# Smith v. Hooey

> Supreme Court of the United States · January 20, 1969 · 393 U.S. 374

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423884

## Case

- **Full name:** Smith v. Hooey, Judge
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** January 20, 1969
- **Citations:** 393 U.S. 374; 89 S. Ct. 575; 21 L. Ed. 2d 607; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2781
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by White
- **Judges:** Stewart, Black, Harlan, White
- **Cited by:** 989 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423884

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that states are under "a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort” to acquire the presence of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction in order to comport with the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial
- explaining that the accused’s ability to defend himself while incarcerated is hampered because “his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired”
- holding the State had a constitutional duty, upon request of federal prisoner that he be brought to trial on a state charge, to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before state court for trial
- holding that where a defendant in federal custody in another state demands a speedy trial on state criminal charges, the state must make diligent, good-faith efforts to secure his presence for trial
- observing, in case involving delay in state-court prosecution, “the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.”

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, understanding its remand of the cause “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion” to leave open the ultimate question whether Texas must dismiss the criminal proceedings against the petitioner. The Texas court’s erroneous reliance on the fact of incarceration elsewhere prevented it from reaching the other facets of this question, which may now be adjudicated in the manner permitted by Texas procedure.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423884. Public record. Not legal advice.