# Smith v. Illinois

> Supreme Court of the United States · January 29, 1968 · 390 U.S. 129

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423613

## Case

- **Full name:** Smith v. Illinois
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** January 29, 1968
- **Citations:** 390 U.S. 129; 88 S. Ct. 748; 19 L. Ed. 2d 956; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 3131
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Harlan
- **Judges:** Stewart, White, Harlan, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 642 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423613

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, absent waiver by the defendant, a denial of cross-examination is a “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that the ___ _____ defendant must be accorded a fair opportunity to place an adverse witness in the witness's proper setting and to put his testimony and credibility to a meaningful test
- explaining that the defendant must be accorded a fair opportunity to place an adverse witness in the witness’s proper setting and to put his testimony and credibility to a meaningful test
- holding that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him
- recognizing as beyond the proper bounds of cross-examination “those inquiries which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness”

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting.
We granted certiorari in this case believing that it presented with requisite clarity the issue whether a defendant in a state criminal trial may constitutionally be denied on cross-examination of a principal state witness the right to question such witness as to his actual name and address. Were I still of the view, after examination of the record, that this case clearly presents that question, I would concur in the Court’s judgment on due process, but not on Sixth Amendment “incorporation,” grounds. * The record, however, raises serious doubt that this petitioner was denied any information that he did not already have, thus either rendering the error harmless or at least making the issue inappropriate for constitutional adjudication.
The State’s witness identified himself as “James Jordan.” Apparently knowing that this was not his real *135 or his only' name, defense counsel asked Jordan whether that was his correct name, and received a negative reply. Further inquiry was disallowed by the trial judge as to both the witness’ name and address. Later, however, defense counsel said of the witness “I represented him before, I know him.” Still later, when asked by defense counsel on direct examination how long he had known James Jordan, the defendant replied, “I’d say a few years or so, casually.” The defendant also indicated that he knew Jordan to be a narcotics addict, and that he knew that Jordan was acquainted with a person whose legal name he knew to be Herbert Simpson.
In the face of these developments, the Court’s suggestion that perhaps the defense nevertheless did not know Jordan’s name or address is, to say the least, exceedingly dubious. At no point did defense counsel, or defendant, state that he lacked the requested information, nor did counsel pursue the point with any vigor after the State’s objections to the questions,* he simply turned to another series of questions without suggesting any way in which his attempt to present a defense had been prejudiced. The inference seems to me patent that counsel was asking routine questions, to which he already knew the answers, and that his failure to get answers in court was of no consequence.
I would not reverse a state conviction on a record so opaque, indeed one savoring of a disingenuous constitutional contention. Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 ; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 . I would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
See my opinion concurring in the result in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 408 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423613. Public record. Not legal advice.