# In re B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., N.R., E.O.-R., E.R., and S.V. and In re B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., N.R., E.O.-R., E.R., and S.V.

> West Virginia Supreme Court · April 4, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9384727

## Case

- **Court:** West Virginia Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 4, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Juvenile
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

January 2023 Term FILED
_______________ April 4, 2023
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
No. 22-0199 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

_______________ OF WEST VIRGINIA

IN RE B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., N.R., E.O.-R., E.R., AND S.V.
____________________________________________________________

AND
_______________

No. 22-0206
_______________

IN RE B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., N.R., E.O.-R., E.R., AND S.V.
____________________________________________________________

Appeals from the Circuit Court of McDowell County
The Honorable Edward J. Kornish, Judge
Case Nos. 21-JA-24, 21-JA-25, 21-JA-26, 21-JA-27, 21-JA-28,
21-JA-29, 21-JA-30

AFFIRMED, IN PART, VACATED, IN PART,
and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
____________________________________________________________

Submitted: January 10, 2023
Filed: April 4, 2023

Dana F. Eddy, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Public Defender Services Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia Brittany Ryers-Hindbaugh, Esq.
Counsel for Petitioner Mother Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Thomas H. Evans, III, Esq. Petitioner for Respondent DHHR
THOMAS HANNA EVANS, PLLC
Oceana, West Virginia R. Keith Flinchum, Esq.
Counsel for Petitioner Father Law Office of R. Keith Flinchum
Princeton, West Virginia
Guardian ad Litem
JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “‘Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject

to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts

without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and

shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or

neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the

finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not

overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must

affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety.’ Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223,

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).” Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).

2. “For a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an abuse and

neglect case, the child must be an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ as those terms are

defined in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-

4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court’s finding that a child is an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected

child’ must be based upon the conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and

neglect petition.” Syl. Pt. 8, In re C.S. and B.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022).

i
3. The mere fact that a child is in a legal guardianship at the time an

abuse and neglect petition is filed does not preclude a circuit court from exercising subject

matter jurisdiction in adjudicating whatever rights a respondent to that petition may still

have to that child, provided that the child meets the definition of an “abused child” or

“neglected child” as defined in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018) so as to confer that

jurisdiction. To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must make specific factual

findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are being harmed or threatened by

the allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the petition. Due to the

jurisdictional nature of this question, generalized findings applicable to all children named

in the petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific findings with regard to

each child so named.

4. “Because the purpose of an abuse and neglect proceeding is remedial,

where the parent or guardian fails to respond to probative evidence offered against him/her

during the course of an abuse and neglect proceeding, a lower court may properly consider

that individual’s silence as affirmative evidence of that individual’s culpability.” Syl. Pt.

2, W. Va. Dept. of Health and Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W. Va. 489, 475

S.E.2d 865 (1996).

ii
WOOTON, Justice:

This consolidated opinion stems from separate appeals filed by Petitioner

Mother M.O.-R. 1 and Petitioner Father W.V.-2 (collectively “Petitioners” or “the parents”)

challenging the order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County that terminated their

parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to seven children: B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., N.R.,

E.O.-R., E.R., and S.V. (collectively “the children”). 2 Three of the children resided in the

home at the time the abuse and neglect petition was filed, but the other four children were

in legal guardianships with various relatives. In addition to addressing Petitioners’ specific

arguments on appeal, we requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether this

Court’s holding in In re C.S. and B.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022), 3 precluded

the circuit court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the children in legal

guardianships.

