# Daniel Davis v. United States Postal Service

> Merit Systems Protection Board · April 13, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9386955

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** April 13, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9386955

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[a]n inquiry into the propriety of an agency’s imposition of an indefinite suspension looks only to facts relating to events prior to suspension that are proffered to support such an imposition”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DANIEL P. DAVIS, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, PH-0752-16-0127-I-3

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: April 13, 2023
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Joseph J. Chester, Esquire, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

Daniel E. Ellenbogen, Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the agency.

Thao T. Pham, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his indefinite suspension. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous a pplication of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affec ted the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant was the Postmaster of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Davis v.
U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-16-0127-I-1, Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 5 at 50. In December 2014, the agency’s Office of Inspector General
(OIG) initiated an investigation into allegations that the appellant had opened
Express Mail packages, without authorization, at post offices in the Pittsburgh
area. IAF, Tab 4 at 70. On June 29, 2015, one of the OIG investigators presented
his findings to detectives from the Allegheny District Attorney’s Office. IAF,
Tab 5 at 10. The detectives then interviewed various Postal Service employees
who had witnessed the appellant’s alleged misconduct. Id.
¶3 On September 15, 2015, the appellant was arrested and charged with four
counts of intimidation of witnesses or victims, four counts of criminal coercion,
3

four counts of official oppression, and one count of obstructing the administration
of law or other Government function. Id. at 5-48. The four counts of
intimidation were felony charges and the remaining counts were misdemeanor
charges. Id. Each charge was punishable by imprisonment. IAF, Tab 4 at 35-36.
The charges alleged that the appellant threatened and/or intimidated subordinate
employees who had observed him opening Express Mail packages in violation of
Federal law and agency regulations, and/or directed them not to report his actions
and not to cooperate with law enforcement investigations of his actions. Id.
Following a September 30, 2015 preliminary hearing, a Magisterial District Judge
ordered the appellant to stand trial on all charges. Id. at 51-65.
¶4 On October 20, 2015, the agency proposed the appellant’s indefinite
suspension based on reasonable cause to believe that he was guilty of a crime
punishable by imprisonment. Id. at 35-38. The appellant responded to the
proposal both orally and in writing. Id. at 26-33. Effective November 27, 2015,
the agency indefinitely suspended the appellant pending the disposition of the
criminal charges and any resulting administrative action. Id. at 20-24.
¶5 The appellant filed a Board appeal of the indefinite suspension and
requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The administrative judge twice dismissed
the appeal without prejudice pending the resolution of the criminal charges
against the appellant, and the appeal was automatically refiled following each
dismissal. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision; Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB
Docket No. PH-0752-16-0127-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 1, Tab 7, Initial Decision;
Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-16-0127-I-3, Appeal
File (I-3 AF), Tab 1. 3

3
In January 2017, shortly before this appeal was refiled a second time, a jury convicted
the appellant of 6 of the 13 counts against him. I-3 AF, Tab 10 at 18-19. In April
2017, he was sentenced to 5 years’ probation. Id. at 21-22. The agency subsequently
removed the appellant for improper conduct and his removal appeal is pending before
4

¶6 Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
affirming the agency’s action. 1-3 AF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 10.
The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tab 1. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for review.
PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS
The administrative judge properly sustained the indefinite suspension.
¶7 To establish that an indefinite suspension is valid, the agency must show the
following: (1) it imposed the suspension for an authorized reason; (2) the
suspension has an ascertainable end, i.e., a determinable condition subsequent
that will bring the suspension to a conclusion; (3) the suspension b ears a nexus to
the efficiency of the service; and (4) the penalty is reasonable. Henderson v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶ 5 (2016), aff’d, 878 F.3d
1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017). One of the authorized circumstances for imposing an
indefinite suspension is when the agency has reason able cause to believe an
employee has committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment could be
imposed. Id. The appellant argues on review, as he did below, that the agency
did not have such reasonable cause and that it also failed to satisfy the third and
fourth criteria. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; I-3 AF, Tab 31. We disagree.

