# Crandel v. Hastings

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · August 1, 2023 · 75 F.4th 537

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9412824

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 1, 2023
- **Citations:** 75 F.4th 537
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil Rights
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Case: 22-10360 Document: 00516841273 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/01/2023

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED
August 1, 2023
No. 22-10360 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk

Otis Crandel, as dependent administrator of, and on behalf of Billy
Wayne Worl, Jr., Emily Garcia, James Matthew Garcia,
and Jared Andrew Garcia, individually, the Estate of Brenda
Kaye Worl, and Brenda Kaye Worl’s heirs-at-law; Billy
Wayne Worl, Jr., Individually,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Dalena Hall; Cari Renea McGowen,

Defendants—Appellees,

consolidated with
_____________

No. 22-10361
_____________

Otis Crandel, as dependent administrator of, and on behalf of Billy
Wayne Worl, Jr., Emily Garcia, James Matthew Garcia,
and Jared Andrew Garcia, individually, the Estate of Brenda
Kaye Worl, and Brenda Kaye Worl’s heirs-at-law; Billy
Wayne Worl, Jr., Individually,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus
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Vegas Hastings; Daniel Piper,

Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 1:21-CV-75, 1:21-CV-75
______________________________

Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, Circuit Judge:
This opinion is rendered contemporaneously with the opinion for the
appeal in 22-50102, Edmiston v. Borrego. The two opinions concern the
suicide by two pretrial detainees in two Texas jails and, inter alia, failure-to-
protect claims. Moreover, the same counsel for plaintiffs appear in each
appeal.
For the challenge at hand to four defendants’ being awarded summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, primarily at issue is whether they
possessed subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by detainee
Brenda Kaye Worl. The two jailer-defendants and two officer-defendants
filed two separate summary-judgment motions; and the resulting two
contested judgments were entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) (“[T]he court may direct entry of final judgment as to one
or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay”.).
This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of Worl’s death while
in pretrial detention in the Callahan County, Texas, Jail. Plaintiffs’ challenge
to the adverse summary judgments includes contesting evidentiary rulings.
Plaintiffs fail to show the requisite genuine dispute of material fact for
whether the four defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
suicide; therefore, they fail to show a constitutional violation. And, even if

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the court abused its discretion in sustaining defendants’ evidentiary
objections, any error was harmless. Accordingly, the two summary
judgments based on qualified immunity are proper. Therefore, the two Rule
54(b) judgments are AFFIRMED.
I.
Plaintiffs assert claims against Dalena Hall, Cari Renea McGowen,
Officer Vegas Hastings, and Officer Daniel Piper for failing to protect Worl,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (The claims against these four
defendants for bystander liability were also dismissed based on qualified
immunity.)
Plaintiffs also claim under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that the jail-suicide-
prevention policies of Callahan County and City of Clyde, Texas, caused a
violation of Worl’s constitutional rights. Those claims are not at issue in
these two consolidated appeals.
A.
The following recitation of facts is, unless otherwise noted, based on
the summary-judgment record, including, inter alia: party affidavits,
depositions, reports, the Officers’ body-cam videos, and jail-surveillance
video. Along that line, to the extent minor differences exist between the
affidavits and depositions, the latter controls. E.g., S.W.S. Erectors v. Infax,
Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996). Additionally, we give weight to the
extensive videos from the Officers’ body-cameras and the jail-surveillance
cameras. These provide compelling summary-judgment evidence regarding
the four defendants’ interactions with Worl.
At 10:13 p.m. on 2 April 2019, Callahan County dispatch received a
911 call from Worl, charging domestic abuse by her husband. Hall, a jailer-