1
Consistent with our practice in cases involving sensitive facts, we use initials
where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235
W. Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015).
2
Petitioners share only one biological child: S.V. Petitioner Mother is the biological
mother of N.R., E.O.-R., and E.R., while Petitioner Father is the biological father of B.V.,
W.V.-1, and L.V. The other biological parents of the children are nonoffending and are
not parties to this appeal.
3
In brief, In re C.S. held that a circuit court may only exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a child in an abuse and neglect proceeding where the court has found said
child to be an “abused child” or “neglected child” as defined in the West Virginia Code
section 49-1-201. 247 W. Va. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 353, syl. pt. 8. In that case, we concluded
that one of the children involved did not meet either of these definitions, in part due to her
having been placed in a legal guardianship several years prior to the initiation of the
proceedings. Id. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 362.
1
Because we find ample support for the termination of Petitioners’ parental

rights as to those children who resided in the home, we affirm the circuit court’s

dispositional order in that regard. However, because we find that the circuit court failed to

make adequate findings to support its exercise of jurisdiction over the children in legal

guardianships, we vacate that portion of the adjudicatory and dispositional orders

culminating in the termination of Petitioners’ parental rights to those four children and

remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before delving into the facts underlying this abuse and neglect petition it

should be noted that the parents have had several interactions with Child Protective

Services (“CPS”) and the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources

(“DHHR”) over the years. In the course of those interactions four of Petitioners’ seven

children were placed in permanent legal guardianships with relatives prior to the initiation

of the instant abuse and neglect proceedings. Specifically, B.V. and L.V. were placed with

maternal grandmother, T.K.; W.V.-1 was placed with paternal grandmother, T.M.; and

E.O.-R. was placed with paternal grandmother, B.S. Under the terms of these

guardianships the legal guardians were vested with discretion to control any visitation the

children had with the parents, and we can glean from the record that the two eldest children,

B.V. and W.V.-1, had some contact with the parents, though it is not clear to what extent.

2
Turning to the instant abuse and neglect petition, CPS received a report on

May 8, 2021, that the child E.R., who resided with Petitioners, was suspected to have been

physically abused. The child’s grandparents observed bruising on the majority of his body

and, at the advice of a McDowell County sheriff’s deputy, took the child to Welch

Community Hospital for a medical examination. The exam revealed that the child also

suffered from a fractured nasal bone, and the treating physician opined that the injuries

could not have been sustained accidentally. 4

Following the medical exam, three of the children, E.R., N.R., and B.V., were

forensically interviewed at Stop the Hurt Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”). These

interviews were admitted without objection into evidence before the circuit court at the

adjudicatory hearings, and the record indicates they were reviewed in camera. In his

interview E.R. disclosed that Petitioner Father beat and choked him. E.R. explained that

some of the current bruising resulted from an incident in which E.R. tried to choke his little

sister, S.V., and that Petitioner Father choked him so he “would know how it felt.” The

child further revealed that Petitioner Father broke his nose by slamming a car door into it,

and that Petitioner Father regularly twisted his nipples and genitals in a so-called “cow

bite” to make him shout. At a subsequent interview, E.R. confirmed an allegation from a

different child that Petitioner Father regularly took him to an outbuilding near the family’s

4
E.R. was brought to the hospital by a different grandparent days later for a follow-
up exam and reported that the child experienced pain while urinating. A subsequent exam
revealed extensive bruising to his genitals.

3
home, but did not disclose what occurred in that building, simply noting that it “wasn’t a

good place.”

CAC also interviewed N.R., who also resided with Petitioners, and

confirmed that Petitioner Father beat and choked E.R. after the child allegedly tried to

choke S.V. She stated that she witnessed the incident, as well as other incidents in which

Petitioner Father caused injury to E.R. She further disclosed witnessing Petitioner Father

beat Petitioner Mother and threaten to kill her, as well as an incident in which Petitioner

Father held a gun to S.V.’s stomach and threatened to kill her if she did not stop crying.

As noted above, N.R. disclosed that Petitioner Father regularly took E.R. to an outbuilding

to “punish him.”

CAC also interviewed the oldest child, B.V., who did not reside in the home

with the parents and the children N.R., E.R., and S.V. In her interview B.V. disclosed that

Petitioner Father had hit her, and that she had witnessed him hit Petitioner Mother and

threaten to kill her. Further, she disclosed an incident in which Petitioner Father allegedly

overdosed on methamphetamine in the family home, although the record is unclear as to

whether B.V. was present for this incident. 5 For reasons that are unclear to this Court, the

DHHR never pursued adjudication or disposition on these specific disclosures with regard

5
Subsequent testimony at one of the adjudicatory hearings indicates that B.V. may
have learned of this incident from her grandmother, T.M., rather than witnessing it
firsthand.

