# Ashe v. Swenson > Supreme Court of the United States · April 20, 1970 · 397 U.S. 436 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424231 ## Case - **Full name:** Ashe v. Swenson, Warden - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** April 20, 1970 - **Citations:** 397 U.S. 436; 90 S. Ct. 1189; 25 L. Ed. 2d 469; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 54 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Harlan - **Judges:** Stewart, Black, Harlan, Brennan, Bubger, Douglas, Marshall - **Cited by:** 3,645 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Declined to follow on other grounds by Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 17 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424231 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that determining the preclusive effect of a prior judgment requires courts to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verd… - explaining that when judgment of acquittal is based on a general verdict, the reviewing tribunal must “examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have g… - stating that when a previous judgment of acquittal is based on a general verdict, the court must “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded … - recognizing an issue preclusion component to the federal Double Jeopardy Clause and concluding that, when the defendant was acquitted for the robbery of one person based on the state’s failure to prove the defendant’s identity as one of the robbers, the state was precluded fro… - finding that once the first jury “had determined upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification evidence in a second prosecution for the [same] r… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring. If I were to judge this case under the traditional standards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, I would adhere to the decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464 (1958), believing that regardless of the reach of the federal rule of collateral estoppel, it would have been open to a state court to treat the issue differently. However, having acceded in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 744 (1969), to the decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), which, over my dissent, held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States the standards of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, I am satisfied that on this present record Ashe’s acquittal in the first trial brought double jeopardy standards into play. Hence, I join the Court’s opinion. In doing so I wish to make explicit my understanding that the Court’s opinion in no way intimates that the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces to any degree the “same transaction” concept reflected in the concurring opinion of my Brother Brennan. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424231. Public record. Not legal advice.