# Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. > Supreme Court of the United States · June 23, 1958 · 356 U.S. 525 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421614 ## Case - **Full name:** Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 23, 1958 - **Citations:** 356 U.S. 525; 78 S. Ct. 893; 2 L. Ed. 2d 953; 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1029 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Frankfurter - **Judges:** Brennan, Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan - **Cited by:** 819 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421614 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that state procedural law must be applied where it is “bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties” but explaining that the balancing test is “whether the federal policy ... should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the … - concluding that, considering the "strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in federal courts[,]” federal court need not follow state rule, despite the countervailing “interest of furthering the objective that ... litigation shou… - holding that plaintiff in diversity suit was entitled to jury trial even though negligence claim would have been tried by judge in state court - holding that the allocation of decision-making authority between the judge and jury is “a quintessentially procedural determination” (citing Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538) - holding that Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in federal court may exist even with respect to a state-created right and even when a state statute or state constitution would preclude a jury trial in state court ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins, dissenting. This is a suit for common-law negligence, brought in a United States District Court in South Carolina because of diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332 . Respondent is a cooperative, organized and operating under the South Carolina Rural Electric Cooperative Act, S. C. Code, 1952, § 12-1001 et seq., engaged in distributing electric power to its members, and extending the availability of power to new users, in rural areas of the State. Incident to the expansion of its facilities and services, it had made a contract with R. H. Bouligny, Inc., whereby the latter was to construct 24.19 miles of new power lines, to rehabilitate and convert to higher capacity 87.69 miles of existing lines, and to construct two substations and a breaker station. In the execution of this contract, petitioner, a citizen of North Carolina, and a lineman for Bouligny, was seriously burned when he attempted to make a connection between the equipment in one of the *552 new substations and an outside line through which, by a mistake on the part of another of Bouligny’s employees, current was running. Petitioner filed a claim against Bouligny pursuant to the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Law, S. C. Code, 1952, § 72-1 et seq., under which both Bouligny and respondent operated, and recovered the full benefits under the Law. He then brought this suit. Respondent defended on the ground, among others, that, since petitioner was injured in the execution of his true employer’s (Bouligny’s) contract with respondent to perform a part of its “trade, business or occupation,” respondent was petitioner’s “statutory employer” and therefore liable to petitioner under § 72-111 of the State’s Workmen’s Compensation Law. 1 It would follow from this that petitioner, by virtue of his election to proceed against Bouligny, was barred from proceeding against respondent, either under the statute or at common law (§§ 72-121, 72-123). 2 After all the evidence was in, the *553 court granted petitioner’s motion to strike the defense, on the ground that an activity could not be a part of a firm’s “trade, business or occupation” unless it was being performed “for somebody else.” The court also denied respondent’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for petitioner in the amount of $126,786.80. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Pourth Circuit found the District Court’s construction of § 72-111 unsupportable under controlling South Carolina decisions. 3 In concluding that respondent had sustained its defense, the appellate court cited the following evidence elicited at trial. Respondent employed a sixteen-man “outside crew,” two-thirds of whose time was spent in such construction work as building new power lines and extensions; since World War II the demand for electrical service had been so great that independent con-tractors had to be employed to do much of the necessary construction work. All of respondent’s construction work, regardless of who was actually performing it, was done under the supervision of an engineering firm with which respondent has an engineering service contract. Testimony as to the construction of substations was not altogether consistent; however, stated most favorably to petitioner — and that is the light in which the Court of Appeals considered it — that evidence was to the effect *554 that respondent had with its own facilities constructed three substations, although it had built none of the six it was operating at the time petitioner was injured, nor was respondent at that time employing personnel capable of constructing substations. The construction work in connection with which petitioner was injured was clearly among the functions respondent was empowered to perform by the statute under which it was organized; moreover, this construction was necessary to the discharge of respondent’s duty to serve the area in which it operated. Finally, respondent was the “main actor” in this particular construction project: it secured the necessary financing; its consulting engineer prepared the plans (approved by respondent) and supervised the construction ; it purchased the materials of which the substations were constructed; it had the responsibility of de-energiz-ing and re-energizing existing lines that were involved in the work. From this evidence the Court of Appeals was satisfied that “there can be no doubt that Blue Ridge was not only in the business of supplying electricity to rural communities, but also in the business of constructing the lines and substations necessary for the distribution of the product,” 238 F. 2d 346, 351 . The Court of Appeals, having concluded that respondent's defense should have been sustained, directed the District Court to enter judgment for the respondent. The District Court had decided the question of whether or not respondent was a statutory employer without submitting it to the jury. It is not altogether clear whether it did so because it thought it essentially a nonjury issue, as it is in the South Carolina courts under Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S. C. 532, 96 S. E. 2d 566 , or because there was no controverted question of fact to submit to the jury. The construction of the state law by the Court of Appeals is clearly supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and so we need not rest on the *555 usual respect to be accorded to a reading of a local statute by a Federal Court of Appeals. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 708 . It is clear from the state cases that a determination as to whether a defendant is an “employer” for purposes of § 72-111 will depend upon the entire circumstances of the relationship between such defendant and the work being done on its behalf; no single factor is determinative. Both the approach of the Court of Appeals and the conclusions that it reached from the evidence in this case are entirely consistent with prior declarations of South Carolina law by the highest court of that State. 