4
to B.V. despite their having been admitted into evidence. Further, the circuit court did not

make any individual determinations as to this child at Petitioners’ adjudication and

disposition.

Following these interviews the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition on

May 14, 2021, alleging that Petitioner Father physically abused E.R., engaged in domestic

violence, and engaged in substance abuse. The petition further alleged that Petitioner

Mother failed to protect the children from the abuse. 6 The DHHR later filed an amended

petition in which it added W.V.-1’s guardian, T.M., as a potential offending party because

she allegedly facilitated contact between the child and Petitioner Father. However, T.M.

was never adjudicated on this allegation and was later determined to be nonoffending.

The circuit court held multiple adjudicatory hearings from June 23, 2021, to

October 26, 2021, during which it heard testimony from the investigating CPS worker and

from the CAC director regarding the children’s forensic interviews. The court also heard

testimony from a McDowell County Sheriff’s Deputy and the emergency room treating

physician regarding E.R.’s injuries on the night of the medical examination. The parents

declined to testify at the adjudicatory proceedings, citing their pending parallel criminal

6
We note that the B.V. and N.R. each stated in their forensic interviews that they
recalled Petitioner Mother attempting to leave Petitioner Father on two occasions. Once,
Petitioner Mother locked Petitioner Father out of the home. On another occasion, she
packed bags for herself and the children with the intention of leaving. Neither attempt was
successful.

5
proceedings as the basis for that refusal. Ultimately the court issued an adjudicatory order

dated November 24, 2021, finding that Petitioner Father physically abused E.R., that there

was domestic violence in the home, and that Petitioner Mother failed to protect the children

from that domestic violence. The court thereafter adjudicated Petitioner Father as an

abusing parent and Petitioner Mother as a neglectful parent.

Significantly, the parents never moved the circuit court for an improvement

period. Moreover, to the extent the DHHR attempted to provide services in the form of

parenting classes, drug screens and supervised visitation, the parents were extremely

uncooperative. Initially they refused to supply the DHHR with any contact information,

then relocated from McDowell County, West Virginia, to somewhere near Martinsburg in

Berkeley County, West Virginia, without providing an address. The McDowell County

DHHR attempted to communicate with the Berkeley County DHHR office to facilitate the

provision of services, but that effort was largely unsuccessful, consisting solely of a series

of intermittent drug screen reports.

The matter proceeded to disposition over the course of two hearings held on

December 2, 2021, and January 26, 2022. At this time, the circuit court reiterated its

findings that Petitioner Father physically abused E.R. and that Petitioner Mother failed to

protect the children from domestic violence. The parents again elected not to testify on

6
their own behalf. 7 Thereafter the circuit court found that the parents failed to acknowledge

any responsibility for their abusive and neglectful conduct, resulting in a conclusion that

the conditions of abuse and neglect could not be rectified. The court further concluded

there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected

in the foreseeable future, and terminated Petitioners’ parental, custodial, and guardianship

rights to all seven children by order dated February 14, 2022.

Petitioners filed separate appeals of that order raising legally distinct

arguments. In this Court’s October 20, 2022, scheduling order, we ordered the parties to

submit simultaneous supplemental briefing to address whether this Court’s decision in In

re C.S. precluded the circuit court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the

children who were in legal guardianships prior to the filing of the abuse and neglect

petition. 8

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has long held that our standard of review in abuse and neglect

matters is as follows:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court
are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse

The record indicates that the parents declined to testify because their respective
7

counsel in the parallel criminal matters resulting from the same abusive conduct advised
them not to testify in the civil abuse and neglect proceeding.

All parties, save Petitioner Father, submitted the requested briefing and this matter
8

proceeded to argument on January 10, 2023.

7
and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the
circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These
findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a
reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In
Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177
(1996).

