# United States v. White

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · September 23, 2002 · 307 F.3d 336

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9414199

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin WHITE, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** September 23, 2002
- **Citations:** 307 F.3d 336; 2002 WL 31106976
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Dennis
- **Judges:** Garwood, Demoss, Dennis
- **Cited by:** 107 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9414199

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “we see no need to except ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the general rule allowing defendants to waive their statutory rights so that they can reach a plea agreement if they wish”
- stating that “a waiver of appeal may not be enforced against a section 2255 petitioner who claims that ineffective assistance 25 of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or involuntary.”
- holding that “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself’
- holding “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself’
- holding that “the district court was within its power when it looked at relevant conduct to assign the quantity of drugs within [the maximum] statutory ranges”

## Opinion text

DENNIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
As I disagree that a person can make an intelligent, knowing waiver of the right to contest constitutional violations before the violations occur, I respectfully dissent. As the Fourth Circuit observed, “[A] defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.” United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir.1992). Rather, “a defendant’s agreement to waive appellate review of his sentence is implicitly conditioned on the assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.” United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732 (4th Cir.1994). Therefore, a defendant should not be able to waive his right to appeal constitutional violations when he lacks the fundamental ability to be aware of their existence because they have not yet occurred. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 572 (5th Cir.1992)(Parker, Judge Robert, concurringXA “right can not come into existence until after the judge pronounces sentence; it is only then that the defendant knows what errors ... exist to be appealed, or waived.”)
In addition, while a number of claims might ultimately lack merit, the majority’s approach creates the opportunity for the systematic denial of a defendant’s constitutional rights. If a defendant cannot maintain the right to challenge constitutional violations that occur during sentencing, then the other parties to the sentencing lose a powerful incentive to safeguard these rights.
For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for consideration of the defen- » dant’s claims of constitutional violations during sentencing.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9414199. Public record. Not legal advice.