# Russell v. United States > Supreme Court of the United States · May 21, 1962 · 369 U.S. 749 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422417 ## Case - **Full name:** Russell v. United States - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 21, 1962 - **Citations:** 369 U.S. 749; 82 S. Ct. 1038; 8 L. Ed. 2d 240; 1962 U.S. LEXIS 2206 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Clark - **Judges:** Stewart, Douglas, Harlan, Frankfurter, Brennan, Whitman, White, Clark - **Cited by:** 1,521 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422417 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that “[undoubtedly, the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general descriptio… - holding that to permit defendants to “be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted [them],” would deprive them “of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of the grand jury was designed to s… - recognizing that the sufficiency of an indictment is measured by “whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet” - stating that a purpose of the specificity requirement in the indictment “is to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction” (quotation omitted) - explaining the settled rule that, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “an indict- ment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury, unless the change is merely a matter of form” ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting. Although I have joined Brother Harlan in dissenting on the grounds ably expressed in his opinion, the Court today so abruptly breaks with the past that I must visually add my voice in protest. The statute under which these cases were prosecuted, 2 U. S. C. § 192 , was originally passed 105 years ago. Case after case has come here during that period. Still the Court is unable to point to one case — not one — in which there is the remotest suggestion that indictments thereunder must include any of the underlying facts necessary to evaluate the propriety of the unanswered questions. Following the universal art and practice, indictments under this statute have commonly phrased the element of pertinency in the statutory language, i. e., the unanswered question was “pertinent to the question under inquiry.” This Court in Sacher v. *780 United States, 356 U. S. 576 (1958), had an opportunity to put a stop to this widespread practice but instead reversed on other, rather unsubstantial grounds without even acknowledging that numerous defendants were being denied “one of the significant protections which the guaranty of a grand jury indictment was intended to confer.” In requiring these indictments to “identify the subject which was under inquiry at the time of the defendant’s alleged default or refusal to answer,” the Court has concocted a new and novel doctrine to upset congressional contempt convictions. A rule has been sown which, as pointed out by Brother Harlan, has no seeds in general indictment law and which will reap no real benefits in congressional contempt cases. If knowing the subject matter under investigation is actually important to these recalcitrant witnesses, they can utilize the right recognized in Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957), of demanding enlightenment from the questioning body or the time-honored practice of requesting a bill of particulars from the prosecutor. Let us hope that the reasoning of the Court today does not apply to indictments under other criminal statutes, for if it does an uncountable number of indictments will be invalidated. If, however, the rule is only cast at congressional contempt cases, it is manifestly unjust. By fastening upon indictment forms under § 192 its superficial luminosity requirement the Court creates additional hazards to the successful prosecution of congressional contempt cases, which impair the informing procedures of the Congress by encouraging contumacy before its committees. It was only five years ago in my dissenting opinion in Watkins that I indicated the rule in that case might “well lead to trial of all contempt cases before the bar . . .” of the House of Congress affected. Watkins v. United States, supra, at p. 225. In that short period the Court has now upset 10 convictions *781 under § 192. This continued frustration of the Congress in the use of the judicial process to punish those who are contemptuous of its committees indicates to me that the time may have come for Congress to revert to “its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House [affected]Id., at 206. Perhaps some simplified method may be found to handle such matters without consuming too much of the time of the full House involved. True, a recalcitrant witness would have to be released at the date of adjournment, but at least contumacious conduct would then receive some punishment. The dignity of the legislative process deserves at least that much sanction. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422417. Public record. Not legal advice.