# Smith v. Illinois

> Supreme Court of the United States · January 29, 1968 · 390 U.S. 129

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423612

## Case

- **Full name:** Smith v. Illinois
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** January 29, 1968
- **Citations:** 390 U.S. 129; 88 S. Ct. 748; 19 L. Ed. 2d 956; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 3131
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by White
- **Judges:** Stewart, White, Harlan, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 642 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423612

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, absent waiver by the defendant, a denial of cross-examination is a “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that the ___ _____ defendant must be accorded a fair opportunity to place an adverse witness in the witness's proper setting and to put his testimony and credibility to a meaningful test
- explaining that the defendant must be accorded a fair opportunity to place an adverse witness in the witness’s proper setting and to put his testimony and credibility to a meaningful test
- holding that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him
- recognizing as beyond the proper bounds of cross-examination “those inquiries which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness”

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
concurring.
In Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687, 694 (1931), the Court recognized that questions which tend merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a witness may go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination. I would place in the same category those inquiries which tend to en *134 danger the personal safety of the witness. But in these situations, if the question asked is one that is normally permissible, the State or the witness should at the very least come forward with some showing of why the witness must be excused from answering the question. The trial judge can then ascertain the interest of the defendant in the answer and exercise an informed discretion in making his ruling. Here the State gave no reasons justifying the refusal to answer a quite usual and proper question. For this reason I join the Court’s judgment and its opinion which, as I understand it, is not inconsistent with these views. I should note in addition that although petitioner and his attorney may have known the witness in the past, it is not at all clear that either of them had ever known the witness’ real name or knew where he lived at the time of the trial.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423612. Public record. Not legal advice.