# Doe v. Hennepin County > Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · October 6, 1988 · 858 F.2d 1325 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8963850 ## Case - **Full name:** Steven DOE and Margaret Doe, individually and as the natural guardians of Jane Doe and Jean Doe, minor children v. HENNEPIN COUNTY Hennepin County Community Services Department Social Services Division-Child Protection Hennepin County Community Services Department Social Services Division-Child Protection-Acute Unit Raymond Ahrens, Division Director, individually and in his official capacity Milton Henry, supervisor, individually and in his official capacity Gail Guthrie, Child Protection Worker, individually and in her official capacity Carolyn McHenry, Child Protection Worker, individually and in her official capacity Judith DuPre, Legal Section Worker, in her official capacity Mindy Mitnick, supervisor, individually and in her official capacity Richard Merwin, supervisor, individually and in his official capacity and James Christianson, supervisor, individually and in his official capacity - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - **Decided:** October 6, 1988 - **Citations:** 858 F.2d 1325; 1988 WL 102202 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Henley - **Judges:** Gibson, Henley, Lay - **Cited by:** 36 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8963850 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding no violation of due process where government officials asserted temporary custody of plaintiffs' children on the basis of alleged sexual abuse and holding that defendant government officials were entitled to qualified immunity even though the allegations later were pro… - holding no constitutional violation occurred where children removed from home after reports of sexual abuse, post-deprivation hearings were held the following day, and children were subsequently kept from home for 16 days and returned to home after reports of abuse proved unfo… ## Opinion text HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the result reached by the court, and in main I agree with the court’s reasoning, but write separately to express some misgiving about due process and shock at the manner in which these child abuse cases were handled by local officials. Cf. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1470 (8th Cir.) (F. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987). While it cannot be gainsaid that failure to follow Minnesota statutes and administrative rules does not amount to a denial of due process, what the district court may have overlooked is that, Myers notwithstanding, appellants may still have stated a § 1983 claim if the procedures actually followed did not comport with due process. The right of personal choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected to some extent by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-43 , 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2108-09 , 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977). Defining the particular dictates of due process requires the balancing of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The private interest here, preservation of the family from governmental intermed-dling, would, in my opinion, be of the highest order. As an offset, however, the government has a strong interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect. At the very least, the parents were entitled to demand that the State conduct a minimally adequate investigation before forcibly removing the children from the home. Here, the social workers’ lackadaisical attitude at the outset (i.e., failure to quickly investigate Yackley’s allegations) is totally at odds with their subsequent haste in petitioning for removal of the children. Weight is added to appellants’ due process claim by governmental reliance on what has been described charitably as “exaggerated” allegations and on “false inferences” by agency officials. In the totality of the circumstances, I have serious doubt that the procedures actually followed comport with due process. Even so, I cannot disagree with the court’s holding that appellees are protected by qualified immunity. The district court found no evidence of malice or improper motives. And this court, relying on Myers, supra, has chosen to affirm. While I think it is arguable that appellees did not act in an “objectively reasonable manner,” id. at 1455 , the result reached by the court is one with which I am not prepared to disagree. Thus, as indicated, I concur. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8963850. Public record. Not legal advice.