# Terry v. Ohio

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 10, 1968 · 392 U.S. 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423754

## Case

- **Full name:** Terry v. Ohio
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 10, 1968
- **Citations:** 392 U.S. 1; 44 Ohio Op. 2d 383; 88 S. Ct. 1868; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1345
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by White
- **Judges:** Black, Douglas, Harlan, Warren, White
- **Cited by:** 33,289 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 3
- Distinguished by: 21
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423754

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding "that where a police officer observes unusual conduct that leads him reasonably to con- *405 elude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of i…
- holding "that where a police officer observes unusual conduct that leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investig…
- recognizing that “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person”; the “careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is . . . a ‘sear…
- explaining that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot,” the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or di…
- finding “authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. Th…

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, reserving judgment, however, on some of the Court’s general remarks about the scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule which the Court has fashioned in the process of enforcing the Fourth Amendment.
Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this case, I think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation. In my view, it is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons. Perhaps the frisk itself, where proper, will have beneficial results whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest will fol *35 low. If none are found, the frisk may nevertheless serve preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has been aroused. But if the investigative stop is sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423754. Public record. Not legal advice.