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). With this standard in

mind, we now proceed to address the parties’ arguments on appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Petitioners filed separate appeals with legally distinct

arguments. Petitioner Mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding that she failed

to protect the children when there was “uncontroverted evidence” she took steps to protect

them. She also argues that the court erred in finding that the DHHR was relieved of its

duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family in this matter. Petitioner Father

argues that the court erred in adjudicating him as an abusing parent, contending that the

adjudication was not necessary to protect the welfare of the children, and further

contending that he could have properly parented the children if given the proper tools. He

also argues that the court erred in relying on his failure to acknowledge the conditions of

abuse and neglect as a basis for termination because his pending criminal charges

8
“prevented [him] from testifying or acknowledging the alleged abuse.” We address each

of these arguments in turn below.

A. Jurisdiction

Before we can properly consider Petitioners’ legal arguments as to

termination, we must address a separate matter. As noted above, in addition to Petitioners’

arguments, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on the question of whether this

Court’s decision in In re C.S., 247 W. Va. at 212, 875 S.E.2d at 350, deprived the circuit

court of jurisdiction over the four children in legal guardianships at the time the instant

abuse and neglect proceedings began, thus presenting a question of subject matter

jurisdiction which must be resolved prior to consideration of the terminations of parental

rights.

In the requested supplemental briefing, the DHHR and guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) each argued that In re C.S. has no impact on the terminations at issue here, while

Petitioner Mother argued that In re C.S. fully precludes circuit courts from exercising

subject matter jurisdiction over any child in a legal guardianship prior to the initiation of

the abuse and neglect proceedings. Neither of these positions is correct.

In re C.S. centered on a mother’s appeal of the termination of her parental

rights to two children arising from her substance abuse. 247 W. Va. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at

354. One child, C.S., resided in the mother’s home. Id. The other child, B.S., had been in

9
a permanent legal guardianship with third parties for five years at the time the abuse and

neglect petition was filed. Id. On appeal to this Court the mother argued that the circuit

court erroneously exercised jurisdiction over B.S. because the child was not in her care

when the abuse and neglect petition was filed. Id. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 360-61. We agreed,

based upon our conclusion that B.S. did not qualify as an abused or neglected child under

the definitions set forth in the West Virginia Code. 9 In reaching this decision, we held:

For a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an
abuse and neglect case, the child must be an “abused child” or
a “neglected child” as those terms are defined in West Virginia
Code § 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code §
49-4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court’s finding that a child is an
“abused child” or a “neglected child” must be based upon the
conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and
neglect petition.

Id. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 353, syl. pt. 8.

In applying that holding to the facts of the case, we explained that B.S. did

not qualify as an abused or neglected child because her

health and welfare were not harmed or threatened by the
[mother’s] drug addiction, and there is no evidence that any

9
West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 states, in relevant part, that an “abused child” is a
child “whose health or welfare is being harmed or threatened by: . . . [a] parent, guardian,
or custodian who knowingly or intentionally inflicts, attempts to inflict, or knowingly
allows another person to inflict, physical injury or mental or emotional injury, upon the
child or another child in the home.” The same Code section explains, in relevant part, that
a “neglected child” is a child “[w]hose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened
by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to
supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or
education, when that refusal, failure, or inability is not due primarily to a lack of financial
means[.]” Id.

10
person inflicted abuse or neglect upon B.S. or upon another
child in the home where B.S. was living. It is undisputed that
[the legal guardians] are non-abusing guardians. Critically, the
[mother] did not have custody of B.S. and could not have
simply gone to the guardians’ home to retrieve B.S. any time
she wished. To obtain custody of B.S., the [mother] would
have to file a petition to terminate the legal guardianship. . .
and a court would have to grant that petition.

Id. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 362; see also In re C.T.-1, No. 22-0047, 2022 WL 3960166 (W.Va.

Aug. 31, 2022) (memorandum decision) (finding that a child who had been in a

guardianship with a relative for eleven years at the time the abuse and neglect petition was

filed did not qualify as an abused or neglected child).

