# Katz v. United States > Supreme Court of the United States · December 18, 1967 · 389 U.S. 347 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423553 ## Case - **Full name:** Katz v. United States - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** December 18, 1967 - **Citations:** 389 U.S. 347; 88 S. Ct. 507; 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Douglas - **Judges:** Black, Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, Stewart, White - **Cited by:** 11,133 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 4 - Distinguished by: 9 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423553 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that the officers would have had a right to sniff the students’ lockers and automobiles and, therefore, the odors detected by their canines were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because “the dog’s olfactory sense merely ‘enhances’ that of the police officer” rathe… - holding, in a constitutional context, that affirmative acts of concealment create an expectation of privacy because ”[o]ne who ... shuts the [phone booth door] behind him, and pays ... to place a call is surely entitled to assume the words he utters into the mouthpiece will no… - holding that “the Fourth amendment protects people, not places” and that when an individual “seeks to preserve [something] as private” and this expectation of privacy is “constitutionally protected,” official intrusion into that privacy is a search that requires a warrant supp… - explaining that "the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police' " (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (19… - stating that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" (footnote call number omitted) ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring. While I join the opinion of the Court, I feel compelled to reply to the separate concurring opinion of my Brother White, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels “national security” matters. Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously inves *360 tigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of adversary- and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate. There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes. Article III, § 3, gives “treason” a very narrow definition and puts restrictions on its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive offenses. The arrests in cases of “hot pursuit” and the arrests on visible or other evidence of probable cause cut across the board and are not peculiar to any kind of crime. I would respect the present lines of distinction and not improvise because a particular crime seems particularly heinous. When the Framers took that step, as they did with treason, the worst crime of all, they made their purpose manifest. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9423553. Public record. Not legal advice.