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dispatcher with the Callahan County Jail, received the call and dispatched
Clyde, Texas, Police Officers Hastings and Piper (the Officers). (As shown
in the Officers’ body-cam videos, two other unidentified officers were also at
the Worls’ home that night. These two officers are not parties in this action.)
The Officers arrived at the scene at 10:17 p.m., and Worl and her
husband, Billy Worl, spoke with them. It appeared to the Officers that the
incident involved conduct by both parties. Billy Worl stated, as documented
in Officer Hastings’ report, and as recorded in his body-cam video, that the
couple had “drank a couple boxes of wine”; and the Officers noted he
smelled of alcohol and Worl appeared to be intoxicated.
Due to jail-capacity concerns—there was only room for one of the
Worls—the Officers arrested Worl for assault, partially due to her behavior
at the scene after they arrived and because she had two prior arrests for
assault. Officer Hastings transported Worl to the jail for booking; Officer
Piper followed to observe.
After arriving at the jail a few minutes after 11:00 p.m., one of Worl’s
hands slipped out of her handcuffs as she waited to be booked. Instead of
securing her hand, McGowen, also a jailer-dispatcher with the jail, removed
the handcuffs. Officer Hastings then escorted Worl to the booking area,
where Hall attempted to begin the booking process.
Worl was uncooperative and refused to answer questions, including
those for the jail’s “Screening Form for Suicide and
Medical/Mental/Developmental Impairments”. Officer Piper and
McGowen assisted Hall and Officer Hastings.
After the four defendants attempted to persuade Worl to comply, it
was decided that it would be best to allow Worl to calm-down before
continuing. McGowen conducted a pat-down of Worl, confiscating her coat,
shoes, and an eyeglass lens she had felt in Worl’s coat pocket. McGowen

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then, in the presence of Officer Hastings, asked Worl whether she had ever
attempted suicide; in response, she presented her arms and said, “I don’t
know. Have I?”.
McGowen, with Officer Hastings “observ[ing] from the adjacent
hallway”, then placed Worl in the jail’s visitation room at 11:33 p.m.
McGowen, in her affidavit, explained: because Worl was “brought in on an
assault charge and because of her behavior”, “it was not safe to place [her]
in a cell with another inmate”; and, because the jail was then at full capacity,
Worl was placed in the visitation room. In her deposition, McGowen
expanded on this, explaining that Worl was placed in the visitation room so
“she wouldn’t be out in the open just to run around”; and that she could not
be placed in a cell with another inmate because “[s]he might be combative
with the other inmate”.
The visitation room is a small area used to permit detainees to
converse with visitors who sit outside the room in the hallway, on the other
side of the two observation windows. Detainees speak with visitors through
telephones mounted on the room’s wall. The room includes a bench, two
small tabletops, and two mounted telephones—one of the telephone’s cords
appears longer than the other.
Worl was not observed constantly. At 11:45 p.m., 12 minutes after she
was placed in the visitation room, Hall checked on Worl through a viewing
window and observed her crying as she sat on the visitation-room bench.
Two minutes later, at 11:47 p.m., McGowen checked on Worl. From the
viewing window, McGowen could see only the top of Worl’s head.
McGowen returned to the dispatch office to retrieve a key to the room. Once
she entered it, she discovered Worl on the floor with her head facing down.
McGowen “gently lifted [Worl’s] head back” and discovered one of the
telephone cords wrapped around her neck. She removed the cord.

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McGowen then yelled for Hall to contact emergency medical services
(EMS). Hall paged EMS at 11:48 p.m. and the Callahan County Sheriff at
11:52 p.m. Officers Hastings and Piper performed CPR on Worl until EMS
arrived at 12:00 a.m. EMS obtained a pulse and transported Worl to the
hospital, where she was placed on life support. She died the next day (4 April
2019).
B.
This action was filed in March 2021. Defendants’ two summary-
judgment motions (one for the two jailers, the other for the two Officers),
based on qualified immunity, were granted in March 2022. In doing so, the
district court sustained objections to plaintiffs’ summary-judgment evidence.
In granting summary judgment, the district court concluded: “there
[was] no evidence before the Court, beyond speculative evidence, to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether [defendants] appreciated that
Worl was a suicide risk or that the phone cord would likely be an instrument
of suicide”; and that Worl was “intoxicated, belligerent, uncooperative, and
refused to answer questions related to mental health and suicide risk” was
insufficient to make defendants subjectively aware of a substantial risk of self-
harm.
The court ruled defendants’ objections regarding, inter alia,
authentication and hearsay, were meritorious. In the alternative, even if it
considered the exhibits, they did not “raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to deliberate indifference” by defendants.
A summary-judgment order and a Rule 54(b) judgment were entered
in March 2022 for each of the two motions in favor of the two jailers and two
officers in their individual capacities. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). (The
court’s summary-judgment orders did not address plaintiffs’ bystander
claims, but the claims were dismissed in the court’s 54(b) judgments,