Here, Petitioner Mother contends that in all circumstances In re C.S.

precludes a circuit court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a child in a legal

guardianship prior to the filing of the abuse and neglect petition. Simply put, that is an

incorrect reading of this Court’s opinion. To the extent that the DHHR and the GAL argue

that In re C.S. has no impact on the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction, they likewise

misread the opinion. With respect to a child in a legal guardianship at the time an abuse

and neglect petition is filed, In re C.S. stands for the proposition that a circuit court must

make factual findings that said child is an “abused child” or “neglected child,” as defined

in West Virginia Code section 49-1-201, in order to exercise jurisdiction over the child.

247 W. Va. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 353, syl. pt. 8.

11
Lest there be further confusion regarding In re C.S., while we would observe

that the mother’s lack of custody over B.S. was a predominant factor in the decision, we

wish to make clear that nothing in In re C.S. forecloses a circuit court from finding that a

parent’s conduct has threatened the child’s health or welfare such that the child may

properly be deemed an abused or neglected child, as that term is defined by section 49-1-

201, even though the parent does not have legal custody of their child. Without venturing

into hypotheticals, we can envision countless factual scenarios wherein a child in a

guardianship could be directly threatened by their parent’s conduct, so as to render the

child an abused or neglected child. The mere fact that a child is in a legal guardianship at

the time an abuse and neglect petition is filed does not preclude a circuit court from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction in adjudicating whatever rights a respondent to that

petition may still have to that child, provided that the child meets the definition of an

“abused child” or “neglected child” as defined in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018)

so as to confer that jurisdiction. To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must

make specific factual findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are being

harmed or threatened by the allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named

in the petition. Due to the jurisdictional nature of this question, generalized findings

applicable to all children named in the petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make

specific findings with regard to each child so named.

Such a finding was not possible in In re C.S. because the abuse and neglect

petition only pertained to the mother’s drug abuse and its impact on C.S, the child in her

12
home. 247 W. Va. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 354. The child in the guardianship, B.S., had been

out of the mother’s home for five years and the petition only mentioned the child in a

perfunctory fashion. Id. at ---, 875 S.E.2d at 354-55. It was not clear from the record

whether the mother had any contact with B.S. during the time period in which she was

suffering from substance abuse problems. Id. The same was true in In re C.T.-1, as the

allegations in the petition were specific to the child who resided in the home, C.T.-2, and

there was no indication that the mother’s conduct impacted C.T.-1—the child who had

been in a guardianship for eleven years. See 2022 WL 3960166 at *5.

The case at bar differs from those mentioned above. The original abuse and

neglect petition included allegations of domestic violence and drug abuse predicated at

least partially on disclosures from B.V., a child who was indisputably in a legal

guardianship at the time the petition was filed. At a minimum, these facts suggest the

possibility that B.V. may have been directly exposed to the conditions of abuse and neglect

created by the parents, despite having been in a guardianship with a non-offending guardian

during the relevant time frame. Moreover, the amended petition added a different legal

guardian, T.M., as an offending party 10 based upon allegations that she permitted W.V.-1

to have unfettered contact with Petitioner Father and refused to acknowledge that the

parents engaged in abusive and neglectful behaviors. The GAL’s report lends some

credence to that assertion, insofar as he noted his concern that W.V.-1 was exposed to

10
T.M. was ultimately not adjudicated as an abusing or neglectful guardian.

13
ongoing problems in the home as a result of this unrestricted contact. 11 Thus, at least as to

B.V. and W.V.-1, there remains an open question as to whether the parents’ abusive and

neglectful conduct threatened their health and welfare such that they would qualify as

abused or neglected children even while in legal guardianships.

The circuit court’s decision in this matter was rendered prior to our decision

in In re C.S., so the court may not have been aware of the questions posed by the existing

legal guardianships and should not be faulted for failing to make the required jurisdictional

findings. We are mindful that “[u]njustified procedural delays wreak havoc on a child’s

development, stability and security.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In Interest of Carlita B., 185 W.

Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991). However, this Court is not a factfinding tribunal, and we

cannot infer that findings as to the four children in guardianships could have been properly

made in this case; the record does not afford sufficient facts from which to draw any such

inference. For that reason we must vacate, in part, the circuit court’s adjudicatory and

dispositional orders with regard to the four children—B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., and E.O.-R.—

in legal guardianships at the time the underlying abuse and neglect petition was filed. We

remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, including but not limited to

an order setting out the requisite findings as to whether any of the four children in legal

11
The other two children in guardianships, L.R. and E.O.-R. were each mentioned
only once in the underlying proceedings; in the GAL’s report it was noted that those
children had little to no contact with the parents. It is impossible for this Court to determine
whether those children were exposed to any abusive or neglectful conduct at the hands of
the parents that would justify a finding they were abused or neglected children.

14
guardianships met the statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child, based on the

evidence previously adduced. See W. Va. Code § 49-1-201. To the extent that evidence

does not support such a determination, we further direct the circuit court to undertake such

proceedings, consistent with this opinion, as may be necessary to ascertain whether the

children in legal guardianships met the statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child,

so that the circuit court might properly exercise jurisdiction.

B. Termination

Having determined that the portion of the dispositional order dealing with

the children in guardianships must be vacated, we now turn to that portion of the

dispositional order dealing with the children—N.R., E.R., and S.V.—residing with

Petitioners. We begin with Petitioner Mother, who contends that the record includes

“uncontroverted evidence” that she took steps to protect the children from Petitioner

Father’s abusive conduct; to wit: in their forensic interviews B.V. and N.R. recounted

instances in which she locked Petitioner Father out of the home and where she packed bags

for herself and the children with the intention of leaving the home. Although this evidence

was undoubtedly before the circuit court, the court found it to be insufficient to rebut the

evidence that she failed to protect the children.

This Court has explained that “[a]n appellate court may not decide the

credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and task of the

trier of fact.” State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995).

15
The circuit court’s finding that Petitioner Mother failed to protect the children is amply

supported by the evidence of record. While she may have occasionally taken steps to leave

the home, the record is clear that those steps were minimal, were never successful, and that

she continued her relationship with Petitioner Father throughout the proceedings. In

addition, the court had before it significant evidence that Petitioner Mother was present or

in the next room when Petitioner Father was abusing E.R. and failed to intervene. Thus,

even with evidence of Petitioner Mother’s limited attempts to protect them, the circuit court

was wholly justified in finding she failed to protect the children.

Next, Petitioner Mother contends the circuit court erred in finding that the

DHHR was relieved of its duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family in this

matter. While it is true that the DHHR generally must make such reasonable efforts, West

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A) (2020) relieves it of that duty where the circuit court

makes a finding that the parent “has subjected the child, another child of the parent or any

other child residing in the same household or under the temporary or permanent custody of

the parent to aggravated circumstances which include, but are not limited to, abandonment,

torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse[.]” In the instant case, Petitioner Mother readily

concedes that Petitioner Father engaged in chronic abuse of E.R., and the circuit court made

an explicit finding to that effect. It is clear from the circuit court’s order that this finding

applied to both parents; Petitioner Mother was aware of the chronic abuse and did nothing

to prevent it. See, e.g., In re A.L.C.M., 239 W. Va. 382, 392, 801 S.E.2d 260, 270 (2017)

(“Thus, for a child to be determined to be an ‘abused child,’ the parent charged with such

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abuse need not commit the abuse him/herself, so long as he/she knew that the subject abuse

was being perpetrated, even if the alleged abuse occurs outside of the presence of the parent

charged with such abuse.”) (citation omitted). The DHHR was properly relieved of its duty

to preserve the family in this instance.

Even assuming such a finding had not been made, Petitioner Mother fails to

rebut the wealth of evidence in the record illustrating that the DHHR attempted to provide

services to the parents in the form of supervised visits, parenting classes, and drug screens.

The parents rendered those efforts futile by being uncooperative with the DHHR, failing

to provide contact information, and relocating in the middle of the proceedings without

informing the DHHR of their new address. Further, the parents abjectly failed to

acknowledge the conditions of abuse or neglect; that fact alone renders those problems

untreatable and any services the DHHR may have provided an exercise in futility. In re

Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 56, 743 S.E.2d 352, 364 (2013). Accordingly, we find no error

in the circuit court relieving the DHHR of its duty to preserve the family.

