# United States v. Garey

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · August 20, 2008 · 540 F.3d 1253

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9416141

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Milton GAREY, Jr., A.K.A. Miles Garey, A.K.A. Milton Garey, A.K.A. Eddie Garey, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** August 20, 2008
- **Citations:** 540 F.3d 1253; 2008 WL 3850284
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Barkett
- **Judges:** Edmondson, Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus, Wilson, Pryor
- **Cited by:** 113 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9416141

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the court may allow an uncooperative defendant to proceed pro se provided the “court is assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before him, (2) knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se”
- explaining good cause to appoint a new attorney refers to a “fundamental” problem, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication between the client and the attorney, “or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict”
- observing that a defendant’s voluntary waiver and knowledge may be demonstrated by an affirmatively invocation or the defendant’s conduct in rejecting all other available options and responses to the district court’s warnings and questions
- stating that whether the defendant’s “waiver of counsel was both knowing and voluntary” is “a mixed question of law and fact which this Court reviews de novo”

## Opinion text

BARKETT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The record reflects that Eddie Milton Garey, Jr. objected to representation by appointed counsel; that the trial judge advised Garey that he was entitled to effective representation but not to the counsel of his choice; that the trial judge extensively warned Garey on the record of the dangers of self-representation; that Garey, although disdainful of his options, voluntarily expressed a preference for self-representation over appointed counsel; and that the trial judge required Garey’s appointed counsel to remain as standby counsel to assist during trial. Thus, I concur in the majority’s judgment in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9416141. Public record. Not legal advice.