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providing that “Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against [defendants] in their
individual capacit[ies] are” dismissed.)
II.
Primarily at issue in this appeal are the failure-to-protect claims
against jailer-dispatchers Hall and McGowen and Officers Hastings and
Piper (defendants). Following addressing that issue, we turn to their
sustained objections to plaintiffs’ summary-judgment evidence.
A.
Pursuant to the two-part test, discussed infra, plaintiffs generally
claim genuine disputes of material fact exist for whether the jailers and
Officers: subjectively knew Worl was at substantial risk of serious self-harm;
and failed to appreciate the risk by knowingly placing unsupervised Worl in
the visitation room containing a telephone cord, a commonly known obvious
ligature. Because they fail to show genuine disputes of material fact regarding
defendants’ subjective knowledge of Worl’s substantial risk of suicide,
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the failure-to-protect claim.
It follows that, because the failure-to-protect claims fail, no violation
exists for bystander claims against the jailers and Officers. See Joseph ex rel.
Est of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting bystander
liability requires, inter alia, that officer “knew a fellow officer was violating
an individual’s constitutional right”). Therefore, we address only the
failure-to-protect claims.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g., Estate of Henson v.
Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is
proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is

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such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Ordinarily, our court “must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party resisting the motion”. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701
F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1983). When, however, defendants, as in this
instance, assert qualified immunity, the burden of proof shifts to plaintiffs to
“rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law”. Brown
v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct
violates a clearly established [statutory or] constitutional right.” Converse v.
City of Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mace v. City of
Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiffs maintain, solely for
the purpose of preserving the issue for further review, that qualified
immunity should be “abolished or modified so that it is inapplicable here”.
For this appeal, we proceed with the qualified-immunity doctrine intact.
Again, when defendants assert qualified immunity, “a plaintiff
seeking to overcome qualified immunity must show: (1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct”. Id. (citation omitted).
We have discretion to elect which prong of this two-prong analysis to address
first. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
As stated, “[t]o overcome the officials’ qualified immunity defense
Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that each official violated [Worl’s] statutory
or constitutional right”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775. “[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment protects[, inter alia,]pretrial detainees’ right to medical care and
to ‘protection from known suicidal tendencies’”. Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d
320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Garza v. City of Donna,

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922 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2019)); see also Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (“We
have repeatedly held that pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment
right to be protected from a known risk of suicide.” (emphasis added)).
Where the claimed violation of that right turns, as in this instance, on
an official’s alleged acts or omissions, the question is whether the official
“had gained actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded
with deliberate indifference”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added)
(quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d, 633 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
It is undisputed that “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard
to meet”. Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
2001).
Accordingly, an “official will not be held liable if he merely ‘should
have known’ of a risk”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Rather, to satisfy this high standard, plaintiffs
must show the official: was “aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”; and “also [drew] the
inference”. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). An official with such
knowledge then “shows a deliberate indifference to that risk ‘by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it’”. Id. at 776 (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at
648).
Plaintiffs, however, maintain this court should instead apply the
objective-unreasonableness standard the Court adopted in Kingsley v.
Hendrickson for claims of excessive force (not failure to protect) by officers against
a pretrial detainee. 576 U.S. 389 (2015). But, we are bound by our rule of
orderliness. E.g., Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir.
2008) (“It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of
our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening
change in the law, such as by statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court,