Reasonable Cause:
¶8 The administrative judge found that the Magisterial District Judge’s
determination that there was sufficient evidence to order the appellant to stand
trial on all 13 charges established more than adequate evidence to meet the
threshold requirement of reasonable cause. ID at 6 (citing Dunnington v.
Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The appellant

the Board on review. Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-17-
0388-I-1, Petition for Review File, Tab 1.
5

seems to challenge this finding on review, reiterating his argument from below
that the agency failed to meet the reasonable cause requirement because his
criminal prosecution was “replete with harmful procedura l error.” PFR File,
Tab 1 at 6; I-3 AF, Tab 31 at 6. The administrative judge rejected this argument
in the initial decision, correctly finding that the appellant’s claim of procedural
irregularities in connection with his criminal prosecution is immater ial to the
issue in the appeal, the validity of the agency’s indefinite suspension. ID at 6
(citing Rhodes v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 487 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that “[a]n inquiry into the propriety of an agency’s imposition of
an indefinite suspension looks only to facts relating to events prior to suspension
that are proffered to support such an imposition”)). The appellant’s reiteration of
his argument that the agency failed to prove reasonable cause is essentially mere
disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained findings, which does not
establish a basis for review. See Broughton v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (finding that mere reargument of issues
already raised and properly resolved by the administrative judge below does not
establish a basis for review).
¶9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that a formal
judicial determination made following a preliminary hearing usually provides
“more than enough evidence” of possible misconduct to meet the threshold
requirement of reasonable cause to suspend. See Dunnington, 956 F.2d at 1157.
Therefore, given the Magisterial District Judge’s order directing the appellant to
stand trial on felony and misdemeanor charges, each of which is punishable by
imprisonment, the agency clearly had reasonable cause to believe that the
appellant had committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment could be
imposed.

Ascertainable End:
¶10 The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that the
indefinite suspension had an ascertainable end, and we agree with that finding.
6

PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 7. The Board has held that an indefinite suspension may
be continued after criminal charges are resolved if the agency has provided
advance notice of possible administrative action in the suspension proposal or
decision notice and takes action within a reasonable time after the criminal
proceedings are concluded. Camaj v. Department of Homeland Security,
119 M.S.P.R. 95, ¶ 11 (2012). The appellant’s indefinite suspension had an
ascertainable end because the agency stated in the decision letter imposin g the
suspension that the suspension would end following disposition of the criminal
charges against the appellant, followed by the expiration of a reasonable amount
of time while the agency decided the appropriate administrative action to take
based on the disposition of the criminal charges. IAF, Tab 4 at 23. Moreover,
the agency terminated the appellant’s indefinite suspension effective February 27,
2017, approximately 6 weeks after his conviction. I-3 AF, Tab 22 at 4.

Nexus:
¶11 The administrative judge found that, given the nature of the criminal
charges against the appellant, it is clear that the agency established a nexus
between the criminal charges and the efficiency of the service . ID at 7-8. The
appellant challenges this finding on review, reiterating his argument from below
that the agency could not prove nexus due to the “non-public nature of [his]
actual administrative duties” and the lack of any “competently proven” media
disclosure. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 31 at 5.
¶12 This argument is unavailing. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, his
alleged misconduct was disclosed by the media, as it was the subject of multiple
news reports that identified him as a Postmaster for the agency. IAF, Tab 4
at 40-49; see Jones v. Government Printing Office, 13 M.S.P.R. 365, 369 (1982)
(affirming the administrative judge’s conclusion that nexus was shown because
the appellant’s continued presence in the workplace would affect the agency’s
reputation, given that the pending criminal action against her received widespread
notoriety). Further, as the administrative judge noted, the four felony counts of
7

witness intimidation were based on the appellant’s interactions with four
subordinate employees. ID at 7-8; IAF, Tab 5 at 6, 15, 24, 33. Consequently, the
administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant’s actions adversely
affected his coworkers’ job performance. ID at 8. The administrative judge also
correctly found that the appellant’s conduct adversely affected the agency’s trust
and confidence in the appellant, as well as the agency’s mission. Id. Given these
circumstances, we agree with the administrative judge that there is a nexus
between the appellant’s alleged criminal conduct and the efficiency of the
service.

