# Ungar v. Sarafite

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 4, 1964 · 376 U.S. 575

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422764

## Case

- **Full name:** Ungar v. Sarafite, Judge of the Court of General Sessions of the County of New York
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 4, 1964
- **Citations:** 376 U.S. 575; 84 S. Ct. 841; 11 L. Ed. 2d 921; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1535
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Harlan
- **Judges:** Harlan, White, Black, Goldberg, Douglas
- **Cited by:** 1,681 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422764

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding no recusal was warranted based on a party’s “contemptuous remarks” and personal criticism of the presiding judge: “[w]e cannot assume that judges are so irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their authority or with h…
- recognizing, in criminal context, that trial judges have discretion over continuances, but stating nonetheless that “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality”
- holding the denial of a petitioner’s continuance request did not deny the petitioner due process when the petitioner was given five days’ notice of the hearing, the issues were limited and clear-cut, and the petitioner did not request the continuance until the day of the hearing
- concluding that state trial judge did not become "personally embroiled” with trial witness and thus could preside over contempt proceedings arising from the witness's "contemptuous remarks” toward the judge
- stating that the determination of whether a denial of a motion for continuance is arbitrary is rooted "particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied."

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I agree with and join the opinion of the Court, but wish to add that the contempt procedure employed by Judge Sarafite accorded Ungar more than his due under Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 . In light of that case it is clear that Judge Sarafite, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, could have proceeded at the close of the main trial to hold Ungar in contempt without any hearing at all. The fact that the contempt adjudication followed a five-day notice given Ungar two days *592 after the close of the trial cannot, as a constitutional matter, well be deemed to have extinguished the judge’s power to proceed summarily.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422764. Public record. Not legal advice.