# In Re WINSHIP > Supreme Court of the United States · May 18, 1970 · 397 U.S. 358 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424222 ## Case - **Full name:** In Re Winship - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 18, 1970 - **Citations:** 397 U.S. 358; 90 S. Ct. 1068; 25 L. Ed. 2d 368; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 56 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Burger - **Judges:** Brennan, Harlan, Burger, Black, Stewart - **Cited by:** 9,912 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 (1974). - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 6 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424222 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining “[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned” and, therefore, “every individual going about his ordinary affairs [must] have confidence that his … - explaining the long-standing history of the government’s burden-of-proof, describing the “vital role [the reasonable-doubt standard plays] in the American scheme of criminal procedure,” and “explicitly hold[ing] that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convicti… - holding that the reasonable doubt standard is “a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence' — that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies … - stating that "[t]he [reasonable-doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law"' (quoting Coffin v. United States… - holding that “where a 12-year-old child is charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (alteration and internal quotation marks… ## Opinion text Mr. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting. The Court’s opinion today rests entirely on the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are “criminal prosecutions,” hence subject to constitutional limitations. This derives from earlier holdings, which, like today’s *376 holding, were steps eroding the differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal courts. The original concept of the juvenile court system was to provide a benevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could provide for dealing with the special and often sensitive problems of youthful offenders. Since I see no constitutional requirement of due process sufficient to overcome the legislative judgment of the States in this area, I dissent from further strait-jacketing of an already overly restricted system. What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breathing room and flexibility in order to survive, if it can survive the repeated assaults from this Court. Much of the judicial attitude manifested by the Court’s opinion today and earlier holdings in this field is really a protest against inadequate juvenile court staffs and facilities; we “burn down the stable to get rid of the mice.” The lack of support and the distressing growth of juvenile crime have combined to make for a literal breakdown in many if not most juvenile courts. Constitutional problems were not seen while those courts functioned in an atmosphere where juvenile judges were not crushed with an avalanche of cases. My hope is that today’s decision will not spell the end of a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment intended to mitigate the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful offenders to a traditional criminal court; each step we take turns the clock back to the pre-juvenile-court era. I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well on the way to accomplishing. We can only hope the legislative response will not reflect our own by having these courts abolished. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9424222. Public record. Not legal advice.