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or our en banc court.”). This rule renders this assertion meritless. See Cope
v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 n.7 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining Kingsley “did not
abrogate [this court’s] deliberate-indifference precedent”), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 2573 (2022); Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419
n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Because the Fifth Circuit has continued to rely on Hare
and to apply a subjective standard post-Kingsley, this panel is bound by our
rule of orderliness.”).
Regarding qualified immunity’s second prong, for a right to be
“clearly established” it must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”. Est.
of Bonilla v. Orange Cnty., 982 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Critically, “[c]ourts must not ‘define
clearly established law at a high level of generality’”; rather, we must
undertake the inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case”. Cope, 3
F.4th at 204 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
Pursuant to our above-discussed discretion to elect which of the two
qualified-immunity prongs to consider first, we begin with the first. For the
reasons that follow, there was no violation of a statutory or constitutional
right. Therefore, we do not reach the second prong (whether clearly
established).
Again, for the first prong, and to prevail against summary judgment
for the claimed violation at hand, plaintiffs must establish a genuine dispute
of material fact for whether Hall, McGowen, Officer Hastings, or Officer
Piper “(1) had subjective knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm and
(2) responded to that risk with deliberate indifference”. Id. at 210 (citation
omitted); Callahan, 623 F.3d at 253. In the context of detainee suicide, the
requisite substantial risk of serious harm must be specific; plaintiffs must
allege defendants “were aware of a substantial and significant risk that the

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detainee might kill himself”. Cope, 3 F.4th at 207 (alteration omitted)
(citation omitted).
When, as here, multiple government actors are defendants and assert
qualified immunity, we “evaluate each [actor’s conduct] separately, to the
extent possible”. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir.
2012).
Because plaintiffs, for the reasons discussed infra, fail to establish
genuine disputes of material fact regarding defendants’ subjective knowledge
of a substantial risk of suicide, whether defendants responded with deliberate
indifference does not come into play.
1.
For the jailers, plaintiffs generally maintain genuine disputes of
material fact exist for their subjective knowledge of Worl’s substantial risk
for serious self-harm, including suicide. They contend the conduct of both
Hall and McGowen raise genuine disputes of material fact showing they
subjectively understood the risk.
Regarding such genuine disputes vel non, we consider whether
anything concerning Worl led Hall or McGowen to form the requisite
subjective knowledge of a substantial risk, specifically a risk of suicide. E.g.,
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Cope, 3 F.4th at 207–08 (official witnessed decedent
attempt suicide day before incident in question); Converse, 961 F.3d at 776,
778–79 (official was present when decedent was pulled off bridge while he
attempted to jump and where official heard decedent express he should have
jumped and would make another attempt to do so when released); Hyatt v.
Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 2016) (even though decedent stated he
did not want to commit suicide, official knew decedent suffered from
depression, had recently attempted suicide, and his wife believed him to be
suicidal).

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Both Hall and McGowen noted Worl’s intoxication and lack of
cooperation. That they recognized that Worl may have been intoxicated and
observed her defiant demeanor is insufficient, however, to create a genuine
dispute of material fact on whether they formed the requisite subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305
(explaining even if detainee was intoxicated, it “would not indicate [official]
inferred she was a suicide risk”).
Regarding the lack of mental-health screening, plaintiffs emphasize
that the jailers’ failure to conduct the screening shows a genuine dispute of
material fact that Worl needed to be treated as suicidal. This assertion also
fails. Our court has acknowledged there is no independent constitutional
right to mental-health screening. E.g., id. at 307 (quoting Taylor v. Barkes,
575 U.S. 822, 826 (2015)) (“No decision of this Court establishes a right to
proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols. No
decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention
protocols.”). (Additionally, even if plaintiffs could assert a right to suicide
screening, “evidence of inadequate screening . . . would not raise an issue of
deliberate indifference without additional evidence that [the jailers] knew
that [Worl] was in fact at risk for suicide”. Id. at 305.) Even if Worl’s refusal
to cooperate should have alerted Hall and McGowen to a substantial risk of
suicide, the summary-judgment record does not show a genuine dispute of
material fact for whether they actually perceived that risk. Converse, 961 F.3d
at 775–76.
Absent additional, independent evidence that the jailers believed Worl
was at risk for suicide, failure to screen does not establish a genuine dispute
of material fact for the jailers’ subjective knowledge regarding Worl’s risk of
suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305. We turn to the conduct by each
of the two jailers.

