# Eric Watkins v. Tennessee Valley Authority

> Merit Systems Protection Board · April 26, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9390205

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** April 26, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9390205

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ERIC WATKINS, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, AT-0752-18-0398-P-1

v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, DATE: April 26, 2023
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Eric Watkins, Sequatchie, Tennessee, pro se.

John E. Slater, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross
petition for review of the initial decision, which granted, in part, the appellant’s
motion for compensatory damage and ordered the agency to pay the appellant
$20,000 in nonpecuniary damages. Generally, we grant petitions such as these
only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition and the cross petition for
review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND
¶2 On September 6, 2018, an administrative judge issued an initial decision
finding that the appellant’s retirement from the agency was involuntary and
constituted a constructive removal. Watkins v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-18-0398-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 29,
Initial Decision (ID) at 1. He reversed the constructive removal. ID at 1, 14.
The administrative judge also found that the appellant established a prima facie
case of disability discrimination based on the agency’s failure to accommodate
his disability by reassigning him to a vacant position for which he was qualified
and that the agency failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same action absent the discriminatory motive. ID at 12-13. The
agency did not file a petition for review of that decision, and it became final on
October 11, 2018. ID at 16.
¶3 On December 4, 2018, the appellant filed a request for compensatory
damages based on the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when it failed to
3

accommodate him. Watkins v. Tennessee Valley Authority, MSPB Docket
No. AT-0752-18-0398-P-1, Damages File (P-1 DF), Tab 1. Specifically, he
argued that due to the agency’s discrimination, he suffered from depression, was
forced to refinance his house, and withdrew money from his retirement account
earlier than intended. Id. at 1. He supplemented his initial request with a formal
motion for compensatory damages, wherein he sought in excess of the
statutorily-permitted $300,000 award. P-1 DF, Tab 3 at 2. The agency did not
respond to the motion.
¶4 The administrative judge issued an initial decision on the written reco rd.
P-1 DF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (P-1 ID). Following a discussion of the
appellant’s requests for current and future pecuniary damages as well as
nonpecuniary damages, he granted the appellant’s motion in part, ordering the
agency to pay the appellant nonpecuniary compensatory damages in the amount
of $20,000. P-1 ID at 4-9. In so doing, he denied the appellant’s request for
current and future pecuniary damages. P-1 ID at 4-6.
¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the administra tive
judge erred in not awarding him more compensatory damages, both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary. Watkins v. Tennessee Valley Authority, MSPB Docket No. AT-
0752-18-0398-P-1, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 1-2. He also argues
that he was reinstated into a new position in which he earns less money than other
employees but has the most seniority and that he missed out on training
opportunities for that position because he was reinstated so late . Id. He included
with his petition for review the contact information for his physician. Id. at 5.
He included with his reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review
what appears to be a receipt of his payment to a law firm. PFR File, Tab 5 at 5.
¶6 The agency has filed a cross petition for review claiming that the Board
lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s motion for compensatory damages because
the appellant failed to make this request during the merits proceed ings. PFR File,
4

Tab 3 at 5-6. It also responded to the appellant’s petition for review, arguing that
$20,000 is a reasonable amount. Id. at 7-9.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employee may recover
compensatory damages from a Federal agency that engaged in unlawful and
intentional discrimination against him on the basis of his disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a); Schultz v. U.S. Postal Service, 70 M.S.P.R. 633, 639 (1996); 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.202(c). The statute authorizes the award of compensatory damages f or
pecuniary losses and for nonpecuniary losses, such as, but not limited to,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment
of life. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b); Heffernan v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 107 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶ 6 (2007). To receive an award of compensatory
damages, an appellant must demonstrate that he has been harmed as a result of the
agency’s discriminatory action and establish the extent, nature, and severity of
the harm, as well as the duration or expected duration of the harm. Id. The
Board defers to and adopts the criteria of the Equal Employmen t Opportunity
Commission for proving both the entitlement to and the amount of compensatory
damages. Id., ¶ 5; Sloan v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 58, 70 (1997).

The Board has jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s motion for compensatory
damages.
¶8 As an initial matter, we address the agency’s argument in its cross petition
for review that the administrative judge was without jurisdiction to decide the
appellant’s motion for compensatory damages because the appellant failed to
raise his damages claim during the merits stage of these proceedings. PFR File,
Tab 3 at 5-6. The agency did not raise this argument below. The Board generally
will not consider an argument raised for the first time on review absent a showing
that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the
party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271
5

(1980). The agency has not explained why it could not have made this argument
below, and we will not consider the merits of it further.
¶9 However, to the extent a determination of jurisdiction impacts our ability to
decide this appeal, see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a), we address that here. See Ney v.
Department of Commerce, 115 M.S.P.R. 204, ¶ 7 (2010) (holding that the issue of
the Board’s jurisdiction is always before the Board and may be raised sua s ponte
by the Board at any time). The agency appears to conflate jurisdiction with the
Board’s procedures for awarding compensatory damages. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-6.
The Board’s regulations recognize the statutory authority to award compensatory
damages separate and apart from its procedural and substantive requirements.
Compare 5 C.F.R. § 1201.202(c) (providing for awards of compensatory damages
as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.204 (addressing the
procedure for seeking compensatory damages). The agency’s argument goes to
the appellant’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements ; it does not
concern our well-established jurisdiction to decide the appellant’s motion for
compensatory damages. See Heffernan, 107 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶ 5. Accordingly, we
deny the agency’s cross petition for review.

