Union have long been established beyond question.
By definition, the imposition of a durational residence requirement operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration. Of course, governmental action that has the incidental effect of burdening the exercise of a constitutional right is not ipso facto unconstitutional. But in such a case, governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 634 ; United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 582-583 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406-409 (1963). And once it be determined, that a burden has bee

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424371. Public record. Not legal advice.