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a.
Hall, as dispatcher on duty, received the 911 call shortly after 10:00
p.m. regarding a domestic disturbance between the caller, Worl, and her
husband. She dispatched the two Officers to the Worls’ home.
In preparation for Worl’s booking, Hall, according to her deposition,
began entering Worl’s information into the intake system and obtained
background information on her. This background information included a
check through the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s
Continuity of Care Query (CCQ) system “to determine if Worl had
previously received state mental healthcare or had a known intellectual or
developmental disability”. The CCQ check came back as “no match”.
Once Worl arrived at the jail, Hall, in her deposition, described her as
“uncooperative and vocal” and “[a]lmost in a combative state”. She further
explained in her deposition that, although the Officers told her Worl had been
drinking, she did not observe anything leading her to independently believe
Worl was intoxicated.
Hall, in the presence of the Officers, unsuccessfully attempted to book
Worl. Later, McGowen joined them in attempting to complete the booking
process. Hall observed McGowen: advise Worl that, if she would not
cooperate, she would be placed in the visitation room; and then confiscate
items from Worl. Hall was not present when Worl was placed in the room.
Hall, according to her affidavit, “never heard Worl make any
statements to indicate she intended to harm herself, nor was [she] aware of
any such statements to anyone else”; and, based on her observations, she
“did not believe Worl was engaging in suicidal behavior or had mental health
issues”. Plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Worl
did or said anything to show Hall that she was suicidal or intended to harm

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herself or that Hall otherwise drew that inference. E.g., Converse, 961 F.3d at
776, 778–79; Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 178.
Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding Hall’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, they fail
to show a violation by Hall of Worl’s statutory or constitutional right.
Therefore, Hall is entitled to qualified immunity.
b.
McGowen, as Hall described in her deposition, was the jail’s “acting
supervisor” on duty on 2 April. During her shift, the Officers, via radio,
notified her that: they had arrived at the jail; and a female, later identified as
Worl, was being brought in. After the Officers arrived, but prior to Worl’s
being taken to booking, “Worl advised [Officer Hastings] she slipped her
hand out of her handcuff”. McGowen then spoke with Officer Hastings
regarding McGowen’s removing Worl’s handcuffs as they could be used as a
weapon. Officer Hastings then escorted Worl to booking; McGowen
returned to the dispatch office.
A few minutes later, as stated in her affidavit and confirmed in her
deposition, she “heard Worl raising her voice”; went to the booking area to
determine whether Hall needed assistance; and Hall “advised [her] that
Worl was not complying and was refusing to be booked in or to answer any
questions”, including the questions regarding the mental-health screening
form.
When Worl continued to be noncooperative, McGowen conducted a
pat-down of Worl, confiscating her coat, shoes, and an eyeglass lens she had
felt in Worl’s coat pocket. She instructed Worl that she would be placed in
a holding cell (visitation room) until she could calm down and comply with
the booking process. Prior to placing Worl in the visitation room, and in the
presence of Officer Hastings, McGowen asked Worl if she had ever

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attempted suicide. In response, as stated in McGowen’s deposition, Worl
“shook her arms at [her] and said, ‘I don’t know. Have I?’”
McGowen, in her affidavit, stated she “did not observe any injuries,
scars or markings on Worl’s wrists or arms and took [Worl’s response] as an
attempt by Worl to show [her] she had not attempted suicide”. McGowen
then, with Officer Hastings, placed Worl in the visitation room at 11:33 p.m.,
and returned to the dispatch office.
McGowen, in her affidavit, stated that, during the time Worl was in
the jail, she “never heard [Worl] make any statements to indicate she
intended to harm herself, nor was [she] aware of Worl making any such
statements to anyone else”. Pursuant to her prior training intended to assist
her in recognizing inmates who are potentially suicidal or who may need
mental-health assistance, and based on her observations of Worl, McGowen,
as stated in her affidavit, “did not believe Worl was engaging in any suicidal
behavior or had mental health issues”.
Regarding McGowen’s questioning Worl about whether she had
previously attempted suicide, her response was vague and insufficient to
establish a genuine dispute of material fact for whether McGowen was
subjectively aware of a risk of suicide. E.g., Converse, 961 F.3d at 775.
McGowen’s actions, including her conducting a pat-down, do not create a
genuine dispute of material fact that those actions amounted to anything
more than general jail protocol.
Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding McGowen’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide,
they fail to show a violation by McGowen of Worl’s statutory or
constitutional right. Therefore, McGowen is entitled to qualified immunity.

