# Bumper v. North Carolina

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 3, 1968 · 391 U.S. 543

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423735

## Case

- **Full name:** Bumper v. North Carolina
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 3, 1968
- **Citations:** 391 U.S. 543; 46 Ohio Op. 2d 382; 88 S. Ct. 1788; 20 L. Ed. 2d 797; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1470
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by White
- **Judges:** Stewart, Harlan, Black, White
- **Cited by:** 2,674 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423735

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the government cannot satisfy its burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given when homeowner simply stated “go ahead” in response to police declaration of a warrant to search the residence; “[t]he situation is instinct with coercion — albeit co…
- holding that a defendant’s consent to search was invalid when the defendant consented after police claimed to have a warrant to search the defendant’s home because the police action conveyed that the defendant had “no right to resist the search”
- holding that officers may not obtain consent to search through a “false claim of legal authority”
- holding that the prosecution must prove that consent was “freely and voluntarily given” and that “[t]his burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice White,
dissenting.
When “consent” to a search is given after the occupant has been told by police officers that they have a warrant for the search, it seems reasonable to me for Fourth Amendment purposes to view the consent as conditioned on there being a valid warrant, absent clear proof that the consent was actually unconditional. The evidence in this record does not show unconditional consent with sufficient clarity, and perhaps this would be the result in most cases. But this does not mean that *562 every search following conditional consent is invalid. If upon a motion to suppress or upon an objection to evidence offered at the trial, the State produces a valid warrant for the search, there is no good reason to exclude the evidence simply because police at the time of the search relied on the consent and neither served nor returned the warrant. In the case before us the State represented in this Court that there was a warrant for the challenged search. Unlike the Court and Mr. Justice Harlan, I would not brush this matter aside. Since the existence and validity of the warrant have not been determined in the state courts, the case is not ripe for reversal or affirmance. I would therefore not reverse, but vacate, this conviction, returning the case to the state courts for a determination of the validity of the warrant. If because of the absence of probable cause, or for some other reason, the warrant would not have been a proper predicate for the search, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), would require reversal of the conviction unless it is saved under the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). *
Of course, if it was determined that the grandmother's consent was not good against petitioner, who had standing to raise the validity of the search, it would be unnecessary to deal with the issues which have been argued and determined in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423735. Public record. Not legal advice.