Penalty:
¶13 On review, the appellant argues that, in finding that an indefinite
suspension was a reasonable penalty, the administrative judge failed to accord
sufficient weight to his 14 years of service with the U.S. Marine Corps, his heroic
and honorable military service, and his 20 years of “exemplary service” with the
agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The Board will review an agency-imposed penalty
only to determine if the agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised
management discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Douglas v.
Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981). Relevant factors include
the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the employee’s duties;
the employee’s past disciplinary record; the employee’s past work record,
including length of service and performance on the job; and the effect of the
offense upon supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability to perform his
assigned duties. Id. at 305-06. Not all of the factors will be pertinent in every
instance, and so the relevant factors must be balanced in each case to arrive at the
appropriate penalty. Id. at 306. The Board will modify a penalty only when it
finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the agency
clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in determining the penalty. Id.
¶14 The decision letter and the deciding official’s hearing testimony, as
summarized in the initial decision, demonstrate that he considered the relevant
8

Douglas factors in making his penalty determination, including the nature and
seriousness of the offense and its relation to the appellant’s duties. IAF, Tab 4
at 22; ID at 8-9. In that regard, the deciding official found that the criminal
charges against the appellant were serious and bore directly and substantially on
his employment. IAF, Tab 4 at 22. The deciding official also considered the
publicity surrounding the criminal charges, and his loss of confidence in the
appellant’s ability to continue working in any capacity. Id.; ID at 9 (citing I-3 AF
(hearing testimony of the deciding official)). The deciding official considered the
appellant’s lengthy service, the absence of prior discipline, and his acceptable
performance prior to his arrest as mitigating factors, but found that they were
insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the criminal ch arges. IAF, Tab 4
at 22.
¶15 In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the penalty of
indefinite suspension was reasonable because the charges against the appellant
were serious and directly related to his duties as Postmaster. ID at 9.
Recognizing that the Board must accord proper deference to the agency’s primary
discretion in managing its workforce, we see no reason to disturb this finding.
See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge
that the agency established all the elements necessary to sustain the appellant’s
indefinite suspension. ID at 5-10.

The appellant has failed to show that the administrative judge abused her
discretion in her discovery and witness rulings.
¶16 On review, the appellant contends that the administrative judge improperly
denied his motion to compel discovery, including his motion to compel the
depositions of five agency employees. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; I-3 AF, Tabs 4-6, 9.
He also argues that the administrative judge erred in only partially granting his
motion to compel the deposition of the OIG agent who provided law enforcement
officials with information about the appellant, and in severely limiting the agent’s
deposition and trial testimony. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; I-3 AF, Tab 9. He further
9

alleges that the administrative judge improperly denied six of his eight witness
requests. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; I-3 AF, Tab 12 at 5-6, Tab 15 at 3.
¶17 An administrative judge has wide discretion to exclude evidence and
witnesses when it has not been shown that such evidence and testimony would be
relevant, material, and nonrepetitious. Fox v. Department of the Army,
120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 42 (2014); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(3), (6), (10). The
Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s rulings on discovery matters,
including a motion to compel, absent an abuse of discretion. Fox, 120 M.S.P.R.
529, ¶ 42.
¶18 Based on our review of the record, we find that the appellant has not shown
the administrative judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to compel or
his witness requests. In his petition for review, the appellant merely asserts that
the administrative judge erred in denying his motion to compel ; he does not
specify why he believes the administrative judge abused her discretion in denying
that motion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. As for the administrative judge’s witness
rulings, the administrative judge denied six of the appellant’s eight witness
requests based on her finding that the proposed witnesses would not provide
relevant testimony. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 3. The appellant has not shown that any of
the excluded witnesses would have provided testimony that was relevant,
material, or nonrepetitious. Thus, we find no basis to reverse the administrative
judge’s rulings.
¶19 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

4
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
10

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
11

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at th eir respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
12

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2 302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

5
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
13

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
14

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9386955. Public record. Not legal advice.