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2.
For the two Officers, plaintiffs generally maintain that genuine
disputes of material fact exist regarding the Officers’ subjective knowledge
of Worl’s substantial risk for serious self-harm, including suicide. They
contend the conduct of Officers Hastings and Piper create genuine disputes
of material fact for whether they subjectively understood that risk.
As discussed supra, and regarding such genuine disputes vel non, we
consider whether anything concerning Worl led the Officers to form the
requisite subjective knowledge of a substantial risk, specifically a risk of
suicide. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Cope, 3 F.4th at 207–08; Converse, 961
F.3d at 776, 778–79; Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 178.
Officers Hastings and Piper were dispatched to the Worls’ home in
response to the 911 call. The Officers spoke with both Worls to determine
the situation. When, as seen in his body-cam video, Officer Piper asked Billy
Worl whether Worl had any history of mental health, he responded no.
However, when questioned whether she had any “mental health disabilities,
like bipolar”, he responded “yes, but in the past”.
Plaintiffs claim that, instead of taking Worl to the jail, the Officers
were required by Texas Health and Safety Code § 573.011(a)(1) to transport
her to a mental-health-treatment facility. In doing so, plaintiffs contend the
Officers acted with deliberate indifference; however, they fail to show
genuine disputes of material fact regarding the Officers’ subjective
knowledge requiring such response. They assert Officer Hastings was aware
of the procedure and could have utilized it.
The summary-judgment record does not show a genuine dispute of
material fact that either Officer perceived a substantial risk of suicide. And,
to the extent plaintiffs contend the Officers were required to take Worl into
custody under Chapter 573, that procedure is permissive, not mandatory. See

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TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.001(a) (“A peace officer, without a
warrant, may take a person into custody . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Regarding the lack of mental-health screening at the jail, plaintiffs
maintain: the Officers knew the screening form had not been completed; and
such knowledge creates a genuine dispute of material fact for whether Worl
should have been treated as suicidal. As discussed supra, this assertion fails.
Although our court has acknowledged there is no constitutional right to
screening, even if Worl’s refusal to cooperate should have alerted the
Officers to a substantial risk of suicide, the summary-judgment record does
not create a genuine dispute of material fact they perceived that risk. E.g.,
Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 307 (quoting Taylor, 575 U.S. at 826); Converse,
961 F.3d at 775–76.
Absent evidence that the Officers formed the opinion that Worl was
at a risk for suicide, knowledge that she was not screened does not establish
a genuine dispute of material fact for the Officers’ subjective knowledge
regarding Worl’s risk of suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305. We
turn to the conduct by each of the two Officers.
a.
Officer Hastings, the arresting officer that night, explained in his
deposition that he formed the opinion Worl was intoxicated because he was
told she and her husband had consumed two boxes of wine. After arresting
Worl, Officer Hastings transported her in his patrol vehicle.
Upon arriving at the jail, as shown in Officer Hastings’ body-cam
video, Worl told him she was “happy to be [t]here”, and she thanked him for
getting her out of the situation at her home. He escorted her to the booking
area, where she was, as he described in his deposition, “irritated” when
asked questions; he was unsuccessful in attempting to calm her down.

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When they failed to complete the booking process, McGowen placed
Worl in the visitation room while Officer Hastings observed. The Officer
stated in his deposition that he did not recall McGowen’s confiscating items
from Worl, but conceded it is standard practice to do so because detainees
can harm themselves with certain items. He further recounted Worl’s
presenting her arms to him and McGowen in response to being asked
whether she had previously attempted suicide, but noted that he did not see
any scars and that it wasn’t clear why she was presenting her arms.
Officer Hastings’ forming the opinion that Worl was intoxicated and
uncooperative does not create a genuine dispute of material fact for whether
he formed the required subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide.
E.g., id. at 305. Evidence does not show Worl did, or said, anything explicitly
or implicitly to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Officer
Hastings drew the inference she was a substantial risk of suicide.
Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding Officer Hastings’ subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
suicide, they fail to show a violation by Officer Hastings of Worl’s statutory
or constitutional right. Therefore, Officer Hastings is entitled to qualified
immunity.
b.
Officer Piper, the assisting officer on the scene that night, described
in his deposition Worl’s state at her home as “belligerent” and “[n]ot
responding to [the Officers], yelling, and screaming, not wanting to give [the
Officers] what she needed to tell [them], arguing with other officers”. (As
noted, two unidentified officers were also there.) In his deposition, he further
explained that, although Worl was argumentative, he did not believe she was
combative in a physical sense. He believed she was intoxicated and stated he
could smell alcohol. He also stated in his deposition that Worl said, “she was

