# United States v. City of Miami

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · December 3, 1981 · 664 F.2d 435

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8914276

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. The CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, CITY OF MIAMI LODGE NO. 20, Kenneth R. Harrison, President, and the Miami Police Benevolent Association
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 3, 1981
- **Citations:** 664 F.2d 435; 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 913; 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,328; 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15514
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Judges:** Ainsworth, Anderson, Brown, Clark, Ett, Fay, Garza, Gee, Godbold, Hatch, Hatchett, Henderson, Hill, Johnson, Kravitch, Politz, Randall, Reavley, Roney, Rubin, Tate, Tjoflat, Vance, Williams
- **Cited by:** 149 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8914276

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding only parties prejudiced by a consent decree can block its entry and finding prejudice exists where a party’s legal rights are affected by the decree or where the decree imposes a duty or obligation upon the party
- noting that only a party potentially prejudiced by a decree has a right to a judicial determination on the merits of its objections

## Opinion text

PER CURIAM:
The en banc court has been unable to arrive at a majority consensus as to reasoning and result in this case. Those concurring in the opinion prepared by Judge Gee would, for the reasons stated there, grant broader relief to the Appellant Fraternal Order of Police and a wider remand than would those concurring in the opinion prepared by Judge Rubin. Since all concurring in either opinion referred to agree, however, that at least the relief mandated by Judge Rubin’s opinion should be granted, and since no majority exists to grant broader relief, it is that mandate which becomes the order of the court by which the district court should be guided on the remand that we direct. Those concurring only in Judge Gee’s opinion dissent from the failure of the court’s mandate to reverse and remand more broadly. Separate opinions follow.
AFFIRMED IN PART and IN PART VACATED AND REMANDED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8914276. Public record. Not legal advice.