# Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 3, 1957 · 353 U.S. 180

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421422

## Case

- **Full name:** Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 3, 1957
- **Citations:** 353 U.S. 180; 77 S. Ct. 707; 1 L. Ed. 2d 746; 1957 U.S. LEXIS 1724
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Burton
- **Judges:** Brennan, Burton, Harlan, Whittaker, Clark
- **Cited by:** 694 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421422

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that information returns which “lack the data necessary for the computation and assessment of deficiencies ... are not tax returns within the contemplation of § 375(a) [the predecessor to § 6501]”
- finding a clear statement authorizing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to correct tax rulings and regulations “retroactively” where the statutory authorization for the Commissioner’s action spoke explicitly in terms of “retroactivity”
- stating that IRS is not estopped from correcting an earlier mistake of law
- holding that federal tax authority could retroactively revoke prior ruling granting taxpayer an exemption where prior ruling was erroneously granted

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Burton,
whom Mr. Justice Clark joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in the Court’s opinion insofar as it holds (a) that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion under § 3791 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 when, in 1946, he revoked previous rulings exempting petitioner from federal income taxes and directed petitioner to file returns for 1943 and 1944, and (b) that assessment of deficiencies for those years was not barred by the statute of limitations. However, for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, I dissent from the Court’s holding that the Commissioner acted within his discretion under § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 when he determined, in reliance upon the “claim of right” doctrine, that petitioner’s method of accounting for prepaid membership dues did not clearly reflect its income.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9421422. Public record. Not legal advice.