# Gavin v. Heckler

> Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · February 13, 1987 · 811 F.2d 1195

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8948549

## Case

- **Full name:** Lawrence Mark GAVIN v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- **Decided:** February 13, 1987
- **Citations:** 811 F.2d 1195; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 2156
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Fagg
- **Judges:** Fagg, Lay
- **Cited by:** 278 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8948549

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting once a decision on a disability claim becomes final, “if it is not appealed to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it may not be reviewed by the district court as part of its review of another, subsequent decision by the Secretary,” quoting, in turn, Wils…
- applying res judicata to prevent the Secretary from reaching an inconsistent result in a second proceeding based on evidence that has already been weighed in a claimant’s favor in an earlier proceeding
- holding that collateral estoppel precluded the ALJ’s reevaluation of the evidence presented at the earlier hearing
- holding, based on 42 U.S.C. § 405 (h), that agency findings made after a hearing are binding on the parties
- holding ALJ was collaterally estopped from reevaluating evidence pre-dating first hearing

## Opinion text

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I would not preclude the Secretary from attempting to show Gavin is capable of doing other work, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the court the record does not support the AU's finding that Gavin is able to return to his former work and is thus not disabled. Although Gavin is on the whole physically able to work and has expressed a desire to do so, it is clear he cannot return to work as a general factory laborer because of his reactions to stress in that type of working environment. I do not, however, agree with the court “that it [is] obvious that a remand would be a futile gesture.” Ante at 1202.
If Gavin is unable to return to his former work, our cases require the Secretary to assume the burden of proving that other jobs exist in the national economy for a claimant with Gavin's vocational characteristics. See Edwards v. Secretary, 809 F.2d 506, 507 (8th Cir.1987); Tucker v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 793, 795-96 (8th Cir.1985). Because the ALJ focused on Gavin’s ability to return to his former work, the Secretary was not put to the task of showing Gavin nevertheless could perform other work. Thus, the Secretary did not utilize vocational evidence to establish whether there are stress-free jobs available in the national economy and, if there are, whether Gavin can perform those jobs in light of his personality and behavioral disorders and his individualized reaction to job stress. See O’Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir.1983); Lancellotta v. Secretary, 806 F.2d 284, 285, 287 (1st Cir.1986).
Although Gavin cannot return to his former work, “it is better that the Secretary be allowed to explore other evidentiary means to establish what jobs exist that [Gavin] might still pursue.” Kirksey v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir.1987). I would remand this case to permit the Secretary this opportunity.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8948549. Public record. Not legal advice.