4 In holding respondent a statutory employer, the Court of Appeals was giving the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Law the liberal construction called for by the Supreme Court of that State. In Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 198 S. C. 65, 72, 15 S. E. 2d 833, 835 , that court said: “[T]he basic purpose of the Compensation Act is the inclusion of employers and employees, and not their exclusion; and we add that doubts of jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of inclusion rather than exclusion.” It would be short-sighted to overlook the fact that exclusion of an employer in a specific case such as this one *556 might well have the consequence of denying any recovery at all to other employees vis-á-vis this employer and others similarly situated. The Court of Appeals, through the experienced Judge Soper, recognized the short-sighted illiberality of yielding to the temptation of allowing a single recovery for negligence to stand and do violence to the consistent and legislatively intended interpretation of the statute in Berry v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, 114 F. 2d 255 , 257: “It may well be, and possibly this is true in the instant case, that sometimes a recovery might be had in a common law action for an amount much larger than the amount which would be received under a Compensation Act. This, though, is more than balanced by the many advantages accorded to an injured employee in a proceeding under a Compensation Act which would not be found in a common law action.” When, after the evidence was in, petitioner moved to strike respondent’s defense based on § 72-111, the following colloquy ensued: “The Court: In the event I overrule your motion, do you contemplate putting up any testimony in reply? You have that right, of course. On this point, I mean. “Mr. Hammer [petitioner’s counsel]: We haven’t discussed it, but we are making that motion. I frankly don’t know at this point of any reply that is necessary. I don’t know of any evidence in this case— “The Court: The reason I am making that inquiry as to whether you intend to put up any more testimony in the event I overrule your motion, counsel *557 may wish to move for a directed verdict on that ground since it is a question of law. But that is his prerogative after all the evidence is in. Of course, he caiji't move for a directed verdict as long as you have a right to reply. “Mr. Hammer: We are moving at this time in the nature of a voluntary dismissal. “'I’he Court: You move to dismiss that defense? “Mr. Hammer: Yes, sir, at this stage of the game.” After argument by counsel, the court made its ruling, granting petitioner’s motion. Respondent having indicated its intention to move for a directed verdict, the court then said, “I will allow you to include in that Motion for Directed Verdict your defense which I have stricken, if you desire. . . .” Respondent’s motion was overruled. It is apparent that petitioner had no intention of introducing any evidence on the issue of whether respondent was his statutory employer and that he was prepared to — and did — submit the issue to the court on that basis. Clearly petitioner cannot be said to have relied upon, and thus to have been misled by, the court’s erroneous construction of the law, for it was before the court had disclosed its view of the law that petitioner made apparent his willingness to submit the issue to it on the basis of respondent’s evidence. If petitioner could have cast any doubt on that evidence or could have brought in any other matter relevant to the issue, it was his duty to bring it forward before the issue was submitted to the court. For counsel to withhold evidence on an issue submitted for decision until after that issue has been resolved against him would be an abuse of the judicial process that this Court surely should not countenance, however strong the philanthropic appeal in a particular case. Nor does *558 it appear that petitioner had any such “game” in mind. He gave not the slightest indication of an intention to introduce any additional evidence, no matter how the court might decide the issue. It seems equally clear that, had the trial court decided the issue — on any construction — in favor of the respondent, the petitioner was prepared to rely solely upon his right of appeal. We are not to read the record as though we are making an independent examination of the trial proceedings. We are sitting in judgment on the Court of Appeals’ review of the record. That court, including Chief Judge Parker and Judge Soper, two of the most experienced and esteemed circuit judges in the federal judiciary, interpreted the record as it did in light of its knowledge of local practice and of the ways of local lawyers. In ordering judgment entered for respondent, it necessarily concluded, as a result of its critical examination of the record, that petitioner’s counsel chose to have the issue decided on the basis of the record as it then stood. The determination of the Court of Appeals can properly be reversed only if it is found that it was baseless. Even granting that the record is susceptible of two interpretations, it is to disregard the relationship of this Court to the Courts of Appeals, especially as to their function in appeals in diversity cases, to substitute our view for theirs. The order of the Court of Appeals that the District Court enter judgment for the respondent is amply sustained on either theory as to whether or not the issue was one for the court to decide. If the question is for the court, the Court of Appeals has satisfactorily resolved it in accordance with state decisions. And if, on the other hand, the issue is such that it would have to be submitted to the jury if there were any crucial facts in controversy, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that there was no conflict as to the rele *559 vant evidence — not, at any rate, if such inconsistency as existed was resolved in favor of petitioner. According to the governing view of South Carolina law, as given us by the Court of Appeals, that evidence would clearly have required the District Court to grant a directed verdict to the respondent. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment. “§ 72-111. Liability of owner to workmen of subcontractor. “When any person, in this section and §§ 72-113 and 72-114 referred to as ‘owner/ undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 72-113 to 72-116 referred to as ‘subcontractor’) for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him.” “§ 72-121. Employee’s rights under Title exclude all others against employer. "The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, *553 dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death. “§ 72-123. Only one remedy available. “Either the acceptance of an award under this Title or the procurement and collection of a judgment in an action at law shall be a bar to proceeding further with the alternate remedy.” It may be noted that not even petitioner's counsel supports the trial court’s theory regarding the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Law. For example, whether or not the defendant had ever itself performed the work contracted out has not been thought to be a conclusive criterion. In fact, in Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S. C. 479, 8 S. E. 2d 878 , the court rejected the defendant’s contention that, because it had never performed the work in question, it could not be held an employer. See also Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., 208 S. C. 307, 38 S. E. 2d 4 ; Kennerly v. Ocmulgee DLmber Co., 206 S. C. 481, 34 S. E. 2d 792 . Nor is the question whether or not the accomplishment of the work involved requires specialized skill determinative. See Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825 . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421614. Public record. Not legal advice.