# Baker v. Carr > Supreme Court of the United States · March 26, 1962 · 369 U.S. 186 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422372 ## Case - **Full name:** BAKER Et Al. v. CARR Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** March 26, 1962 - **Citations:** 369 U.S. 186; 82 S. Ct. 691; 7 L. Ed. 2d 663; 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1567 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stewart - **Judges:** Brennan, Douglas, Clark, Stewart, Whittaker, Harlan, Frankfurter - **Cited by:** 5,294 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422372 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that, “[tjhere are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion d… - concluding that the malapportionment claim "should have been dismissed for `failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted'" because "[u]ntil it is first decided to what extent [the] right [to apportion] is limited by the Federal Constitution, and whether what [a St… - concluding that plaintiffs alleging “impairment of their votes by the 1901 apportionment …. have standing” because “[t]hey are asserting ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,’ not merely a claim of ‘the right possessed by every… - explaining that “[t]he gist of the question of standing” is whether the plaintiff has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for i… - stating that the “gist of the question of standing” is whether “the appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for il… ## Opinion text *265 MR. Justice Stewart, concurring. The separate writings of my dissenting and concurring Brothers stray so far from the subject of today’s decision as to convey, I think, a distressingly inaccurate impression of what the Court decides. For that reason, I think it appropriate, in joining the opinion of the Court, to emphasize in a few words what the opinion does and does not say. The Court today decides three things and no more: “(a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) . . . that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes.” Ante, pp. 197-198. The complaint in this case asserts that Tennessee’s system of apportionment is utterly arbitrary — without any possible justification in rationality. The District Court did not reach the merits of that claim, and this Court quite properly expresses no view on the subject. Contrary to the suggestion of my Brother Harlan, the Court does not say or imply that “state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter.” Post, p. 332. The Court does not say or imply that there is anything in the Federal Constitution “to prevent a State, acting not irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people.” Post, p. 334. And contrary to the suggestion of my Brother Douglas, the Court most assuredly does not decide the question, “may a State weight the vote of one county or one district more heavily than it weights the vote in another?” Ante, p. 244. In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281 , the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not “deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initia *266 tive as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.” 335 U. S., at 284 . In case after case arising under the Equal Protection Clause the Court has said what it said again only last Term — that “the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 . In case after case arising under that Clause we have also said that “the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it.” Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 584 . Today’s decision does not turn its back on these settled precedents. I repeat, the Court today decides only: (1) that the District Court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) that the complaint presents a justi-ciable controversy; (3) that the appellants have standing. My Brother Clark has made a convincing prima facie showing that Tennessee’s system of apportionment is in fact utterly arbitrary — without any possible justification in rationality. My Brother Harlan has, with imagination and ingenuity, hypothesized possibly rational bases for Tennessee’s system. But the merits of this case are not before us now. The defendants have not yet had an opportunity to be heard in defense of the State’s system of apportionment; indeed, they have not yet even filed an answer to the complaint. As in other cases, the proper place for the trial is in the trial court, not here. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9422372. Public record. Not legal advice.