# Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 15, 1998 · 140 F.3d 1405

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9415388

## Case

- **Full name:** Janice ANDREWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKESHORE REHABILITATION HOSPITAL, HealthSouth Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** May 15, 1998
- **Citations:** 140 F.3d 1405; 40 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1026; 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,405; 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1617; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9764; 1998 WL 244248
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Edmondson
- **Judges:** Edmondson, Hull, Clark
- **Cited by:** 94 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9415388

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a claim that an employer retaliated against an employee by firing her for filing a race discrimination claim is cognizable under § 1981
- recognizing that if supported by evidence in the record a district court’s preliminary factual findings made to apply Rule 15(c) will probably stand
- concluding a claim that an employer retaliated against an employee by firing her for filing a race discrimination claim is cognizable under § 1981
- explaining that Rule 25(c) “allows substitution of parties when a transfer in interest has occurred . . . during the pendency of litigation”
- recognizing that § 1981 prohibits retaliation against employees for making complaints of racially discriminatory treatment in the workplace

## Opinion text

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part:
I concur in the result, except I dissent from that part of the decision requiring LSSI to be added as a defendant.
I do not understand the district judge’s opinion and—more important—his decision about LSSI in the same way that today’s court responds to what he wrote. I do not understand, for example, that the district judge held that plaintiffs motion to join LSSI was timely filed. The district judge wrote that the motion was filed after the statute of limitations had’ “expired”; so, in this sense at least the motion was untimely. And I cannot say that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs “inexcusable neglect” was the reason LSSI was not earlier named as a party: the burden was on plaintiff, as the movant, to show cause for her neglect and the delay. As I understand the law, Civil Rule 15(a) controls whether or not a party will be joined; and in the light of Civil Rule 15(a), I cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to join LSSI.
About 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , I accept that it includes claims for retaliation such as this one. In this circuit, a retaliation claim was part of our section 1981 law pre-Patterson. (By the way, this view—whether accurate or inaccurate—of the law seems to have been prevalent in the federal courts nationwide.) And, I think that Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not intend to cut back on section 1981’s scope as the scope was understood before Patterson.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9415388. Public record. Not legal advice.