We turn now to Petitioner Father, who first contends the circuit court erred

in terminating his parental rights, or more specifically that termination was unnecessary to

protect their welfare. We find this argument to be without merit. The circuit court’s

dispositional order thoroughly explains that Petitioner Father subjected E.R. to extensive

physical abuse and engaged in domestic violence against Petitioner Mother in the presence

of the children. Moreover, the record is replete with evidence suggesting Petitioner

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Father’s abusive conduct was pervasive that he continuously exposed the children to his

egregious behavior, perhaps including those children residing outside of the home. Finally,

as noted above, the record makes clear that throughout the proceedings Petitioner Father

failed to acknowledge any responsibility for this abusive behavior. In light of this record

there is scant merit to the argument that it was unnecessary to terminate his parental rights

in order to protect the children’s welfare.

In the same vein, Petitioner Father argues the circuit court erred in finding

that he failed to acknowledge his abusive conduct because pending criminal charges

“prevented [him] from testifying or acknowledging the alleged abuse.” As a preliminary

matter, Petitioner Father fails to cite to any authority supporting this proposition. No such

precedent exists; this Court’s precedents lead to the exact opposite conclusion. More

specifically, we have previously considered whether a circuit court may consider a parent’s

silence in an abuse and neglect proceeding when a parallel criminal proceeding is pending.

We explained that “[t]here is no basis in law for requiring that a court be disallowed from

considering a parent’s or guardian’s choice to remain silent as evidence of civil

culpability.” W. Va. Dept. of Health and Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W. Va.

489, 497, 475 S.E.2d 865, 873 (1996). Instead, we held that

[b]ecause the purpose of an abuse and neglect
proceeding is remedial, where the parent or guardian fails to
respond to probative evidence offered against him/her during
the course of an abuse and neglect proceeding, a lower court
may properly consider that individual’s silence as affirmative
evidence of that individual’s culpability.

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Id. at 492, 475 S.E.2d at 868, syl. pt. 2.

In reaching this conclusion, we explained that a parent or guardian’s rights

in the criminal proceedings are sufficiently protected such that they may still acknowledge

responsibility in the civil abuse and neglect proceeding. We stated:

Such a parent or guardian may be invoking his/her right to
remain silent pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because that
individual also may be facing criminal charges arising out of
the abuse and neglect of the child. The rights of the criminally
accused are sufficiently protected, however, by the following
statutory provisions: 1) West Virginia Code § [49-4-603(a)(5)
(2018)] which allows medical and mental examinations of the
child or other parties involved in an abuse and neglect
proceeding provides that “[n]o evidence acquired a result of
an[] [] examination of the parent or any other person having
custody of the child may be used against [the] person in any
subsequent criminal proceedings against [the] person”; 2) West
Virginia Code § [49-5-101(a) (2022)] . . . and 3) West Virginia
Code § 57-2-3 (1966) provides that “[i]n a criminal prosecution
other than for perjury or false swearing, evidence shall not be
given against the accused of any statement made by him as a
witness upon a legal examination.”

Id. at 497 n.22, 475 S.E.2d at 873 n.22. In short, the laws of this state already account for

the possibility that civil abuse and neglect proceedings may run parallel to criminal

proceedings, and afford protection to the criminally accused should that be the case. Thus,

in light of established law, there was nothing preventing Petitioner Father from

acknowledging his abusive conduct in the instant abuse and neglect proceedings.

Therefore, the circuit court was well within its authority to take his failure to do so into

account in determining whether to terminate his parental rights.

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For the reasons stated, we affirm the termination of the parents’ parental,

custodial, and guardianship rights to N.R., E.R., and S.V., the children who resided in the

home. We vacate in part the dispositional and adjudicatory orders of the circuit court as to

B.V., W.V.-1, L.V., and E.O.-R., the children in legal guardianships at the time the abuse

and neglect petition was filed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, the Circuit

Court of McDowell County’s February 14, 2022, dispositional order, and November 24,

2021, adjudicatory order. We remand this matter for further proceedings with regard to

the children placed in legal guardianships, consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed, in part, vacated, in part,
and remanded with instructions.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9384727. Public record. Not legal advice.
