# Rochin v. California > Supreme Court of the United States · January 2, 1952 · 342 U.S. 165 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9420651 ## Case - **Full name:** Rochin v. California - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** January 2, 1952 - **Citations:** 342 U.S. 165; 25 A.L.R. 2d 1396; 72 S. Ct. 205; 96 L. Ed. 2d 183; 96 L. Ed. 183; 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2576 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Douglas - **Judges:** Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, Minton - **Cited by:** 2,789 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 3 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9420651 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding conscience-shocking conduct where deputy sheriffs illegally entered the open door of a house, forced open the door to the accused’s bedroom, forcibly attempted to extract capsules that the accused swallowed, and directed a physician to pump the accused’s stomach so tha… - concluding that “[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents” do “more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting … - concluding that the police’s unlawful breaking into the defendant’s home, forcible attempt to extract evidence from the defendant’s mouth, and the involuntary pumping of the defendant’s stomach contents was behavior that shocked the conscience - concluding that police conduct shocked the conscience when officials entered a defendant's home unlawfully, used physical force against the defendant to pry pills from his mouth and, when unsuccessful, had the defendant's stomach pumped - holding that police do not violate substantive due process rights when they attempt to elicit, through bribery, information from a child about her parents ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring. The evidence obtained from this accused’s stomach would be admissible in the-majority of states where the question has been raised. 1 So far as the reported cases reveal, the only states which would probably exclude the evidence would be Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, and Missouri. *178 2 Yet the Court now says that the rulé which the majority of the states have fashioned violates the “decencies of civilized conduct.” To that I cannot agree. It is a rule formulated by responsible courts with judges as sensitive as we áre to the proper. standards for law administration. As an original matter it.might be debatable whether the provision in the»Fifth Amendment that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” serves the ends of justice. Not all civilized legal procedures recognize it. 3 But the choice was made by the Framers, a choice which sets a standard for legál trials in this country. The Framers made it *179 a standard of due process for prosecutions by the Federal Government. If it is a requirement of due process for a trial in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say it is not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state courthouse. That was the issue recently surveyed in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 . The Court rejected the view that compelled testimony should be excluded and held in substance that the accused in a state trial can be forced to testify against himself. I disagree. Of course an accused can be compelled to be present at the trial, to stand, to sit, to turn this way or that, and to try on a cap or a coat. See Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-253 . But I think that words taken from his lips, capsules taken from his stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible provided they are taken from him without his consent. 'They are inadmissible because of the • command of the Fifth Amendment. That is an unequivocal, definite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal courts. But we cannot in fairness free the state courts from that command and yet excoriate them for flouting the “decencies of civilized conduct” when they admit the evidence. That is to make the rule turn not on the Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here. . The damage of the view sponsored by the Court in this case may not be conspicuous here. But it is part of the same philosophy that produced Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , denying counsel to an accused in a state trial against the command of the Sixth Amendment, and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , allowing evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure that is illegal under the Fourth Amendment to be introduced in a state trial. It is part of the process of erosion of civil rights of the citizen in recent years, See People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199 , 168 P. 2d 443 (pumping of accused’s stomach to recover swallowed narcotic) ; Rochin v. California, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140 , 225 P. 2d 1 (pumping of accused’s stomach to recover swallowed narcotic); People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 198 P. 2d 941 (blood test to determine intoxication); State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18 , 211 P. 2d 142 (blood test to determine intoxication); Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640 , 57 A. 2d 289 (blood typing to link accused with murder); Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320 , 92 P. 2d 979 (examination mf accused for venereal disease); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99,- 70 A. 2d 909 *178 (blood test to determine intoxication); State v. Alexander, 7 N. J. 585, 83 A. 2d 441 (blood typing to establish guilt); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192 , 20 N. E. 2d 265 (commenting»on refusal to submit to blood test or urinalysis to determine intoxication); State v. Nutt, 78 Ohio App. 336 , 65 N. E. 2d 675 (commentirfg on refusal to submit to urinalysis to determine intoxication); but cf. Booker v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio Supp. 152 (examination and urinalysis to determine intoxication); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577 , 160 P. 2d 283 , 164 A. L. R. 952, 967 (blood test to determine intoxication); Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577 , 73 A. 2d 688 (blood typing linking accused to assault). Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277 , 10 S. W. 2d 370 (examination for venereal disease); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650 , 91 N. W. 935 (examination for venereal disease); State v. Weltha; 228 Iowa 519 , 292 N. W. 148 (blood test to determine intoxication, limiting rules on search and seizure); but cf. State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168 , 300 N. W. 275 (comment on refusal to submit to blood test to determine intoxication) ; People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274 , 221 N. W. 309 (examination for venereal disease); but see People v. Placido, 310 Mich. 404, 408 , 17 N. W. 2d 230, 232 ; State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54 , 119 S. W. 405 (examination for venereal disease); State v. Matsinger, 180 S. W, 856 (examination for venereal disease). See Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate in European Criminal Procedure, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1010 (1935). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9420651. Public record. Not legal advice.