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to offer
sufficient evidence to establish his entitlement to pecuniary damages.
¶10 Pecuniary damages are available for out-of-pocket expenses shown to be
related to the discriminatory conduct. Edwards v. Department of Transportation,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 12 (2012). These damages include reimbursement for
medical, job hunting, and moving expenses. Id. Claimants generally must
document these expenses, typically with receipts, bills, or physicians’ statements.
Id. Past pecuniary losses are ones that occur before a complaint is resolved and
future pecuniary losses are losses likely to occur after a complaint is resolved.
Id.
¶11 Below, the appellant argued that he was entitled to past pecuniary damages
because he had to refinance his home, withdraw money from his retirement
6

account earlier than expected, and pay for medicals bills regarding the treatment
of his depression. P-1 DF, Tab 1 at 1. The administrative judge found that the
appellant offered no evidence to document these expenses or establish the amount
of losses. P-1 ID at 5. He further found that, even if the appellant had
established the amount in question, he failed to establish the extent, severity, and
duration or expected duration of such harm. Id. On review, the appellant has not
challenged the administrative judge’s findings on these points, nor has he
submitted any documentary evidence establishing the costs of these expenses.
PFR File, Tabs 1, 5. Accordingly, we will not disturb the initial decision in this
regard.
¶12 In addition to the past pecuniary damages, the appellant also sought future
pecuniary damages, asserting that he should receive damages if the agency
attempted to restore him to a position “at a lower pay scale than that of a system
operator.” P-1 DF, Tab 1 at 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant
neither alleged nor established that the agency had restored him to such a position
and therefore failed to establish that he was entitled to an award of compensatory
damages on the basis of future pecuniary losses. P-1 ID at 5-6. On review, the
appellant argues that he could not establish his future pecuniary losses “because
they just brought [him] back to work” in April of 2019. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. He
also asserts that he earns less money in his new position yet has the most
seniority, and that the position to which he was reinstated caused him to miss out
on several bonuses. Id. He claims that his requests to the agency for accurate
records regarding pay and bonuses in his new position have been ignored. Id.
¶13 The appellant’s assertions are unavailing. He has not presented any
evidence beyond his unsworn statements in his petition for review to support an
award of pecuniary damages based on his reinstatement. PFR File, Tabs 1, 5.
Further, even if the appellant had established that he was not properly restored as
ordered in the final decision on the merits, IAF, Tab 29 at 14, his claim is a
compliance issue and not a question of compensatory damages , see 5 C.F.R.
7

§ 1201.182. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that the
appellant failed to establish that he is entitled to any pecuniary damages.

The administrative judge’s award of $20,000 in nonpecuniary damages is an
appropriate amount, which we will not disturb.
¶14 As discussed above, nonpecuniary damages include emotion pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life. Edwards,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶21. An award of compensatory damages for nonpecuniary
losses should reflect the extent to which the agency directly or proximately
caused the harm and the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. Id.
Acceptable evidence of nonpecuniary damages may include a statement by the
appellant explaining how he was affected by the discrimination. Id., ¶ 22.
Statements from others, including family members, friends, and health care
providers may address the outward manifestations of the impact of the
discrimination on the appellant. Id. The appellant may also submit
documentation of medical or psychiatric treatment related to the effects of the
discrimination, although such evidence is not a mandatory prerequisite to
establishing entitlement to nonpecuniary damages. Id. The amount of a
nonpecuniary damage award should not be “monstrously excessive” standing
alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent
with the amount awarded in similar cases. Id., ¶ 21.
¶15 The appellant sought nonpecuniary damages for emotional pain and
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life. P-1 DF,
Tab 1 at 1, Tab 3 at 2. He asserted that he experienced these nonpecuniary losses
“as a result of an ongoing pattern of retaliation” for equal employment
opportunity activity to which he was subjected by the agency. P-1 DF, Tab 3
at 2. He also claimed that he and his wife suffered “undue stress” resulting from
him being out of work, that he had been attending therapy sessions for stress and
anxiety, and that he had been prescribed several different medications. P-1 DF,
8