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too drunk”; and he agreed that an intoxicated individual may not act
rationally.
Although not referenced by either party, our review of the summary-
judgment record, specifically the body-cam videos, revealed that, upon the
Officers’ arriving at the Worls’ home, Worl stated in Officer Piper’s
presence: “I don’t care if I die tonight” and “I’m tired of this”. Worl was
turned away from Officer Piper when she made these statements.
Despite her statement’s being muffled, it is well established that video
recordings are given a presumption of reliability and significant evidentiary
weight because “[a]n electronic recording will many times produce a more
reliable rendition . . . than will the unaided memory of a police agent”. United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971). Accordingly, where testimony
conflicts with video evidence, our court must view the “facts in the light
depicted by the videotape”. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); see
also United States v. Vickers, 442 F. App’x 79, 86, 87 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2011).
Even assuming Officer Piper heard these statements, it does not alter
our analysis. The statements fail to create a genuine dispute of material fact
that Officer Piper had actual knowledge of a risk of suicide or was “aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exist[ed]” and that he “also [drew] the inference”. E.g.,
Converse, 961 F.3d at 775. Worl made these statements when the Officers
first arrived at the Worls’ home, at a time when Worl was not aware that she
was going to be taken to jail. Considered in context, Worl’s statements and
tone appear to be directed at her frustration with her very distressing living
situation. Moreover, that plaintiffs do not mention this interaction suggests
they do not believe it is evidence regarding suicide propensity.
At the jail, Officer Piper assisted in attempting to book Worl; and he
remembered talking to her to explain that, if she was noncompliant, they

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would have to wait for her to become sober before she could be processed.
He did not assist in placing Worl in the visitation room.
Although Officer Piper conceded in his deposition that he formed the
opinion Worl was intoxicated, and he agreed that an intoxicated individual
may not act rationally, this is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact that the Officer formed the requisite subjective knowledge of a
substantial risk of suicide. Likewise, his observing her noncompliance does
not create genuine disputes of material fact. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at
305. The summary-judgment record does not show Worl did, or said,
anything explicitly or implicitly to create a genuine dispute of material fact
that Officer Piper drew the inference she was a substantial risk of suicide.
Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding Officer Piper’s subjective knowledge of a risk of suicide, they fail
to show a violation by Officer Piper of Worl’s statutory or constitutional
right. Therefore, Officer Piper is entitled to qualified immunity.
B.
In their responses in opposition to the two summary-judgment
motions, plaintiffs attached exhibits for the summary-judgment record. In
reply, defendants objected, albeit briefly, to many of those exhibits. In each
of its two summary-judgment orders, the court in a brief note sustained the
objections, ruling they were meritorious.
Preserved challenges to evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. E.g., Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1999).
“A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Axon Pressure Prods., Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 256
(5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Evidentiary rulings are “subject to the
harmless error doctrine”; therefore, even if the court abused its discretion,

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“the ruling will be reversed only if it affected the substantial rights of the
complaining party”. Adams v. Mem’l Hermann, 973 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Perez v. Tex. Dept.
of Crim. Just., Inst. Div., 395 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An erroneous
evidentiary ruling is reversible error only if the ruling affects a party’s
substantial rights.”).
The exhibits at issue generally contain research, as plaintiffs describe,
regarding “widespread knowledge of jail suicides by telephone cords in the
corrections community and the public generally”, including expert reports,
scholarly and news articles, and media depictions addressing telephone cords
as ligatures.
Even assuming the court abused its discretion, the contested exhibits
concern only defendants’ knowledge regarding the risk of telephone cords as
ligatures; they do not bear on defendants’ subjective knowledge regarding
whether Worl was a substantial suicide risk. Accordingly, the court’s
sustaining defendants’ objections did not affect plaintiffs’ substantial rights.
Therefore, this assumed error was harmless. Perez, 395 F.3d at 210.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the two Rule 54(b) judgments are
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9412824. Public record. Not legal advice.