# Payne v. Arkansas

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 19, 1958 · 356 U.S. 560

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421618

## Case

- **Full name:** Payne v. Arkansas
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 19, 1958
- **Citations:** 356 U.S. 560; 78 S. Ct. 844; 2 L. Ed. 2d 975; 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1030
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clark
- **Judges:** Harlan, Whittaker, Clark
- **Cited by:** 635 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421618

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding confession involuntary where “a mentally dull 19-year-old youth” was arrested without a warrant, not advised of his rights to remain silent or to counsel, held for three days without counsel or an advisor, prohibited from making a phone call, denied food for long perio…
- finding confession involuntary where teenage suspect had been held for three days without Miranda warnings, a hearing or access to counsel; had been denied food for long periods of time; and was told by police that they would protect him from likely mob violence if he confessed
- holding that defendant's confession was coerced when, among other factors, chief of police told defendant "that there would be 30 or 40 people there in a few minutes that wanted to get him" and defendant immediately confessed to avoid threat of mob violence
- holding that a confession was unconstitutionally coerced because the interro- gating police officer had promised that if the accused confessed, the officer would protect the accused from an angry mob outside the jail- house door
- holding that a confession was unconstitutionally coerced because the interrogating police officer had promised that if the accused confessed, the officer would protect the accused from an angry mob outside the jail-house door

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Clark,
dissenting.
I believe that on this record the state courts properly held petitioner’s confession voluntary. Moreover, even if the confession be deemed coerced, there is sufficient other evidence of guilt to sustain the conviction on the authority of Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 188-194 (1953). Just five years ago this Court established in Stein that there was no constitutional error “if the jury admitted and relied on the confession,” or “rejected it and convicted on other evidence.” 346 U. S., at 193-194 . For purpose of making the latter determination, this Court assumed there that the confession was found coerced by the jury. It makes no difference that the determination of coercion here is by this Court rather than by the jury, for as is evident from the majority *570 opinion, the inquiry is the same — whether the confession was coerced. I must apply the Stein rule here because the Arkansas procedure on admission of challenged confessions is identical to that which we approved in that case. See Nolan v. State, 205 Ark. 103, 104 , 167 S. W. 2d 503 -504; Dinwiddie v. State, 202 Ark. 562, 570 , 151 S. W. 2d 93, 95-96 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421618. Public record. Not legal advice.