Tab 1 at 1, Tab 6 at 3. He requested damages “in excess of the jurisdictional
limit of $300,000.” P-1 DF, Tab 3 at 2.
¶16 The administrative judge found that, while the record is not entirely clear
regarding the extent to which the appellant’s nonpecuniary losses are strictly
attributable to the agency’s failure to reasonably accommodate him, the stress
that the appellant suffered as a result of having to adjust to the uncertainties of
his work status and loss of income resulting from his retirement constitute
compensable nonpecuniary damages. P-1 ID at 8. After considering the
appellant’s statements and comparable cases, he concluded that the appellant was
entitled to an award of $20,000 in nonpecuniary damages. Id.
¶17 On review, the appellant reiterates his claim that the emotional stress he
experienced warranted nonpecuniary damages in excess of the statutory limit of
$300,000. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. He also asserts that he has been working to get a
copy of his medical records reflecting his depression. Id. These arguments do
not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. Although the appellant claims
that he is working on getting his medical records, the current record i ncludes only
the appellant’s unsworn statements and contact information for a Department of
Veterans Affairs clinic. P-1 DF, Tabs 1, 3, 6; PFR File, Tabs 1, 5.
¶18 Given the limited record evidence, we agree with the administrative judge’s
award of $20,000. He appropriately considered the record evidence and
comparable cases and awarded an amount that is not “monstrously excessive.”
P-1 ID at 8-9; see Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 21. The appellant’s petition for
review offers no new argument or evidence; he essentially restates his argument s
from below, demonstrating mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s
findings and well-reasoned conclusions. Accordingly, it does not provide a basis
to disturb the initial decision. 2 See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R.

2
The appellant’s petition for review includes a request for a hearing on the question of
nonpecuniary damages. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. We deny that request. The appellant is
not necessarily entitled to a hearing on the issue of compensatory damages, and he did
9

98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
inferences, and reached well-reasoned conclusions); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)-(d).

An award of compensatory damages does not include back pay or other related
relief.
¶19 The appellant argued below and reasserts on review that the agency failed
to provide him the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and sick and
annual leave. P-1 DF, Tab 6 at 3; PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-2, Tab 5 at 1-3. He argues
that he was unable to provide the administrative judge and the Board with the
exact amount he believes the agency owed him because it has not responded to
his requests to produce that information. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-3. Although the
initial decision in the underlying matter awarded back pay and related relief, IAF,
Tab 29 at 14, the appropriate avenue to pursue an allegation that the agency has
failed to provide proper relief is through a compliance proceeding. 3 The instant
case is limited to a motion for compensatory damages, and the statute does not
authorize an award of back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of
equitable relief authorized by Title VII as a component to a compensatory

not request a hearing below. P-1 ID at 1. Further, the Board’s regulations at the
petition for review stage do not entitle the appellant to a hearing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117.
3
The appellant filed a petition for enforcement asserting that the agency was in
noncompliance with the Board’s final order in the underlying matter. Watkins v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-18-0398-C-1, Compliance File
(CF), Tab 1. The administrative judge issued an initial decision in that matter, noting
that the agency failed to reply to the appellant’s allegations in accordance with his
order, and finding that it failed to prove that it complied with the final decision or that
it had good cause for noncompliance or for incomplete or partial compliance. CF,
Tab 4, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 2-3. Neither party petitioned for review of
the compliance initial decision, which became final on March 14, 2019. CID at 6. The
matter has been referred to the Board’s Office of General Counsel to obtain the
agency’s compliance. See Watkins v. Tennessee Valley Authority, MSPB Docket
No. AT-0752-18-0398-X-1.
10

damages reward. 4 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (stating that compensatory damages
shall not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of relief
authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see Heffernan, 107 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶ 6.
¶20 We have considered the parties’ arguments in the petition and cross pet ition
for review but have determined that there is no basis to disturb the initial
decision. Accordingly, we deny both the petition and cross petition for review
and affirm the initial decision.

ORDER
¶21 We concur with the administrative judge’s decision to grant the appellant’s
motion for compensatory damages and award him $20,000 in nonpecuniary
damages. The agency is ORDERED to issue a check to the appellant in this
amount. The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the
date on which this Order is issued.
¶22 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶23 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

4
The appellant’s reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review appears to
indicate that he paid $2,095 to his attorneys and includes a receipt of payment for
another $595. PFR File, Tab 5 at 1, 5. To the extent the appellant is requesting an
award of attorney fees related to prior Board proceedings in his motion for
compensatory damages, we deny that request. See Boots v. U.S. Postal Service,
105 M.S.P.R. 500, 502 n.2 (2007) (stating that compensatory damages do not include
fees incurred for representation). Pursuant to the Board’s regulations, the appellant
may file a motion for attorney fees, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.203, but we make no finding here
regarding the timeliness of such a motion.
11

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by an y attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
13

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
14

Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for th e Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at thei r
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9390205. Public record. Not legal advice.