# Smith v. Hooey > Supreme Court of the United States · January 20, 1969 · 393 U.S. 374 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423883 ## Case - **Full name:** Smith v. Hooey, Judge - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** January 20, 1969 - **Citations:** 393 U.S. 374; 89 S. Ct. 575; 21 L. Ed. 2d 607; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2781 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Black - **Judges:** Stewart, Black, Harlan, White - **Cited by:** 989 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423883 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that states are under "a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort” to acquire the presence of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction in order to comport with the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial - explaining that the accused’s ability to defend himself while incarcerated is hampered because “his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired” - holding the State had a constitutional duty, upon request of federal prisoner that he be brought to trial on a state charge, to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before state court for trial - holding that where a defendant in federal custody in another state demands a speedy trial on state criminal charges, the state must make diligent, good-faith efforts to secure his presence for trial - observing, in case involving delay in state-court prosecution, “the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.” ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Black concurs in the opinion and judgment of the Court, but he would make it absolutely clear to the Supreme Court of Texas that so far as the federal constitutional question is concerned its judgment is set aside only for the purpose of giving the petitioner a trial, and that if a trial is given the case should not be dismissed. Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. I agree that a State may not ignore a criminal accused’s request to be brought to trial, merely because he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, but that it must make a reasonable effort to secure his presence for trial. This much is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and I would rest decision of this case on that ground, and not on “incorporation” of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial provision into the Pour- *384 teenth. See my opinion concurring in the result in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 226 (1967). I believe, however, that the State is entitled to more explicitness from us as to what is to be expected of it on remand than what is conveyed merely by the requirement that further proceedings not be “inconsistent with this opinion.” Must the charges against petitioner be dismissed? Or may Texas now secure his presence and proceed to try him? If petitioner contends that he has been prejudiced by the nine-year delay, how is this claim to be adjudicated? This case is one of first impression for us, and decides a question on which the state and lower federal courts have been divided. Under these particular circumstances, I do not believe that Texas should automatically forfeit the right to try petitioner. If the State still desires to bring him to trial, it should do so forthwith. At trial, if petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he has in fact been prejudiced by the State’s delay, I would then shift to the State the burden of proving the contrary. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423883. Public record. Not legal advice.